NORM-DRIVEN CHANGE: THE INTERNATIONAL NORMATIVE SYSTEM AND THE ORIGINS OF JAPANESE REVISIONISM (1860-1930)

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ABSTRACT

for

"Norm-Driven Change: The International Normative System and the Origins of Japanese Revisionism (1860-1930)"

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This dissertation deals with the source of political revisionism, a fundamental question in world politics and a crucial factor in achieving global peace. In explaining why some states, but not others, choose a revisionist path and challenge the international system, I emphasize the impact of normative power on potential revisionist states. In addressing the question of political revisionism, I construct an analytical model called "norm-driven change"—a mechanism whereby the international normative system interacts with the domestic normative system to shape domestic policy. The model argues that when the international normative system is heterogeneous and unstable, this creates uncertainty at the domestic level. The normative uncertainty heightens political debates and changes actors' worldview and national identity, which affects change in state behavior in critical ways.

The norm-driven change model is applied to the Japanese political development from the 1850s to the 1930s. The investigation emphasizes the historical shift of Japanese politics from a normative perspective, as it transformed from a *status quo* imperial power that valued cooperation with other Great Powers, to an aggressive, revisionist state in the 1930s. In analyzing the emergence of Japanese revisionism in the 1930s, a central focus

is placed on the impact of shifting international norms during the interwar period. The case study discusses how the decline of European imperialism and the rise of Wilsonian internationalism strengthened the position of the Japanese internationalists, which enabled them to push their agenda in the 1920s. The case study further examines how the fall of Wilsonian principles and the rise of other norms, such as economic protectionism, pan movement, and fascism, de-legitimized the internationalists' policy, and helped the military-nationalists to advance their agenda, resulting in Japan's aggressive continental policy in the 1930s.

Carefully scrutinizing the correlations between the international normative system and domestic politics, the study concludes that Japanese foreign policy was stable and congruent with the international normative system when the nature of the system was relatively stable (1850s~1910s). Critical shifts in Japanese foreign policy during the 1920s and 1930s occurred in conjunction with the increasing uncertainty of the normative environment.

Dissertation readers: Dr. Tobie Meyer-Fong (chair)
        Dr. Mark Blyth (advisor)
        Dr. Steven David (advisor)
        Dr. Erin Chung
        Dr. Mike Mochizuki

PREFACE

The theme of this dissertation first came into shape when I took a course called "Logics and Approaches in Political Science" in the Spring of 2001. Each student wrote a research proposal as a part of the course requirements. This is when the question of Japanese "revisionism" originally popped into my head. A number of scholars have investigated imperial Japan in the past. Despite a large body of existing work, however, most studies, especially in the political science field, focused on domestic causes, such as the decision-making structure, state-society relations, and domestic culture and ideology, in order to explain the development of Japanese empire. Facing this intellectual bias, I became more interested in studying the role of *international norms and culture* in Japanese foreign policy making. In addition, instead of simply focusing on the rise of Japanese revisionism in the 1930s, I tried rather to emphasize why Japan, which had been eager to follow prevailing international norms since the Meiji period, eventually shifted its course and decided to challenge to the international system. My intension was to shed new light on the development of the Japanese empire from an international-normative perspective.

After having spent some time to research this topic, I submitted a preliminary research proposal entitled "What Makes a Revisionist State Revisionist? Role of International Norms in State Identity Formation." Since then, the research project gradually grew into my dissertation. During the long journey of working on my dissertation, I received a great deal of support, help, and encouragement from a number of people. As my dissertation is finally completed, it is my great pleasure to acknowledge

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these people, without whom I certainly could not have completed this daunting task that took me many years.

Dr. Mark Blyth, one of my dissertation advisers, has provided me with extensive advice to guide me in the right direction ever since the beginning of this research project when I took the "Logic and Approaches" class with him. His continuous encouragement, detailed feedback on my earlier drafts, and prompt response to my many questions, were essential for keeping me moving forward. Dr. Steven David, my other dissertation adviser, has been a great supporter from the beginning to the end. His comments and critique from a realist perspective were extremely helpful in making my constructivist research more persuasive to non-constructivist scholars.

Dr. Thomas Berger, my first adviser at the graduate school before he moved to Boston University, also helped me in a various ways. He gave me detailed feedback when I did an independent study with him on this topic. With his expertise as a constructivist scholar and a Japan specialist, he provided me with solid insights to improve my theory chapter, as well as introducing me to many works highly relevant to my case study. After I moved to suburban Boston, he also introduced me to the Harvard Study Group on Japan to prevent me from being isolated from an intellectual community. I would also like to mention my gratitude to Dr. Mike Mochizuki for his constant encouragement and friendship. He has been my mentor since my tenure at the Brookings Institution, and he originally inspired me to enroll in a Ph.D. program. His comments on Japanese revisionism at the early stage of this research had a crucial impact on the later course of the dissertation research.

Dr. Erin Chung and Dr. Tobie Meyer-Fong, along with Dr. Blyth, Dr. David, and Dr. Mochizuki, served as readers for my dissertation committee. Not only did they agree to read the nearly 300-page manuscript in three weeks, but they also offered various insightful comments for the future improvement of the dissertation. I am also grateful to Dr. Adam Sheingate, Dr. Michael O'Hanlon, and Robert Dujjaric, who read an earlier draft of the dissertation and gave me helpful feedback. Dr. Yōko Nojima of Tokyo University supported my research in the summer of 2005. She helped me acquire permission to use the Tokyo University Libraries, which helped me to collect most of the primary and secondary source materials in Japanese that I used for my case study chapters. Dr. Shin Watanabe of Sophia University in Japan consistently encouraged me and raised my hopes, especially when I felt down.

Daniel Stout, Niclas Ericsson, Susan Wagner, and Amy Hemmert provided indispensable support by proofreading and editing the manuscript. Librarians, including Laura Wong of the Library of Congress, and Jeannette Pierce and Michael Handzo of the Johns Hopkins Library, extended their invaluable help to make the research process smooth. The department of political science at Johns Hopkins University generously made fellowships available to proceed with my graduate work. I would also like to extend my appreciation for our great departmental staff, Lisa Williams, Barbara Lazarek, and Mary Otterbein.

I had a wonderful experience as a graduate student at Johns Hopkins University. Towards the end of the writing stage, my colleagues who began the graduate study in the same year formed the "HD4 (Hopkins Dissertating 4) Group" to keep us motivated and provide mutual encouragement whenever needed. My "HD4 buddies"—Takakazu

Yamagishi, Erin Ackerman, and Michael Boda—have been a great source of support during the emotional rollercoaster that most graduate students experience during the dissertation writing. Another source of the mental support that I greatly needed at the final stage of my writing was the Harvard Study Group on Japan, led by Dr. Bill Grimes. The group has been a great intellectual stimulus and inspiration that helped me keep motivated during the lonely writing process.

Last, but not the least, I would like to show my deepest appreciation to my family members for always being there for me. Above all I am indebted to my husband, Robert Lindeman, for his love, support, and believing in my work. During his busy work schedule, he read many pages of the earlier draft to improve it, and more than anything else, he kept my life in order, happy, and fulfilling, even at the hardest time of being a graduate student. My daughters, Midori and Momoko, joined our family during my graduate work and have always supported their "student Mom" and brought lots of laughter and excitement into our lives. I also owe my wonderful parents-in-law, Robert and Nancy Lindeman, for their constant support and encouragement. This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, Toshiko and Mitsuaki Nakajima, who have always been the biggest supporters of my student career. They taught me a good work ethic when I was a child, supported my decision to come to the United States to attend a graduate school, and encouraged me throughout my Ph.D. work. I thank them for everything they have done for me in the past.

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Understanding "Challengers" in International Politics

In the early twentieth century, Japan went from a responsible member of the international state system to a revisionist and failed democracy in the span of twenty years, plunging eastern Asia into more than a decade of war and destruction. How can one explain this radical course of changes Japan experienced, and what kind of lessons does this historical example provide in understanding contemporary international politics?

After more than two centuries of isolation, Japan rejoined the world in 1854, yielding to pressures from Western powers and opening itself to trade with others. In the next fifty years, Japan made significant progress, both in terms of internal political development and foreign relations. The Meiji restoration of 1868 put an end of the *Tokugawa shōgunate*, a feudal military dictatorship which had ruled Japan since 1603. The new Meiji government introduced a new constitution in 1889, which established a two-house parliamentary system. Universal male suffrage was granted in 1925, and the two-party political system that had been developing since the turn of the century finally came of age after World War I, marking the period of party-dominant politics often called *"Taishō Democracy."*

Political modernization and industrialization went hand in hand to improve Japanese international status among other states from a second-class nation to one of the world powers. As Japan transformed into a "modern state" politically as well as economically, the Meiji government's efforts to revise the unequal treaties with the Great

Powers gradually bore fruit. Extraterritoriality was abolished in 1899, and Japan fully achieved control over its own tariffs by 1911. Military victories against China and Russia helped Japan to be recognized as a military power, and after fighting on the victorious allied side, Japan emerged as one of the five great powers at the Paris Peace Conference at the end of World War I. As its permanent membership at the League of Nations indicates, Japan appeared as a major player in constructing postwar international settlements. Japanese foreign policy was based on multilateral principles, putting an emphasis on cooperation among major powers.

These double accomplishments, the development of a party democracy domestically and becoming a full-fledged power in the international arena, did not last long, however. In the realm of domestic politics, increasing influence of military-nationalists gradually undermined the role of political parties, changing Japan to a military-dictatorship. Japanese external relations with other powers underwent a radical change as well. The policy of international cooperation was abandoned as the political power of military-nationalists grew, and Japanese assertive policy in its neighborhoods alienated other powers, pushing Japan towards a revisionist path. Confronting others over its policy in Manchuria, Japan resigned from the League of Nations in 1934, and Japan's continuous expansion into East Asia accelerated its political isolation. In 1940, Japan formed the Axis with Nazi Germany and fascist Italy and fought a war against the rest of the world until its surrender in 1945.

Revisionism in international politics is by no means a rare phenomenon.[1] In fact, the post-Cold War period can be characterized as a repeated attempt of revisionist states

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[1] Despite its common usage, the term "revisionist state" is not always well defined. Within the international relations literature, a state is typically considered revisionist when it is unsatisfied with the existing

to upset international stability. A number of events, such as the military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, or the nuclear brinkmanship of North Korea and Iran, underscore that militant, non-democratic rogue states have increasingly posed a serious challenge to international peace and stability.[2] Reminiscent of the pre-World War II period, when a few revisionist states confronted others, the recent security environment indicates that the contemporary world is dichotomized between two groups of states. While there has been a stable peace among states with various forms of democracies on the one hand, there are several revisionist (or rogue) states, on the other hand, which are often non-democratic and likely to upset international peace and stability.

All of which leads us to one of the oldest and most complex puzzles in international relations. Why do some states happen to challenge the international order, while the majority of others live peacefully, preserving the status-quo? Can one find a "common" cause to account for the difference between these two types of state behavior? Is becoming a revisionist state due to some structural reasons, immune from unique attributes of each state, or is it a reflection of a particular state identity, which is more prone to this kind of behavior?[3]

In accounting for Japanese revisionism, one of the common interpretations is that it was a reaction to the material structure, such as the relative power of states or Japanese timing of industrialization *vis-à-vis* other states. Structural realists, like John Mearsheimer, argue that Japanese expansion was due to a power vacuum in these regions

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arrangement and aims to overturn the status quo. See Schweller (1998:24). Here, I define revisionism broadly as an attempt to challenge established international principles and orders.

[2] Rogue states, a more contemporary term, is similar to revisionist states. Examples of rogue states are Hussein's Iraq, North Korea, and Iran, whose acts appear in active violation of international regimes, such as the Non Proliferation Treaty.

[3] The concept of "state identity" implies certain preferences and consequent actions. A particular identity of a state, such as a status quo or a revisionist state, is linked to certain sets of preferences and foreign policies. See Hopf (1998:175).

that prevented others from balancing against it. Based on his assumption that any state would seek universal domination to maximize its security, the Japanese expansionist policy was a natural result under the particular structural setting.[4] Others highlight the international economic structure, particularly the relative timing of industrialization, in determining state-society relations and the type of subsequent policy the state pursues. In the case of Japan, they argue that the relative lateness of industrialization required Japan to have a strong central state which played a pivotal role in an effort towards industrialization. The strong state leadership in Japan later attributed to the policy of "overexpansion," because strong states tend to be more susceptible to an extreme, irrational policy compared to states where society has more control over the state.[5] Another common approach to explain Japanese revisionism is to look inside the state. According to this school of thoughts, domestic factors, such as the historical development of Japanese political institutions, the nature of the decision-making process, and domestic culture and ideology in the prewar period, contributed to Japanese revisionism and the policy of aggressive expansion.[6]

These traditional approaches, however, fall short of explaining "the double shift" witnessed in prewar Japan—the rise of a democratic institution pursuing international cooperation, followed by the emergence of a military-dictatorship with an expansionist revisionist policy. Generally speaking, conventional accounts focus too much on the Japanese turn towards revisionism, and do not pay enough attention to the period of multilateralism. Rather than explaining it, they often minimize this important political

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[4] Mearsheimer (2001).
[5] Scalapino (1953); Snyder (1991). The original version of the "timing of industrialization thesis" was developed in Gerschenkron (1962).
[6] Snyder (1991); Hosoya (1971); Shillony (1981); Smethurst (1974); Gluck (1985); Maruyama (1963).

development by treating it merely as a pre-stage of military-ruled revisionism. By positing one independent variable as causing the rise of revisionist policy (the timing of industrialization, domestic culture, *etc.*), these theories tend to take a deterministic view towards Japanese revisionist policy and neglect the factors contributing to the cooperative diplomacy. In addition, these conventional accounts are often too static to comprehend very dynamic movements which occurred in prewar Japan. Avoiding this kind of determinism, this dissertation makes a parallel comparison of the two opposite policy developments, one on international cooperation and the other on revisionism. By focusing on the sequence which resulted in specific policy outcomes, rather than the outcomes themselves, the study attempts to demonstrate a *common* pattern to explain both sets of political transformations.

1.2. Argument

This dissertation is an attempt to demonstrate an unconventional cause of revisionist foreign policy, "norm-driven change"—a domestic policy shift generated by the dynamics of the international normative environment. In accounting for Japanese foreign policy in the early twentieth century, this study highlights the causal role of international norms in affecting the domestic policy-making process. Unlike the mainstream political theories, which look into either the international material structure or domestic factors, this "norm-driven change" model connects the international and domestic levels by examining the interaction between international norms and domestic foreign policy-making. This two-level approach enables one to attain a more-

comprehensive account of the foreign policy-making process, which is typically based on both domestic and international concerns.[7]

This leads to the central claim of this model: it is a *transformation* in international norms, and the *uncertainty* resulting from it, that triggers a policy shift at the domestic level. Highlighting the causal role of international norms, it is claimed that what determines state reactions is not a structural change *per se*, but the uncertainty resulting from the change, and how a state selectively learns lessons during the norm transformation. A key concept here is that different states recognize different lessons in uncertain environments. This is why they react *differently* to the *same* structural change, something the structural models fail to explain.

In demonstrating the causality between international norms and foreign policy, I develop a theory of "norm-driven change" to explain how a shift in governing norms at the international level can induce domestic policy transformations. This theoretical model is employed to analyze the case of pre-World War II Japan. Applying the "norm-driven change" model, the exact course of Japanese development is carefully examined, first establishing an infant democracy with a policy of international cooperation, then moving towards a military-dictatorship with a policy of aggressive expansionism.

When Japan reopened itself to the outside world in the late nineteenth century, the dominant norm in the international system was that of European power politics and imperial expansion. Immersed in this normative environment, and quickly learning "the rules of the game," Japan set its policy course to become a full-fledged member of the European-dominated system through modernization and westernization. As its economic

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[7] The "two-level" approach, an attempt to emphasize the interaction of domestic and international factors in accounting for state behavior, has been elaborated among some scholars. See Putnam (1998). For a summary of this approach, see Jacobsen (1996).

and military power grew, Japan followed the path of European predecessors pursuing a policy of imperial expansion in Asia.

In the early twentieth century, newly emerging norms, such as internationalism and anti-colonialism, began eroding the dominance of the traditional norm of imperialism. When the international normative system underwent a transformation, the Japanese domestic consensus over the policy of imperial expansion began eroding as well. Recognizing the change in the international normative environment, and a growing disjuncture between its foreign policy and international trends, a number of discussions took place in Japan, analyzing which direction the governing international principle was heading and how it affected the Japanese position in the world. Japanese interpretations of the international normative environment were gradually consolidated into two positions: the "internationalists," who adhered to the principles of multilateralism and international cooperation, and the "nationalists," who were skeptical of the Western powers' treatment of non-Western states and maintained the conviction of an insurmountable cleavage between the West and the East.

The subsequent shifts in Japanese foreign policy, first the pursuit of multilateralism, then its replacement by the policy of assertive revisionism, resulted from turbulence in the international normative environment during the interwar period. The uncertain normative environment provided a room for both the internationalists and the nationalists to push their own policy agenda whenever they saw any chance to strengthen their political position. The favorable global trend for the internationalists in the 1920s, such as the spread of Wilsonian principles, as well as growing cultural and economic internationalism in Europe, helped the internationalists win a wide support among policy-

makers and the public, which resulted in the practice of the multilateral policy based on international cooperation.

Turbulence in the international normative environment, the same force which enabled the internationalists to realize their policy, made the political consolidation of the Japanese internationalists problematic, and eventually led to their political loss vis-à-vis their nationalist counterparts. Entering the 1930s, internationalism and multilateralism as governing principles were severely undermined by the Great Depression which turned many states away from liberal economic policy and shifted towards protectionism. In addition, the political legitimacy of Japanese internationalists was further weakened facing growing racism against the Japanese people in the West. The global trend of racism increased a political momentum of the nationalist who insisted on an inevitable clash between Japan and the Western powers. While damaging the political base of the internationalists, the international climate during the 1930s helped the nationalists widen their popular base. Japanese foreign policy in the 1930s reflected this change in domestic politics. As the political power of the military-nationalists increased, Japan abandoned the policy of multilateralism, and moved towards an assertive, over-expansionist policy which resulted in the international encirclement of Japan and made its collision against Western powers inevitable.

It is important to emphasize here that the lack of a dominant governing principle at the international level paralleled the fluidity of the course of Japanese foreign policy. The disappearance of a dominant norm at the international level first led to an erosion of a strong consensus seen in domestic policy debates. Both the internationalists and the nationalists took advantage of this uncertain normative environment for their own favor.

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Each of them succeeded in realizing its policy agenda by seizing an opportunity available during the normative transformation. The prewar Japanese case illuminates the critical role of international norms. Following from these insights, the theoretical goal of this investigation is to demonstrate the political process of how a shift in the international normative environment affects domestic politics and policy development.

1.3. Why International Norms Matter

Martha Finnemore claims that "state interests are defined in the context of internationally held norms and understandings about what is good and appropriate."[8] The normative approach employed in this inquiry is built upon constructivist literature which highlights the causal importance of international norms in determining state behavior. Constructivist scholars define international norms as collective understandings or expectations about the proper behavior of states, and they argue that international norms play a critical role in constructing national interests, through which the course of state policy is determined.[9] One of the major contributions of constructivist research is to problematize the question of state identity and national interests. Rather than treating state identity and interests as a fixed variable, constructivists claim that they in fact vary depending on a historical, cultural, political, and social context. By unpacking state identity and interests, constructivist theories provide a powerful explanation of why different states behave differently under the same structural constraint, and why states sometimes do not appear to be acting based on egotistic national interests.[10]

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[8] Finnemore (1996i:2).

[9] As for a definition of international norms, see Legro (1997:33).

[10] There is a tendency for many constructivist works to focus on how a particular international norm encourages states to act cooperatively, offering an antithesis to mainstream realist explanations which claim

Why do states want what they want? Among many factors which determine national interests, what kind of world they think they live in (environment) and who they think they are and where they fit within the system (identity) are two important variables that states rely on to define their national interests. First, international norms are principal indicators for states to learn "what kind of world they live in."[11] Living in the world of imperialism in the nineteenth century versus living in the post-colonial period makes a difference for states in choosing their policy options. In the contemporary world, where the norm of colonialism is completely out of fashion, waging a war of colonial expansion is almost unimaginable.

Second, international norms play a vital role in defining state identity and what kind of position they are in among others. In a world where colonialism is a dominant norm, for instance, states are mainly categorized either as a colonizer or as colonized. In contrast, the identity of a national sovereign state has become predominant in the post colonial world. Identities typically provide a measure of inclusion and exclusion by defining a social "we" which delineate the boundaries against the "others." Having a particular identity, therefore, shapes what kind of policy a state should pursue towards "us" and "others."[12] The "norm-driven change" model is built on the conviction of the causal relationship between international norms, identity formation, national interest construction, and foreign policy outcomes. The model, whose causal mechanism is

that states are concerned with their own security and naturally suspicious of others. Despite this tendency, however, international norms do not necessarily lead to cooperative acts, but can have negative consequences as well. In fact, identities constructed from international norms may be oriented either towards cooperation or conflict. The bottom line is that the effect of international norms should be treated as historical variables. See Wendt (1992:399).

[11] For example, the world of dynastic monarchical sovereignty and popular national sovereignty are two different types of world, each of which was led by a distinctive international norm. For a detailed analysis of how states behave differently under these two environments, see Bukovansky (2002); Hall (1999).

[12] Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink (1999:9).

detailed in the next section, illustrates how the international normative environment affects the formation of a state's national interests and foreign policy decision-making process.

Although the model presented here is based on the previous constructivist scholarship, there is one important difference between this work and past constructivist approaches. Most of the existing international normative literature has drawn attention to an issue-specific international norm, such as one on human rights and nuclear taboos, and studies how it affects state behavior in a critical way.[13] By focusing on the impact of a specific norm, these studies imply that the international normative order is relatively isomorphic in affecting state behavior. In reality, however, there is no single, monolithic international normative order influencing domestic political order at a given time, but rather, there are *multiple* international normative orders influencing states simultaneously, over which domestic actors compete.[14] Highlighting this important but overlooked aspect of multiplicity in international normative orders, this endeavor emphasizes the dimension of "norm selection process," *i.e.*, how multiple governing norms are filtered through a domestic lens, and *selectively* translated into foreign policy.

1.4. How International Norms Matter

The "norm-driven change" model articulates the causal mechanism of how the international normative environment influences domestic politics and foreign policy decision-making. Given an understanding of how international norms help states build an

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[13] Finnemore (1996i); Tannenwald (1999).
[14] The notion of "multiple orders" has been developed in the domestic context by scholars in the field of American Political Development especially in their investigation of the endogenous sources of institutional change. See Orren and Skowronek (1994); Sewell (1992); Smith (1993).

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image about the world and construct their identity, the model further suggests that the resulting world image, as well as state identity, become unstable when the international normative environment undergoes a transformation.

An uncertain normative environment is defined as a situation where there is a lack of a predominant governing principle, or the previously dominant principle starts facing challenges from other principles and begins eroding *vis-à-vis* others. For instance, when policy-makers observe other states conducting policies based on various governing principles, rather than one, or when they recognize a disjuncture between its course and others, these conditions are perceived as an uncertain normative environment by policy-makers.

There are several important political consequences caused by an uncertain normative environment. First, states are likely to engage in reevaluating the environment as well as their identity in the changing world. An increasing number of domestic discussions regarding where the world is heading, *i.e.,* new global developments, and the state's position in the emerging normative system, tend to take place. I call this reevaluation process the *"norm selection process,"* through which states construct their own version of identity as well as the environment. As a result of this process, a new set of national interests and a new foreign policy course is set.

Second, the absence of a predominant norm at the international level makes it difficult to form a single consensus at the domestic level. Under uncertainty, domestic interpretation of the changing normative environment tends to consolidate into multiple versions. More than one set of images and state identity typically emerge, and particular visions can be forged into distinct political/social coalitions. These political coalitions,

each of which adhering to a certain image and advocating particular national interests, engage in political contestation in an attempting to better their respective positions. The result of the contestation determines the next course of foreign policy. I call this stage *"norm contestation process."*

Third, international norms not only trigger a cycle of "norm-driven change," but also have an impact on domestic politics during the norm contestation process. Relatively dominant international norms can empower one domestic group at the expense of others by providing legitimacy and political resources to the group adhering to the norm. Interests of the group favored by an emerging governing principle can be rejuvenated as a result of a norm transition, thereby increasing its ability to advance its agenda. When domestic political coalitions compete over various foreign policy agendas, international norms serve as one of the factors that strengthen or weaken the position of domestic groups. I call this phenomenon *"norm instantiation process."* This is another reason why shifts in relative strengths of international norms are critical in determining policy outcome.

This sequence, consisting of norm selection, norm contestation, and norm instantiation, is a main feature of the "Norm-driven change" model. Multiplicity in the international normative environment with the inherent possibility of friction drives and shapes political change, especially in the period of uncertainty.[15] Under uncertainty, where the preexisting identity and interests undergo political scrutiny, international norms play a critical role in determining the next course of policy outcome. They help

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[15] Some scholars studying institutional change at the domestic level rely on the notion of multiplicity in generating institutional change. Orren and Skowronek (1994), for instance, argue that an institution contains multiple ordering principles, and that these multiple "layers" inherent in the institution become an endogenous source of institutional change.

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states reduce uncertainty by providing possible interpretations of the changing environment, and hence narrowing the possible courses of action states can take.[16] After national interests are reconstructed, international norms continue influencing the policy-making process while different groups compete over various policy options. A particular governing principle can reconfigure the dynamics of domestic politics by favoring a domestic group and providing it the legitimacy to strengthen its position *vis-à-vis* the other groups.

The mechanism of norm-driven change and domestic norm selection is a continuous process and is dynamic in nature. Social practices of states and interactions among states continuously reproduce the intersubjective meanings and actors' identity.[17] As David Campbell asserts, states are always in a process of becoming, because states, more precisely the people within them, are continuously learning about governing norms through direct contacts with other states, as well as through observations of other states interacting.[18] Studying the nature of this recurrent political sequence by scrutinizing a relatively long period of Japanese history enables the establishment of a causal linkage between international norms and foreign policy outcomes.

1.5. Case Selection

This dissertation consists of a single case study. In the field of political science, there has been general skepticism about the credibility of causal inference derived from a

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[16] For a similar account of ideas generating political change, see Blyth (2002: 35-37).

[17] Hopf (1998:178).

[18] Campbell (1992:12). For other constructivists' accounts on the dynamic nature of state identity construction, see Adler (1997:326); Barnett (1996: 411).

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single observation.[19] Although this inquiry deals with the single case of prewar Japan, the scope of this case study, in fact, entails a comparative perspective over time, and therefore multiple observations. It is important to note that the historical period under investigation involves changes in variables. Among them are the course of political struggles between the internationalist and nationalist groups in Japan, which first resulted in a temporary victory for the former, then was supplanted by the latter. Increasing the number of observations by carefully examining a relatively long span of Japanese history makes it possible to observe variations across time and test the proposed analytical model more than once.[20] This study intends to solve the methodological limitation inherent in the "small-*N*" study by carefully selecting a case which contains multiple measures in order to test the hypothesis.[21] By having variations across time, this research endeavor is formulated in such a way that the causal relations between the international normative structure and domestic foreign policy outcomes is tested multiple times to prove its validity.

1.6. The Plan of The Thesis

Following this general statement regarding the puzzle, analytical framework, and the case selection logic, this dissertation shall proceed in a following manner. The main objective of Chapter Two is to detail the analytical framework used in this study. In elaborating the theoretical model of "norm-driven change," I first compare it to other

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[19] Eckstein (1975); King, Keohane, and Verba (1994:ch.6).
[20] Examination of more than one period of time can make a research not only *comparative*, but also *dynamic*, which potentially increases the explanatory power of a theory. See Dessler (1989:447).
[21] A more-detail account on the strategy of making many observations from few cases is found in King, Keohane, and Verba (1994:217-228). The importance of including variations in studies is also stressed in Kowert and Legro (1996:485).

major approaches, particularly structural ones, to highlight key differences between them. Theories focusing on international power structure or international economic structure are put under detailed scrutiny, through which it is revealed why these accounts fall short of capturing the critical dynamics of domestic political transformations. In comparing this to the shortcomings of these structural models, it is argued how international normative theory can overcome these limitations and offer a better explanation for political change. By acknowledging the possibility of change in national interests as well as state identity, normative theory provides a better, more-dynamic conceptual tool kit. At the same time, however, there is a weakness inherent in past normative approaches. It is argued that the past accounts are one dimensional in revealing the causal impact of international norms on state behavior. I discuss how the "norm-driven change" model, borrowing insights from domestic institutional theory, departs from previous approaches to overcome the limitations. The chapter concludes with a detailed account of the "norm-driven change" model, articulating the mechanism in which the international normative environment and its transition induce a shift in state identity and national interests.

Following the theoretical discussion, the subsequent chapters discuss the empirical application of the analytical framework. The case study chapters are divided based on the critical junctures in Japanese political and policy development. Chapter Three covers most of Meiji Japan until the Sino-Japanese war of 1894, in which Japan entered into a world defined by Western Imperial powers, mostly European states. This phase is characterized as a "period of stability," both in terms of the international normative structure and Japanese policy objectives. The normative system was dominated by European imperialism and balance-of-power politics, and there was a high

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congruence between Japanese foreign policy and the international rules of the game. The chapter deals with the part of Japanese history when Japan set its course based on the dominant governing principle, European imperialism, and strove to increase its position within the system.

Chapter Four covers the period from the Sino-Japanese war until the outbreak of World War I. Within this period, Japan fought two wars, one against China and the other against Russia, and, with its victories in both, emerged as a new imperial power in Asia. The international normative system was becoming more heterogeneous than before, with the emergence of new principles, but the dominance of imperialist norms remained intact. The military victories not only provided Japan with continental footholds, but also contributed to an increase in Japan's political status in the international system. There was a strong national sense that Japan had joined the other leading nations, and with this new national identity, people at all levels of society supported the policy of overseas expansion. The national consensus around Japan's new identity as a leading imperial power overshadowed other ideas. Towards the end of this period, Japanese decision-makers recognized that new international norms were emerging, but failed to construct a new vision of the emerging world. Instead, Japanese domestic ideas and foreign policy to a large extent reflected the old international normative environment. Japan's continental expansion was in accordance with the policy of other imperial powers, with the possible exception of the United States. European great powers generally supported Japan's position.[22] In facing Chinese nationalism and anti-Western sentiments, Japan and other

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[22] This was also the case when four states, Britain, Russia, Japan, and France, stood together to block the American attempt to challenge Japan's and Russia's special interests in Manchuria.

imperial powers reacted similarly, which indicate that Japan's new identity and its imperial policy were accepted in the existing international system.

Chapter Five covers a "period of uncertainty," portraying the increasing ambiguity with regard to the dominant international normative discourse in the early twentieth century. During this period, previously predominant European norms increasingly faced challenges and the international normative system went into flux. New norms emerged, such as Wilsonian idealism, communism, and anti-imperial nationalism, which eroded the dominance of European imperialism. Turbulence in the international normative structure caused confusion and increased uncertainty in Japan. This resulted in serious political contestation within the government, notably between 'internationalists' and 'nationalists,' over what appropriate foreign policy Japan should adopt in a changing world.

The chapter proceeds by examining the course of political and policy transformations Japan experienced. The debate between internationalists and nationalists was first settled in a triumph of the former group, which directed Japan towards a multilateral, cooperative course in its relations with other states. In analyzing the rise of Japanese internationalism, commonly called *Shidehara Diplomacy*, the kinds of factors influencing the foreign policy decision-making process, which led to cooperative foreign policy, are carefully examined. Of particular emphasis will be how the spread of Wilsonian internationalism, as well as international economic order based on classical liberalism, fueled the political debate in favor of the internationalists.

This is followed by an analysis of another critical turning point in Japanese history, the development of the military regime pursuing the expansionist revisionist

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policy of the 1930s. In this chapter, factors that caused the gradual shift in the course of Japanese foreign policy are carefully examined. It is argued that the collapse of the norm of Wilsonian internationalism, the rise of fascism and communism in Europe, as well as American racism, played contributory roles in weakening the internationalist position *vis-à-vis* the military-nationalists. Japanese aggressive, over-expansionist policy eventually led Japan to form an Axis with other fascist states, and engage in military confrontations against the United States and others.

Chapter Six, the concluding chapter, draws the theory and the empirical case altogether. The chapter summarizes the key findings of the case study, which are reviewed according to the norm-driven change model. The chapter also revisits the analytical strengths of the norm-driven change model in comparison with more conventional frameworks. Finally, the chapter analyzes two other comparative cases, one historical and the other contemporary, to assess the applicability of the norm-driven change model. Through comparative study, I address questions such as how the international normative system affects different countries across both time and space, and whether there are any commonalities across cases.

2. THEORY

2.1. Introduction: Towards a Model of Norm-Driven Change

The dynamic political development of Japan prior to the Pacific War has garnered the attention of scholars across a variety of disciplines. Japanese history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was distinguished by a zigzag path, a series of political and diplomatic achievements, followed by the complete devastation of the country. Facing external pressures, militarily defenseless and politically fragmented Japan quickly launched a modernization project, forging a unified state. Japan gradually emerged as a preeminent regional power, and by the end of World War I, it was recognized as one of the greatest powers in the international community. The subsequent path of Japan, however, does not resemble its preceding period at all, and this poses a puzzle. During the interwar period, Japan's continuous expansion into Asia gradually fostered its diplomatic isolation in the world community. Its aggressive regional policy led to self-encirclement, and Japan eventually found itself fighting a war against a much stronger coalition of powers, resulting in the total destruction of its empire.

Why did the Japanese empire, immediately after the period of its highest achievement, reverse course and follow a path of self-destruction? A number of scholars, both historians and political scientists, have examined this puzzle and have proffered various explanations. Some scholars stress systemic causes, *i.e.* how the international structure at that time influenced Japanese behavior; while others emphasize internal factors as a root cause of fallen empire. Despite a good deal of scholarship on this subject, however, the research agenda tends to be narrow. As a result, conventional studies shed

light on a particular aspect of prewar Japanese politics, overlooking a much larger picture associated with Japanese political development.[23] This narrow focus can be found in both independent and dependent variables. In terms of independent variables, scholars often look into either systemic reasoning or internal causes in explaining Japanese behavior.[24] Turing to dependent variables, most research on prewar Japan focus on the last stage of its empire, notably the 1930s and afterwards. Common topics covered in these studies are the failure of party-oriented democracy, the rise of Japanese fascism led by the military, Japan's revisionist policy, and the origin of the Pacific War.[25] Because they pay attention to a single aspect of prewar history, these investigations fail to unpack the complex nature of Japanese political development. What kind of political forces existed, both externally and internally, which enabled the rise of party democracy and cooperative foreign policy pursued by Japan during the 1920s? Why did this infant democracy, as well as the policy of international cooperation, become unsustainable only a decade later when the military-nationalists took power?

What is needed is a more comprehensive approach in accounting for prewar Japanese politics. To overcome the aforementioned limitations of conventional analyses, it is necessary to construct a dynamic theory that can bear the weight of such historical changes. Such a dynamic theory sheds new light on why several critical shifts, both in terms of domestic politics and policy formation, took place in Japan. Applying this kind of dynamic model, Japan's pursuit of international cooperation in the 1920s and its alienation from the international community in the 1930s can be investigated together,

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[23] This tendency is particularly strong among works by political scientists.
[24] Examples of the systemic accounts include Schweller (1998), and the domestic explanations include Snyder (1991); Hosoya (1971); and Shillony (1981).
[25] Hosoya (1971); Silberman and Harootunian (1974); Maruyama (1963); Smethurst (1974).

rather than independently. This method allows searching for a common pattern found in these political shifts despite their apparent divergence. On the side of the independent variables, a new theory needs to put equal weight on both systemic and domestic causes in producing political outcomes. The period under investigation, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, is a period of transformation both internationally and domestically. At the international level, the traditional European colonial powers slowly diminished in power and influence. The emergence of new powers, such as the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan, altered the nature of the normative system in many different ways. Events such as World War I and the Great Depression also had a large impact on the international structure. The large-scale transformation at the systemic level corresponded with dynamic changes in Japanese politics. It is inevitable, therefore, to take both levels, international and domestic, into account, and examine how an event happening at one level influences the other.

The norm-driven change model, a mechanism which will be described in the later sections, attempts to accomplish these theoretical goals. The central focus of the model is to unpack the process of political change. The theory clarifies the sequence of political change, as well as the determinants of the direction of change, by examining factors that trigger domestic change and determine an outcome. The exact mechanism of norm-driven change involves a complex interaction between domestic and international factors with a particular emphasis on the impact of uncertainty in the international normative environment on domestic politics.

The sequence of the norm-driven change model can be divided into two parts. The first part of the sequence takes place at the international level. The model focuses on the

nature of the normative system, and the degree of uncertainty. The level of uncertainty has to do with the heterogeneity as well as the stability of the normative system.[26] In general, the higher the level of uncertainty, the more likely it is that a domestic change occurs. The second part of the sequence examines the interaction between the international normative system and domestic politics, and how it produces political change. Particular emphasis is placed on how uncertainty in the normative system initiates domestic political debate and creates new thinking, as well as the ways this normative uncertainty dictates domestic power struggles. Under conditions of uncertainty, ideas play a critical role in determining the outcome of domestic power struggles. To what extent the normative system affects domestic politics depends on the condition of each state. Therefore, relevant domestic factors, such as the degree of domestic support for the existing policy, the political skills of domestic actors in taking advantage of the normative environment, and to what extent a state is integrated into the international community, become relevant.

This norm-driven change model not only complements conventional analyses, but also offers a new account for prewar Japanese political development by integrating various causal variables and highlighting the process of political change. Applying this model to the Japanese case, one can analyze how the normative system interacted with Japanese domestic political structures in fostering domestic debate, influencing power struggles, and in the end producing specific political outcomes. The model suggests that the rise of the "internationalist" group, which designed the cooperative policy of the 1920s, and its replacement by the "military-nationalists" in the 1930s can both be

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[26] A heterogeneous normative system means that there are many governing principles existing at a given time. An unstable normative system is a system in transition. A more thorough analysis of the normative system will be provided in a later section.

understood as a reaction to the same uncertain normative environment. In both cases, uncertainty at the international level initiated a sequence of domestic change by prompting heated debates over ideal policy options. The case study chapters will discuss in detail the disparity of the external normative environment between the two periods, and how it influenced the rise and fall of various domestic groups.

The rest of this chapter is divided into two parts. The first is a critical overview of past analyses on prewar Japanese politics. It focuses particularly on the different independent variables employed in conventional studies, and their analytical implications. The purpose of this literature review is twofold, to categorize existing approaches into several groups based on common features, and to discuss the strengths and weaknesses found in each method. These findings serve as a base for the theoretical goals of the norm-driven change model; the detailed mechanism and exact sequence discussed in the second part of this chapter.

2.2. Competing Explanations

To international relations scholars, the Japanese road to the Pacific War contains many puzzles. Not only did Japan play a major role in the origin of large-scale warfare in the Pacific basin, but its behavior also deviated from what most international relations theorists would predict. This section reviews existing explanations on prewar Japan to see how scholars have approached this historical case. Conventional explanations are divided into several groups based on two criteria. The first measure is "level of analysis"—whether a theory focuses on the international structure (systemic level) or internal factors (domestic level) as a primary cause of Japanese behavior. The second criterion is whether

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a theory puts more emphasis on tangible material elements or cultural/normative elements in understanding Japanese politics. Introducing this kind of categorization will help uncover a common pattern across theories as well as the shortcomings in conventional analyses.

2.2.1. <u>Structural Realism and Its Limitations</u>

Most international relations theorists, particularly those in the realist tradition, argue that the primary goal of any state is to ensure security and survival in the anarchic international environment.[27] They further suggest that states act rationally in order to achieve these goals. For structural realists, often called "neo-realists," the single most important determinant of international politics is the anarchic international structure, which creates incentives for states to act in specific ways. State behavior is therefore determined by the relative material power available to actors. Consequently, increasing its relative power vis-à-vis others becomes a vital task for states. Applying this logic, Japanese prewar policy can be understood as a reflection of international pressures and Japan's vulnerable position in the international system. Japanese foreign policy was most benign during the Taishō period and through the 1920s, when the international environment was relatively favorable to Japan. But as soon as international competition in the economic and security spheres intensified in the 1930s, Japan reacted to these new and unfavorable structural conditions by pursuing an aggressive, over-expansionist

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[27] Specific policies designed to achieve this goal can be varied. Kenneth Waltz (1979:118), for instance, claims that states "at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination."

policy.[28] The neorealists' argument, the idea that system-level factors are paramount in shaping state's foreign policy, is summarized in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Neorealist Argument

On closer examination, however, the neorealist emphasis on the structural determinants of behavior appears problematic. For example, it is empirically questionable whether Japanese expansion in the 1930s was necessary to improve its international position. Even after the Great Depression, Keynesian stimulus and export recovery helped Japan adjust to the depression, and the pursuit of military aggression in China in fact became not a solution but a source of economic difficulties.[29] At the more fundamental level, the Japanese case poses a challenge to the neorealist assumption that the state is a rational, security-maximizer. As opposed to the neorealist prediction, Japanese foreign policy from the 1930s onward turned out to be largely disastrous, continuously worsening nation's national security position. Its policy of aggressive expansion into Asia, its attempt to destroy the Nationalist government of China, and its decision to launch a war against a much stronger country, the Untied States, were disastrous for Japan. For neorealists, the Japanese case appears as an unsuccessful

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[28] For a summary of structural causes of Japanese imperialism, see Snyder (1991: 116-120). Zakaria (1992) and Kapstein (1995) also stress the importance of relative power in analyzing the prewar Japanese case.
[29] Snyder (1991:113, 117-120, 151). Kahler (1988) also discusses the success of Japanese economic recovery after the Great Depression.

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attempt to ensure its security. Neorealism, as such, is not a theory of foreign policy as its structural theory offers no explanation for the failure of Japanese imperialism.[30]

2.2.2. Beyond Structure: Bringing Domestic Factors Back In

For neorealist scholars whose core assumption lies in states' quest for security and survival, the Japanese case, in which a state pursued a course that eroded its security and eventually jeopardized its survival, is a puzzle. In order to explain the anomaly in this empirical case, many realist scholars shift their focus from the structure and instead look "inside the state." For these scholars, the root of Japanese unique behavior is attributed to the distinctive characteristics existing in the country. These include a certain set of domestic preferences, the unique process of the Japanese decision-making structure, and indigenous culture and ideology.[31]

2.2.2.1. State Preference

In his work on the security policy of Japan and other great powers during the interwar period, Randall Schweller highlights the crucial role of state preferences in determining state policy. According to Schweller, states pursue *different* strategies even under the *same* structural circumstance because of a variation in state preferences. For example, some states are more interested in ensuring their security, while others place a higher priority in maximizing their power even if it risks their security. Schweller does

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[30] See Elman (1996) for a critique of neorealism and its failure to explain a source of specific foreign policy. Critics point out that there are a number of empirical cases where states did not follow the neorealist prediction and as a result sacrificed their security. See Legro and Moravcsik (1999:14); Schweller (1998:83). Responding this criticism Waltz (1986:323,335) admits that the theory is not meant to account for a specific foreign policy.

[31] Even among neorealist scholars, some acknowledge, either implicitly or explicitly, that looking only at the international structure is not sufficient to explain the historical path of Japan. These realists incorporate a domestic attribute into the neorealist structural theory in their attempt to find out why Japan chose the policy that undermined its security. For an account that reduces the realists' core assumptions to anarchy and rationality, and incorporates internal factors in their analyses, see Legro and Moravcsik (1999).

not completely dismiss the importance of international structure. Like orthodox neorealists, he maintains that relative power distribution among states, as well as shifts in power balance, plays a crucial role in determining state behavior. But Schweller further suggests that states react differently when faced with the same structural conditions due to their *preferences*, which according to Schweller is why some states behave more aggressively than others.

Both Japan and Germany in the interwar period were dissatisfied revisionist states, and their goal was to maximize their power. Feeling disappointed and betrayed at the conference in Versailles, Japan called for a new order. Soon after the postwar settlement, Japan began military preparations for revisionist assaults against the existing order.[32] It is clear that revisionist Japan was more interested in challenging the system and expanding its influence than in preserving the resources it already controlled. For Schweller, the key factor was a particular state preference that prevented Japan from pursuing a rational strategy to ensure its security. Revisionist Japan sought an excessive accumulation of power despite the political risk that such move would potentially make Japan less secure. The problem with Schweller's theory is the lack of explanation about the origins of particular state preferences. This is a common weakness of structural realist theories, and is what domestic-level realists, such as Jack Snyder, attempt to overcome.

2.2.2.2. Political System and Decision-Making Structure

Jack Snyder offers another account for the anomaly of Japanese over-expansionist policy. Snyder begins with the question of why highly advanced societies like imperial

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[32] Schweller (1998: 21, 24-25, 35). For a good summary of Schweller's argument as well as the difference between Schweller's approach and that of traditional neorealists, see Legro and Moravcsik (1999: 29-32).

Japan risked the survival of their states by acting overly aggressively.[33] Like Schweller, Snyder does not entirely reject the importance of structural factors, *i.e.*, the state's position in the international system, but puts far more emphasis on domestic politics in general, and problems of transitional regimes in particular.[34] In Snyder's view, the Japanese political system was the root cause of its over-expansionist policy.[35] To prove this point, Snyder creates a typology of three different political systems that developed in prewar Japan and compares the foreign policy pursued under each system. He argues that Japan was most prone to overexpansion when its political system was most cartelized, and less prone when it was more unitary (Meiji period) or more democratic (Taishō period).[36] A cartelized system tends to be vulnerable to the over-expansionist policy because its power assets are concentrated in the hands of parochial groups with very narrow interests. In the case of prewar Japan, it was the military cartels that skewed national strategic thinking through organizational manipulation. Rational cost-benefit calculation in foreign policy decision-making was hindered, and military-ruled Japan followed a path of self-destruction.[37]

Similarly, historian Hosoya Chihiro scrutinizes the nature of the Japanese decision-making system as the cause for the military becoming dominant in policy-making. Hosoya especially emphasizes the high degree of decentralization in the Japanese decision-making structure, including the lack of coordination between the

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[33] Snyder (1991:1).

[34] For similar studies on political challenges of transitional democracies and the rise of fascism during the developmental path, see Moore (1966) and Huntington (1968).

[35] As Legro and Moravcsik (1999: 24) accurately pointed out, Snyder's argument is reminiscent of "democratic peace theory," which highlights the causal relations between domestic institutions and the course of foreign policy.

[36] Snyder (1991: 44,113). Snyder defines cartelized politics as one "dominated by a number of interest groups or 'cartels,' each with concentrated interests different from those of other such groups."

[37] Snyder (1991: 31-32, 129-130, 310-311).

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military and civilian sectors and the frequency of inter-departmental conflicts. Despite the structural deficiency in the decision-making process, the system was more or less intact during the strong leadership of the Meiji oligarchs (*genrō*). It was only after the influence of *genrō* decreased that the defects in the decision-making system became serious enough to cause actual harm during the policy-making process. Domestic special interest groups, the military in this case, grabbed this opportunity and managed to distort the formation of state preferences, pushing the state to the suboptimal foreign policy of overexpansion.[38]

2.2.2.3. Perception, Culture, and Ideology

The last factor commonly raised in accounting for prewar Japanese policy is domestic ideas, such as culture, ideology, and perception. Here again, the political effect of the international structure is marginalized as secondary. This group of scholars argues that domestic ideas were a principle cause for the rise of military-dictatorship in Japan as well as its reckless expansionist policy. Elements of Japanese culture, such as the *Bushidō* code of the samurai, the notion of obedience to authority, or domestic ideology, such as collectivism or "ultra-nationalism," created an environment where the national government easily led the public into support for its policy agenda.[39] According to these scholars, the political culture and national ideology prevalent in Japan at that time played a critical role in dictating the policy outcome and preventing Japan from pursuing a rational strategy.

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[38] Hosoya (1971).

[39] Shillony (1981:174); Smethurst (1974:xiv); Gluck (1985); Maruyama (1963); Dore and Ōuchi (1971).

Charles Kupchan highlights domestic perception as a cause of Japan's overly competitive, self-defeating behavior.[40] For Kupchan, the puzzle of the Japanese empire is the same one presented by Snyder: why did policies intended to enhance national power and produce paced imperial growth eventually lead Japan into a self-defeating war?[41] Kupchan admits the importance of the structural setting as well; but in contrast to mainstream neorealists he claims that "how elites *assess* and *interpret* the distribution of power" is more important than the actual distribution of power, since "these assessments and interpretations shape grand strategy."[42] According to Kupchan's hypothesis, elites tend to choose overly competitive or overly cooperative policy when they perceive high vulnerability resulting from shifts in the balance of power.[43] He analyzes the Japanese case using the same logic. Between 1931 and 1937, Japan perceived relatively low vulnerability. During this period, Japan expanded its empire at a moderate pace with restraint and caution, being careful to avoid both self-encirclement and overexpansion. Furthermore, building a limited empire in Asia contributed to imperial economic well-being and enhanced Japan's strategic position in the region. Japan's restrained imperial policy during this period matched its security objectives and helped enhance its strategic position. Its overly competitive policy between 1937 and 1941, however, shows a sharp contrast from the previous period. The policy of overexpansion devastated the economy and set Japan on the path to war against an enemy of vastly superior military capability.[44] Kupchan attributes this adjustment failure after 1937 to perceptions of high vulnerability.

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[40] Works on perception as a determinant of policy is not totally new. Van Evera (1999) emphasizes the role of perception in examining the cause of World War I, arguing that states' perceptions of offense-defense balance contributed to the outbreak of World War I. For other major works on perception, see Jervis (1976).

[41] Kupchan (1994:297).

[42] Kupchan (1994: 5) emphasis by author.

[43] Kupchan (1994:14).

[44] Kupchan (1994: 12).

The change in perceptions of vulnerability induced elites to adopt overly competitive policies in order to gain access to new economic resources, which paradoxically further exacerbated vulnerability.[45]

Similar ideational accounts have been suggested for the origin of the Pacific War. For example, the historian, Iriye Akira highlights the aspect of cultural clash between Japan and the United States as a root cause of the military conflict between them. Iriye asserts that the incompatibility of the two cultures—American individualism versus Japanese group orientation, American liberal democracy versus the Japanese imperial system, and Western versus Eastern cultures—played a large role in their military clash.[46]

Figure 2: Domestic Explanations

Figure 2 summarizes the domestic sources of Japanese foreign policy. Scholars who argue for the primacy of domestic factors do not dismiss the importance of the structural circumstances in influencing the Japanese decision-making process. They maintain, however, that the structural conditions themselves are not sufficient to explain Japan's continuous over-expansionist policy that eventually led the country to disaster. Why did Japan keep expanding even after it became apparent that its action invited encirclement by other states, and that the political costs of expansion began exceeding the

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[45] Kupchan (1994: 12, 298, 357).
[46] Iriye (1981). The concept of conflict between different cultures was reintroduced by Huntington (1996) in his analysis of contemporary world politics.

benefits? For these scholars, the answer lies in the domestic characteristics of Japan evident at that time. They share a view that particular internal conditions prevented Japan from pursuing a rational policy to ensure its security and survival. According to these writers, Japanese elites were committed to a self-defeating policy for various domestic reasons, such as the revisionist state preferences, the cartelized political system, and/or the perception of high vulnerability.

2.2.3. <u>The Return to Structure: The International Economy</u>

These domestic accounts for prewar Japanese policy attempt to overcome the limitations inherent in structural theory. Internal causes are highlighted as a critical intervening factor that allowed the irrational over-expansionist policy to prevail despite its strategic disadvantages. These domestic accounts contain shortcomings, however. Among them is the fact that the historical origins of domestic attributes are often unclear in these approaches. Whether a revisionist state preference, a cartelized political system, a decentralized decision-making structure, or a militaristic culture is at stake, the theory is incomplete unless the origin of these factors is properly addressed.

One common approach to solve this problem is to go back to the structural level: to look at the international economic structure as an explanation for Japan's particular developmental path. Scholars often highlight the impact of the timing of industrialization on subsequent political and institutional development.[47] In the Japanese context, the relative lateness of Japanese industrialization *vis-à-vis* other countries created needs for a strong state, which could centralize the effort for effective resource allocation in order to

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[47] The "timing of industrialization" thesis is originally presented by Gerschenkron (1962). His model suggests that where a state stands on its relative degree of industrialization vis-à-vis other states critically determines the subsequent state building.

speed up the industrialization process and catch up with other states. Strong state leadership indeed, contributed to speeding the industrialization of Japan. At the same time, however, strong statehood, where society had little control over the state, made Japan more susceptible to the emergence of cartelized politics, which in turn led to the overextension of the Japanese empire.[48] The establishment of a strong state apparatus in Japan is, therefore, a functional outcome of its relatively backward position in the international economic hierarchy.

Scholars with a Marxist orientation also stress Japan's path to modernity and its impact on state building, with a particular emphasis on state-society relations.[49] Barrington Moore, for example, highlights the lack of genuine bourgeois revolution in Japan during the process of modernization. According to Moore, the absence of a successful mass movement for democracy in Japan provided a seed for the subsequent rise of fascism.[50]

Figure 3: Sources of Domestic Attributes

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[48] On this point, Snyder (1991: 117) argues that Japan, as a late developer, was especially well situated to use the creation of a military-industrial-imperial complex as a Keynesian stimulus to development. See also Scalapino (1953); Kahler (1988: 437-438, 441-442).

[49] See Young (1998:434-435) and Siberman (1974:230) for a discussion of Japan's incomplete break from its feudal past.

[50] Moore (1966), especially chapters five and eight. Some Marxist analysts insist on a causal connection between the level of Japanese capitalist development and its expansionist foreign policy. According to this view, Japanese expansionist policy was an inevitable result of its capitalist development. For a summary of Marxist accounts of Japanese imperialism and expansionist foreign policy, see Beasley (1987:6-9).

Figure 3 locates theories on international economy in their relation to other accounts of prewar Japanese policy. This summary shows the causal relations between the international economy and domestic factors, which in turn determine foreign policy outcomes.

2.2.4. <u>Summary of Past Approaches and Limitations</u>

The preceding overview illustrates how scholars have analyzed prewar Japanese political development and foreign policy in the past. The review focused in particular on the key independent variable in each approach; which factor does each scholar emphasize as the primary cause that shaped Japanese politics? Needless to say, most analysts acknowledge that any political outcome is a result of a complex collection of factors, and highlighting a single cause is misleading. Nonetheless, they still emphasize certain factors as a primary cause in analyzing this empirical case. The summary of conventional approaches based on their causal arguments is shown in Table 1.

	Systemic/Structural Factors	*Domestic Factors*
Material Factors	∞ Anarchy ∞ Power Distribution ∞ Timing of Industrialization **A**	∞ State Preference ∞ Political System ∞ Decision-Making Structure ∞ State-Society Relations **B**
Ideational Factors	**C**	**D** ∞ Perception ∞ Political Culture/Ideology

Table 1: Theoretical Map of Past Approaches

Table 1 classifies the existing accounts for prewar Japan based on two criteria. The first measure is what is often called the "level of analysis," whether a research

stresses the importance of the international structure or domestic politics as the prime

determinant of political outcome. Theories in the left columns (A and C) emphasize

structural causes, while those in the right columns (B and D) highlight domestic reasons.

The second measure has to do with the ontological basis of each model. The theories are

divided based on whether they emphasize a tangible, materialist aspect of politics or an

ideational one, such as culture and ideology. A quick glance of the table reveals that

conventional analyses of prewar Japan are concentrated in three quadrants (A, B, and D).

Despite the large volume of research on this historical case, there are few studies that

investigate how ideas and culture at the systemic level influenced the course of Japanese

politics at that time.[51]

The scholarly bias shown in Table 1 generally corresponds with prevailing trends

in the field of international relations. Since the 1940s, the discipline, especially security

studies, has been dominated by the neorealist school that emphasizes the distribution of

power in the anarchic environment.[52] The predominance of neorealism has two

implications: the first is a prejudice towards tangible, material factors; and the second is

the relative weight given to structural effects *vis-à-vis* domestic ones. As shown in

quadrant D, there have been studies on domestic ideas and culture. Unfortunately, most

of these analyses devote most of their attention to such developments strictly at the

domestic level. Studies on domestic ideas might address international factors that

influence domestic culture, but they are mostly historical events rather than international

norms *per se*. Consequently, the role of ideas and culture at the systemic level has been

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[51] In general, this tendency is particularly strong among works by political scientists, though there are some exceptions. In contrast, analyses by historians tend to be more comprehensive, taking a more inclusive approach. There are studies by historians which implicitly recognize the impact of the international normative environment on Japanese political development. See Iriye (1981).
[52] Deudney and Ikenberry (1991/1992: 79); Hoffman (1977).

largely overlooked in analyzing prewar Japanese political development. This lack of attention to systemic ideas leads to the first point emphasized in this study: *we need an analytical model that highlights the political impact of international norms and culture on domestic politics and policy-making.*

In addition to the uneven focus on causal factors as mentioned above, two analytical shortcomings found in conventional approaches need to be addressed. The first limitation is intrinsic in domestic theories (quadrant B and D). In these models, the source of a crucial domestic attribute remains under-investigated, which makes an explanation far from complete. While there are a large number of studies discussing how domestic factors influenced Japanese policy-making, most analyses stop short of examining the origins of these key internal attributes.[53] This tendency is most evident in cultural arguments, in which culture is treated as a given, while its source is usually unknown.[54] This leads to the second point this inquiry intends to achieve: *it is vital to unpack the origins of particular internal attributes, such as state preference and domestic culture.*

The second weakness of existing models is their determinism and their difficulty in explaining political change. Take as an example the timing of industrialization thesis. This theory implies that once a state is placed on a certain developmental path based on the relative timing of its industrialization, its destiny is determined. In the historical context of Japan, the theory fails to comprehend the rise of a nascent democracy in Japan

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[53] The only exception is the timing of industrialization argument. Scholars, such as Snyder (1991) and Scalapino (1953), claim that the relative lateness of Japanese industrialization contributed to the formation of Japan's political system, which was susceptible to the military-authoritarian regime.

[54] A similar problem can be found in the strategic culture literature, which investigates the impact of domestic culture on political outcomes. For example, Johnston (1995:34) claims that "different states have different predominant strategic preferences that are rooted in the early or formative experiences of the state, and are influenced to some degree by the philosophical, political, cultural, and cognitive characteristics of the state and its elites." On the same point, Kier (1997) relates the source of culture to a product of changing domestic political contexts. The source of organizational culture is not entirely clear in Thomas (1997:52), Legro (1997), and Barnett (1998).

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preceding its turn to fascism. According to the model, the period of democracy is simply marginalized as the pre-stage of fascism.[55] Consequently, important questions, such as what kind of political forces enabled the rise of democracy, remain unanswered. Cultural analyses tend to suffer from similar shortcomings of failing to comprehend political change.[56] This is due to the method commonly found in cultural analyses, in which culture is treated as an underlying force mitigating other external influences, such as a structural change. Strength in cultural studies, therefore, lies in its ability to explain consistency rather than political change.[57] This kind of determinism in theory becomes especially problematic in analyzing a dynamic case, such as prewar Japan, which experienced a chain of crucial policy shifts. This leads to the third and final point emphasized in this study: *we need a dynamic theory which can adequately comprehend political change.*

The theory of norm-driven change aims to overcome these limitations. First, this research centers on the role of system-level ideas in determining Japanese political development, a largely under-investigated arena in past studies. Key policy developments, as well as their transformation, are examined through the international normative perspective. Did the conventional norms and culture at the systemic level determine the course of Japanese policy? If so, in what way did the systemic norms influence domestic politics? What kind of systemic cultural environment is more likely to produce changes at the domestic level? These are the questions addressed in the study.

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[55] Silberman (1974.229-230).

[56] Specific to the Japanese context, Snyder (1991: 132) argues that "a cultural hypothesis fails to explain the major differences in foreign policy between the militarist, on one hand, and Shidehara and his relatively moderate big business supports on the other."

[57] There has been an effort to respond to criticism regarding the inadequacy of cultural analyses in accounting for political change. See Eckstein (1992: particularly chapter seven); Berger (1998: chapter one).

Second, the norm-driven change model discovers the process through which domestic norms are originally constructed. This is done through a careful examination of the interaction between international and domestic norms. Relevant questions include how domestic actors perceive international norms, and how these perceptions help construct domestic ideas relating to foreign and security policy. By tackling these questions, the model is able to clarify the source of domestic attributes, an overlooked aspect in past approaches.

Third, one of the strengths of the norm-driven change model is its dynamic nature, which makes it suitable for explaining political change. Rather than focusing on a single point in time, the model investigates a relatively long time-span in order to trace an exact process of change. This kind of process-oriented approach is crucial in analyzing the very dynamic political development that occurred in prewar Japan. In conventional studies, Japanese militarism or the assertive expansionist policy has been attributed to a particular factor evident in Japan at one point in time. These accounts, however, tend to miss another important development which occurred in Japan prior to the rise of revisionism, namely the growing trend of party-oriented democracy and a policy of multilateralism and international cooperation found in the 1920s.[58] A more comprehensive account should include an explanation of what caused the cooperative policy of 1920s, why it was not sustainable, and how it was replaced with a more-assertive one in a later period. By applying the model proposed in this study, formations of both cooperative and assertive policy can be analyzed as part of the same political

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[58] In contrast to political scientists, historians who work on Japanese diplomatic history during this period examine long-term historical development. Representative works by historians on this subject are: Iriye (1966i); Iriye (1972); Iriye (1981); LaFeber (1997); Beasley (1987).

sequence triggered by the conditions of international norms at that time, which sheds new light on understanding prewar Japanese politics.

A summary of conventional accounts reveals the inherent limitations of these approaches empirically as well as analytically. The norm-driven change model compensates for these shortcomings by offering a new explanation for Japanese expansionism and revisionism. This historical case is particularly suitable for testing the validity of the model. First, the period investigated is very dynamic both at the systemic and domestic levels; a period of great transformation in the international normative environment. This enables the examination of critical junctures at the domestic level, and the analysis of how transformations of the international normative environment caused change in Japanese political structure and foreign policy. Second, the model allows looking at the rise of Japanese revisionist policy as one of the possible outcomes triggered by international norms. This means that other policy developments, such as the emergence of multilateralism, can be examined within the same analytical framework.

This new approach rejects a deterministic view about the fate of Japanese revisionism, which raises the question of how it could have been avoided. Investigating how other states could have acted differently to avoid the type of militarism and revisionist policy that emerged in Japan would be useful in applying the model to other contemporary scenarios. In the current security environment where the international normative environment is in flux, the norm-driven change model and lessons learned from the Japanese case provide insight into preventing the emergence of potential revisionist states, as well as military conflicts that would undermine international stability.

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2.3. The Norm-Driven Change Model

Norm-driven change is a sequential model, in which a high degree of systemic uncertainty leads to political change at the domestic level. The sequence of political change is divided into two parts. The first part of the sequence focuses on uncertainty in the international normative system, a systemic effect that triggers domestic political change. The international normative system consists of explicit and implicit values, ideas, and principles shared by the members of the system, typically states. The model suggests that the higher the level of normative uncertainty, the more likely change in foreign policy orientation will take place. The systemic uncertainty primarily derives from the heterogeneous nature of the international normative system. The availability of multiple norms and governing principles within a system creates an uncertain environment. The degree of uncertainty becomes especially high under a heterogeneous and unstable normative environment, *i.e.*, a larger number of norms are available within the system, and the relative degree of adherence to norms by states changes.[59] Putting this into context, the interwar period is a prime example of a highly uncertain normative environment. Not only did a variety of norms exist, but the popularity of these norms—states' adherence to them—was also in flux.

Systemic uncertainty has two important political implications at the domestic level: one is inducing political change, and the other is increasing the importance of ideas in determining the direction of change for the future. At the domestic level, internal decision-making processes determine the impact of systemic uncertainty, as well as the

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[59] Here, "relative strength of norm" indicates the degree a norm is adhered to in the system. A norm is considered to be "strong" when it is supported by many states and/or political actors, or when one can find a policy relating to the norm on a frequent basis.

course of change. Key areas of investigation include: how political actors interpret the normative environment, what kind of ideas are proposed to cope with uncertainty, and whether there is any particular domestic group that gains and/or loses legitimacy due to the normative uncertainty in the system. In examining the sequence of internal change, three areas, norm selection, norm contestation, and norm instantiation, each of which covers a distinctive dimension of change, are discussed in detail.

Norm selection, contestation, and instantiation are interconnected in the following way. First, norm selection is a process that occurs when domestic actors attempt to make sense of the uncertain normative environment. Domestic ideas—potentially more than one—about the external world and state identity are constructed during this process. These ideas become a normative foundation for the various policy prescriptions advocated by different political groups. In short, norm selection is the process of how international norms become transmitted to the domestic level, and internalized as domestic norms. Second, the norm contestation process looks into the domestic power struggles and coalition-forming processes as actors compete over different policy objectives based on different ideas. Norm contestation tends to intensify in an uncertain normative environment, where multiple ideas and political positions emerge as a result of the norm selection process. Third, norm instantiation illustrates how international norms influence political outcomes during the height of norm contestation. When the normative system undergoes a transformation, a domestic coalition that endorses a rising norm at the systemic level gains legitimacy and has a better chance of emerging victorious from domestic political struggles. Norm instantiation is a mechanism by which international

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norms affect final domestic political outcomes, especially in the uncertain normative condition.

The norm-driven change model provides new insights into the political development of prewar Japan. In order to clarify the causal connection between the international normative system and the dynamics of Japanese politics, the period investigated is broken down into three consecutive timeframes. During the first period (from 1868 until the Sino-Japanese war of 1894), the normative system was dominated by European imperialist principles. This normative environment was homogeneous and stable, therefore posing little uncertainty. This less-uncertain normative system contributed to the coherent and consistent foreign policy of Japan at that time. Japan committed itself to becoming a part of the international system dominated by the West. Japan pursued the policy of Westernization/modernization in order to improve its international status, and the policy was backed by strong domestic consensus both within and outside of the government.

In the second phase (from the Sino-Japanese war until the outbreak of World War I), the international normative system was still dominated by European imperialism, though the system became slightly more heterogeneous than in the past with the rise of new norms, such as American Open Door principle and Chinese nationalism, both of which posed challenges to the traditional, imperialist norm. Japanese domestic ideas and foreign policy to a large extent reflected the international normative environment. There was a strong national consciousness that Japan had joined the group of advanced civilizations, and the Japan's new mission was to conduct itself as an imperial power to maintain and strengthen its national power base.

Entering the third phase (from World War I until the 1930s), the relative decline of the traditional European powers contributed to a transformation of the international normative system. While previously predominant imperialist norms were increasingly viewed with skepticism, a number of new principles, including American idealism, European liberalism, communism, and anti-colonial nationalism, emerged during this period. Increasing norm heterogeneity created a highly uncertain environment, which facilitated a shift in Japanese policy. Systemic uncertainty instigated heated debates in Japan in searching for a new policy so that Japan would successfully adjust to the changing environment. After a series of political contestations among various domestic groups, the "internationalist" group emerged victorious, shifting its course to a policy of international cooperation and multilateralism. The victory of the Japanese internationalists was greatly helped by favorable normative conditions, *i.e.*, the increasing popularity of Wilsonian internationalism across the world. The normative system continued to be highly uncertain, which made power consolidation by Japanese internationalists highly problematic. As the international influence of Wilsonian norms declined in the 1930s, the fragile political base of the internationalist group was placed in jeopardy, allowing the rise of its political opponents, the military-nationalists. As a result of the growing power base of the nationalists, Japan abandoned its cooperative stance, and shifted towards an aggressive foreign policy.

The analytical strengths of the norm-driven change model lie in its emphasis on both international structure and domestic politics. The model maintains the basic analytical position that both structural and domestic levels play crucial, yet distinctive, roles in determining the final political outcome. On the one hand, the normative system

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helps state actors define themselves and their place in the larger global setting, which becomes a normative foundation for national interests and policy goals. In addition, international norms provide opportunities and constraints for states by encouraging certain actions over others.[60] On the other hand, simply looking at the systemic level is far from sufficient to explain policy outcomes. While the international system plays a role in creating incentives for actors, and favoring a certain course of state responses over others, it is the domestic political process that ultimately determines the final result. It is indispensable, therefore, to unpack domestic politics, and scrutinize the specific mechanism of how international norms reach the domestic front and domestic actors use them for their political purposes.[61] The two-stage approach employed by the norm-driven change model allows analyzing both the structural and domestic levels as a part of the whole process.

2.3.1. Stage One: The International Normative System and Uncertainty

2.3.1.1. The Definition of the International Normative System (INS)

The concept of the INS is based on the ontological belief that this structure is a distribution of ideas or knowledge shared by actors. In contrast to the realists' account of the international system that primarily focuses on *material* forces, the constructivist view focuses on an *ideational* dimension of the international system. The INS consists of

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[60] Deudney and Ikenberry (1991/1992: 111).
[61] The specific mechanism by which international norms reach (or fail to reach) the domestic front has been a relatively overlooked research area among constructivists, as Kowert and Legro (1996:475) state that "the process by which shared knowledge becomes a collective norm remains underspecified." Constructivist research investigating this area includes Legro (1997), Hirata (2004), Cortell and Davis (1996).

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explicit and implicit values, rules, ideologies, norms, and principles that are shared by the members of the system.[62]

One dimension of the INS is the prevailing type of governance and political authority that determine who the main actors are, as well as how interstate relations/diplomacy are conventionally conducted in the system.[63] The INS also reflects prevailing ideas and intellectual movements at a given time. Ideas on modernity, national progress, social/racial divisions, and national security, help states find common solutions to problems, constitute national identities, as well as define interests and security threats.[64] The INS matters in various ways: by delineating the identities of the actors in the system and providing the actors with appropriate and legitimate behaviors within a given identity.[65] In addition, the INS functions as a power resource for contending domestic groups by offering international legitimacy to a particular faction that adheres to a dominant or ascending norm.

Not all ideas available at a given time are considered as a part of the INS. As a constituent of the INS, an idea or a norm needs to be shared and adhered to by the members of the system. Ideas disseminate and are reinforced through various means. First, *institutions*, such as international organizations, provide stability to meanings and

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[62] The members of the international system include both states and non-state actors. The impact of non-state actors has increased over time. In the contemporary system, individuals and non-state organizations, such as international organizations and NGOs, play larger roles in affecting the condition of the INS than in the past.

[63] Examples of political authority include monarchical dynasties and sovereign nation-states. Liberal democracy, authoritarianism, and communism are various types of governance.

[64] For example, the European intellectual movement of Enlightenment led to the rise of classical liberalism, democracy, and capitalism. Social Darwinism prevailed in late-nineteenth-century Europe and the United States offered a particular vision of world progress, which served as an intellectual justification for colonial imperialism.

[65] Bukovansky (2002:47).

socialize participants with a particular set of norms.[66] Second, *political discourses* create new social realities by producing (or reproducing) common sense in the international community and legitimating a particular actor as an authority.[67] Third, *states' diplomatic practices* facilitate the norm dissemination. Prevailing and repeated practices based on a particular principle stabilize and fix the principle as a dominant one, while alternative principles are silenced by a hegemonic principle.[68] Institutions, discourses, and practices all stabilize and strengthen a particular set of norms by increasing its legitimacy.[69]

2.3.1.2. How to measure the International Normative System (INS)

How can one measure the status of the INS? The norm-driven change model claims that the nature of the INS—whether it is homogeneous or heterogeneous, stable or unstable—has a critical impact on domestic politics. In order to assess the degree of heterogeneity or instability, what kind of evidence needs to be look at and which indicators should count?

Before getting into the question of metrics to evaluate the state of the INS, it is necessary to clarify what kind of mediums reify the content of the INS. International laws, governing principles of international organizations, and multilateral/bilateral agreements represent explicit rules and norms that constitute the INS. Natural law and moral rules, customary or established interstate practice that emerge without formal agreement make up implicit normative components of the INS. Political discourse can be traced both from speeches and debates by political elites and from media and popular

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[66] Klotz and Lynch (2007:37).
[67] Klotz and Lynch (2007:40); Milliken (1999:237).
[68] Milliken (1999:230).
[69] For an account of the relations among discourse, practice, and legitimacy, see Milliken (1999:230).

culture, such as books, journals, newspapers, and magazines.[70] This concrete body of evidence of the INS is what one needs to trace and analyze in order to measure the character and the transformation of the INS over time.

Identifying the existence of a single dominant norm that governs a wide range of activities in the system is a practical first step in determining whether the INS is homogeneous or heterogeneous. A norm is considered to be "strong" when it is supported by a majority of state/non-state actors; therefore "relative strength of norms" is assessed by the extent to which members adhere to a norm. The degree of norm adherence is measured through careful examination of various sources. Analysis of international and domestic legal records, documentation of political speeches and debates, published media sources, and states' policy, would reveal whether members of the system support or reject a particular norm. Key questions include: how frequently the key words that indicate the actors' orientation towards a specific norm appear from different individuals and groups; how institutionalized the norm is within the multilateral institutions and states' diplomatic practices; and to what extent the policy of major powers in the system is in line with the norm.[71] In addition, a lack of challenge to the predominant norm, or non-existence of competing norms in the system is a good indicator to determine the supremacy of a particular norm. If a single dominant norm is observed through the examination described above, then the INS should be characterized as *homogeneous*.[72]

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[70] Klotz and Lynch (2007:71, 77).
[71] Milliken (1999:233); Bukovansky (2002:26).
[72] The late 19th century was a good example of a homogeneous INS. Major European powers, including Russia, revived their interests in colonial imperialism. The United States, after the Spanish-American war, became more active in expanding its overseas influence in Latin America and the Pacific. The newly emerging power Japan followed its Western predecessors and began its imperial expansion in Asia. While most major powers engaged in the imperialist activities, challenge to imperialism, such as the resistance in China, was still negligible, making the imperialist norm predominant in the system.

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In contrast, a heterogeneous INS is a condition where there is no distinct prevailing norm, but rather conflicting or contradictory norms within the system.[73] Under a homogeneous INS, major political actors are in general consensus over supporting, or at least adhering to, the prevailing norm. On the other hand, under a heterogeneous INS, political discourses and major states' policies are in disagreement over the worldview and key foreign policy-related ideas. One can trace the same materials, such as speeches, debates, published sources, and states' policies. If words and actions of various states are divided in supporting multiple principles in contention with each other, the INS can be categorized as *heterogeneous*.[74]

One can measure the degree of systemic stability (or instability) by process tracing of the same evidence with special attention paid to signs of variation over a certain period of time. If the tracing of political actors' words and actions reveals little change over a particular period, one can conclude that the INS is *stable*. In contrast, when one witnesses shifts in actors' adherence to norms over time, it means that the INS is going through a transformation, and is therefore *unstable*. Transformation of the INS takes place in several different ways. The first pattern is when a prevailing norm is replaced with another one (one homogeneous INS transitions to another homogeneous INS). This happens when an increasing number of states withdraw their consent from the old dominant norm and bestow it upon the new one. The second scenario is when a previously dominant norm increasingly faces challenges from other conflicting norms

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[73] The interwar period was a prime case of a heterogeneous INS. On one hand, Western liberals, including US President Woodrow Wilson, endorsed the norm of multilateral internationalism. On the other hand, Soviet and Chinese nationalists posed challenges to Wilsonian order.

[74] When domestic opinions are sharply divided over key foreign policy-related ideas in powerful states, this could also potentially contribute to the increasing heterogeneity of the INS.

(homogeneous to heterogeneous). The third case is when a single hegemonic discourse emerges out of multiple competing norms (heterogeneous to homogeneous).

As discussed so far, what determines the nature of the INS is the level of normative adherence by political actors, which can be detected through an examination of records of their words and actions. Similarly, the transformation of the INS also originates from the level of political actors. In analyzing the impact of political actors, the role of powerful states and newly emerging states is particularly crucial in shaping the INS or causing its change; since their international position enables them to have more leverage in affecting the state of the INS.[75] In the same vein, war often has a critical impact on the INS. This is because ideas and norms most associated with the losing side of a war become at particular risk of being discredited, while those of the victorious side are promoted.[76]

2.3.1.3. The Heterogeneity of the International Normative System and Political Change

Once immersed in the INS, states become familiar with appropriate behaviors within the system, and recognize their identity vis-à-vis other states. States, in turn, rely

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[75] Power is an important factor in the rise and fall of international rules and norms, as many scholars have posited the relations between power and dominant norms. Realists maintain that international norms are mere reflections of the interests of powerful states. For example, Rosecrance's notion of "reigning foreign policy paradigm" implies the relation between power and dominant norms. Rosecrance (1995:162) claims that "(w)hen successful nations created a paradigm that included territorial expansion as one of its central tenets, others were willing to follow their lead, at least for a time. When the successful nations favored territorial abstention and policies of peaceful trade, they again gained adherents." Several constructivists acknowledge the impact of powerful states in shaping the normative environment as well. See Thomas (1997:41,53); Weldes (1999:13); Adler (1997:336,340); Bukovansky (2002:7-8). Although powerful states in the international system are often successful in reflecting their views in the INS, the INS is *not* equivalent to a normative paradigm endorsed by the most powerful states. There are cases where less-powerful states or non-governmental groups successfully push their normative agenda. The anti-colonial nationalist movement is one example. Another situation in which a state's power does not correlate with the INS is: the world's leading power has a position which diverges from most of the rest of the world, such as the current US war in Iraq.

[76] Bukovansky (2002:48-49); Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). Both the United States and Japan, new rising powers in the early 20th century, started having an impact on the formation of the INS. American impact on the INS became particularly strong after World War I, where the relative power of the United States rose vis-à-vis war-torn European powers.

on the ideas gained from the INS for establishing national interests and policy objectives. But, how does the INS cause domestic political change? To answer this question, the norm-driven change model highlights the inherent *heterogeneity* of the INS. As opposed to conventional constructivists, who view the normative system as isomorphic, governed by a single dominant principle, the norm-driven change model treats the normative system as a coexistence of multiple norms and principles.[77] The model suggests that this heterogeneity of the system, with multiple norms and principles that are potentially conflicting and contradicting by nature, triggers policy transformation at the domestic level.[78]

Such a heterogeneous structure presents opportunities and incentives for change.[79] Systemic heterogeneity permits domestic political actors to hold multiple viewpoints, and actors rely on these visions to legitimize a certain course of policy in pursuit of their strategic interests.[80] The existence of multiple ideas at the domestic level means the availability of alternatives, creating opportunities for change. When numerous options are proposed during the decision-making process, political struggle among different coalitions intensifies, increasing the possibility of political change.

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[77] Wendt (1999); Bukovansky (2002); Hall (1999); Reus-Smit (1999). These constructivist scholars, whose research concentrates on social and cultural elements of the international system, often describe the system in monolithic terms, such as a "dynastic system" and a "system of popular sovereignty."

[78] Other constructivist scholars have addressed the notion of "competing norms," both implicitly and explicitly. See Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:914) on conflicting rules and norms; Finnemore (1996ii:341-342) on tensions and contradictions among normative principles in international life; Risse and Sikkink (1999:24) discussing the conflict between interventions based on human rights norms and the norm of national sovereignty. Also see Bukovansky (2002) for similar analyses, that examine how contradictions and frictions within an order drive political change.

[79] Scholars studying political institutions have addressed the question of how multiple orderings lead to change. In these studies, institutions are viewed as a fusion of "layered," multiple, and sometimes contested orders. Institutional heterogeneity creates tensions and conflicts, and the friction between orders provides seeds of change. Orren and Skowronek (1994); Lieberman (2002); Thelen (2004); Sheingate (2003).

[80] Bukovansky (2002:12).

Although the heterogeneous nature of the normative system opens the *possibility* of political change, the *probability* of change can vary depending on the degree of uncertainty in the INS. Uncertainty is defined here as unique situations where interests themselves become unclear, and actors can neither anticipate the outcome of a decision nor assign probabilities to the outcome.[81] Uncertainty obscures what the national interest should be, which undermine the normative foundation of existing policy.[82] In this circumstance, actors engage in reevaluating the situation and come up with new sets of national interests and policy objectives based on their reevaluation. The result of this process is policy change. Table 2 summarizes the causal relations between the nature of the INS and the likelihood of domestic change.

INS	*Homogeneous*	*Heterogeneous*
Stable	Change is unlikely (a)	Change is likely (b)
Unstable	Change is likely (c)	Change is highly likely (d)

Table 2: Relations between the Normative System and Change

The horizontal axis indicates the degree of heterogeneity in the normative system. The likelihood of political change is low when the system is relatively homogenous, and therefore less uncertain. This is a situation where there is a single dominant norm governing a wide range of activities in the system. In contrast, change is more likely to happen in a highly heterogeneous system, where there are a large number of norms and governing principles.

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[81] Blyth (2002: 31, 36).
[82] On this point, McNamara (1998:7-8) claims that "uncertainty creates highly fluid conceptions of interest, both national and societal." Blyth (2002:30) notes that "if interests are a function of beliefs and desires, and if agents are confused about their desires, in situations of high uncertainty, then agents' interests must become unstable."

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In addition to systemic heterogeneity, a transformation of the normative system, specified by the vertical axis, also increases uncertainty, and hence the probability of domestic change.[83] The normative transition not only provides an opportunity for challengers to the existing policy, but also increases the opportunity to discredit core beliefs and values already held in society. An unstable INS loosens commitments to existing orthodoxy, and consequently opens a window of opportunity for a new idea to replace existing ones. The breakdown of the old orthodoxy introduces a new round of political contestation among various groups, which increases the likelihood of political change as a result. The normative system keeps evolving over time, often witnessing the emergence of new norms as well as the disappearance of old norms. The norm-driven change model hypothesizes that change is more likely when the normative system undergoes a transformation, compared to a period when the system is relatively stable.

To summarize, political change is most likely when the INS is heterogeneous and in flux. In contrast, change is least likely when the system is homogeneous and stable. A combination of "heterogeneous" and "stable" is a situation where multiple norms and principles exist in the system, but their relative strengths vis-à-vis each other remain unchanged. A combination of "homogeneous" and "unstable" is a condition where the system undergoes a transformation from the domination of one norm to the domination of another. In these two cases, change can occur, but its likelihood is not as high as the case when the system is heterogeneous and unstable.

As shown in Table 3, increasing level of domestic norm contestation and the volatile Japanese foreign policy in the third period corresponds to a time when the INS was heterogeneous and unstable (quadrant d). In contrast, Japanese foreign policy was

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[83] Although not shown in the table, the level of heterogeneity, as well as stability, is a continuous scale.

fairly consistent, backed by a strong consensus among key political figures, during the first and the second period (quadrant a and b). The norm-driven change model hypothesizes that the uncertain normative environment during the third period contributed to parallel shifts in Japanese foreign policy. The subsequent section describes the domestic political process, *i.e.*, the sequence of political change, resulting from this normative uncertainty.

INS	Homogeneous	Heterogeneous
Stable	First Period: Stable Policy (a)	Second Period: Stable Policy (b)[84]
Unstable	[85](c)	(d) Third Period: Policy in Turbulence

Table 3: Relations between the INS and Japanese Foreign Policy

2.3.2. <u>Stage Two: Domestic Ideas and Political Change under Uncertainty</u>

2.3.2.1. *Combining the Two Levels: Where the System meets the States*

The previous section detailed the first segment of the norm-driven change model, focusing on the political effects of the INS. It spelled out how heterogeneity in the system creates uncertainty, and how it causes domestic change. Revealing the impact of the normative system, however, is only one part of the norm-driven change model, since systemic uncertainty itself is not sufficient to determine a political outcome. The exact systemic impact on a state can only be accounted for through the interaction of the international system and domestic politics. As such, a detailed analysis of internal decision-making processes is unavoidable.

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[84] The Cold-War period is one example of a heterogeneous and stable international normative system. While the system was fairly stable, there were multiple normative cleavages, such as East (Communism)-West (Capitalism) and North-South divisions.

[85] Conceptually speaking, a homogeneous and unstable normative system is when the system goes through a transformation from one dictated by a predominant principle to one led by a different dominating norm.

The second stage of the norm-driven change model, therefore, shifts the focus to the domestic level. It scrutinizes the political process of how domestic recognition of systemic uncertainty triggers a new set of policy debates, which results in coalition building and eventual policy change. Once again, the sequence of change is divided into three segments, norm selection, norm contestation, and norm instantiation. Each process covers a particular dimension of the policy-making process, such as how uncertainty encourages domestic actors to reevaluate the nature of the normative system, and how international norms are converted into domestic norms during this reevaluation process. It also discusses how domestic actors compete over different ideas, and highlights key factors, including international norms, that influence domestic power struggles. The three processes identify a recurrent pattern of how systemic uncertainty induces domestic change, and help detect the actual impact of uncertainty on a particular domestic setting.

2.3.2.2. The Norm Selection Process

Norm selection is the first of the three domestic political processes that determine the content of political change. Through the norm selection process, actors attempt to reduce uncertainty by reevaluating the nature of the normative system, which helps them assess the character of the system as well as state identity within the system. The constructed idea serves as a normative foundation in forming national interests and foreign policy.

In the previous section, normative uncertainty was defined as unique situations where actors cannot anticipate the outcome of a decision and are unsure about what the appropriate behavior might be in a particular situation. Political actors comprehend uncertainty through a complex normative process, because what ultimately determines

the degree of uncertainty is the *meaning* of a material condition to a particular actor.[86] It is worth emphasizing that recognition of uncertainty needs to be understood from an actor's perspective, rather than from an objective material condition.[87] An actor perceives uncertainty under three potential circumstances. The first is when actors face an unprecedented condition, something he/she has never experienced in the past.[88] The second is an unexpected situation, where the existing prescriptions a society adheres to results in an unexpected consequence.[89] The third case is when actors receive mixed, potentially contradictory, signals from defined actions.

Once actors acknowledge uncertainty, it triggers a series of internal discussions and debates in their attempts to understand the uncertain condition. Actors engage in reevaluating their external environment as well as trying to renew their image of the normative system. International norms are transmitted and introduced into domestic political discourse by agents, both within and outside the government.[90] In addition to domestic agents, foreign agents can also have significant influence in bringing in new

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[86] In this sense, a purely materialistic account for uncertainty is far from complete. While neorealist Kenneth Waltz (1979:163-170) argues that multipolarity creates an uncertain condition, uncertainty is not an automatic product of multipolarity *per se*, but rather depends on who the poles are in the system, what the basic relations among the poles are, and so forth.

[87] Jeffrey Legro highlights the important role of normative elements in analyzing the impact of a material condition by using the metaphor of an earthquake. According to Legro (2005:36-37), "Just as earthquakes of the same magnitude can have radically different implications based on the construction or geology of the areas affected, so too will societies affected by similar political shocks react differently based on "conceptual construction." (i.e., collective ideas). The interaction between events and extant societal thinking matters."

[88] Wendt (1992:398)

[89] Legro (2005:44).

[90] Agents within the government include politicians, bureaucrats, diplomats, and people within the military. Outside the government, intellectuals also play a critical role in disseminating ideas and norms found in the external environment. The role of intellectuals, most of whom have had some experience overseas, is visible at each critical turning point of Japanese policy development. During the Meiji period, Fukuzawa Yukichi introduced Western ideas and political systems through his numerous publications. The concept of *"Datsu-A, Nyū-Ō"* (Leave Asia and Enter Europe) advocated by him, became an intellectual foundation of policy endorsed by the Meiji government. The short period of democracy and the policy of international cooperation in Japan was also based on an intellectual foundation, such as Yoshino Sakuzō, an academic pillar of the Taishō Democracy, and Nakae Chōmin, who introduced the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

ideas from outside.[91] The most critical source that tends to have the deepest and most lasting impact is firsthand experience, including a state's direct interaction with other states.[92] Actors also learn a great deal from secondhand experiences, through a careful observation of international laws, other states' diplomatic practices and political discourse.[93] These experiences are interpreted by actors and given meaning, which helps them understand the uncertain condition.[94]

Through the interpretative process, actors gradually construct their own idea about the external environment, which contributes to reducing uncertainty. Two components of this uncertainty-reduction-process are particularly important, due to their relevance to national interests and foreign policy objectives. The first is the image of the INS. It consists of actors' understanding of the basic characteristics of the system, such as what the basic rules and norms are, who the main actors are, what kind of social divisions exist within the system, and so forth. The second is the idea of the identity and status of a state within the system.[95] The concept of state identity includes the expected role of the state, as well as its relative position in the international hierarchy.[96] State identity is a highly integral part of the INS, because what is considered appropriate (a norm) is usually subject to state identity and status effects within the system. As a result, social boundaries become a crucial feature of the INS, and the divisions are translated into an

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[91] This was particularly the case in prewar Japan. As a part of the modernization efforts during the Meiji period, the Japanese government invited a number of "foreign advisors" from the United States as well as Europe. These foreign advisors were stationed in various Ministries, to help the institutional development of these newly created bureaucracies.

[92] Jervis (1976: 239-243); Risse-Kappen (1994:185-214).

[93] For a comprehensive account on "organizational learning," see Levitt and March (1988).

[94] Eckstein (1992:268).

[95] Wendt (1992:397) defines identity as "relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self."

[96] Kupchan (1994:5).

identity-related question, such as which group a state belongs to, and which political position this group shares in the system.[97]

These constructed images provide actors key normative guidance in determining national interests and foreign policy objectives.[98] These images not only clarify the anticipated behavior of others, but also help define friends and enemies, the primary interests of the state in a given circumstance, and the means to achieve national objectives. The norm selection process reveals how domestic ideas concerning international politics are originally constructed under uncertainty. It unpacks the origin of several policy alternatives emerging in the society, providing crucial insights into how normative uncertainty eventually brings about a particular political outcome in a given case.

Norm selection involves the process by which an international norm is conveyed by an individual or group and translated into domestic norms. It is a part of domestic norm construction, which sets the stage for political contestation over various policies. The norm selection process narrows the set of feasible policy options within a domestic setting, thus determining the direction of policy change.

2.3.2.3. The Norm Contestation Process

At the stage of norm contestation, domestic ideas have been consolidated into a few viable policy options, resulting from the norm selection process. Ideas held by actors

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[97] Many constructivists point out how the concept of identity provides a measure of inclusion and exclusion by delineating the boundaries between "us" and "them." See Risse and Sikkink (1999:9); Wendt (1992:397); Barnett (1996: 408); Wendt (1999: 341-342).

[98] Wendt suggests "they (actors) define their interests in the process of defining situations" (1992:398). The close connection between ideas and national interests has been one of the main emphases of many constructivist scholars. Blyth (2002:29) asserts that the concept of interest presupposes ideational factors, such as wants, beliefs, and desires. A similar account is made by Wendt (1999:119), who claims that "we want what we want because of *how we think about it*." (emphasis by author)

play a critical role in the norm contestation process, since they serve as a normative basis for each political position and the domestic coalitions formed around them. Norm contestation is the actual decision-making process where actors are engaged in domestic power struggles over ideas and policies. In other words, this is where ideas and domestic power struggles interplay.[99] Norm contestation involves key political groups, such as foreign policy establishments, interest groups, intellectuals, and the general public. Actors with a variety of social visions engage in political struggles to realize their distinctive policy prescription, the result of which determines the ultimate direction of political change.

Norm contestation presupposes the existence of multiple ideas over which actors compete. Under conditions of a heterogeneous INS with the high degree of uncertainty, it is likely that the norm selection process results in the rise of multiple ideas. Under the heterogeneous normative condition, actors tend to interpret the external environment in multiple ways adhering to different principles available in the system.[100] These ideas serve as the bases for political and social coalitions of those who share the same understanding of the INS. These coalitions engage in political contests in order to propagate their own distinct vision of identity and the state's mission in the world affairs.[101]

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[99] For a study of how ideas serve as coalition-building resources among political actors and potentially shift the domestic balance of power, see Bukovansky (2002:52) and Blyth (2002:37-39). Additionally, for accounts of how political actors manipulate ideas for their own political advantage, see Bukovansky (2002:12-13,16); Risse and Sikkink (1999:9); Kowert and Legro (1996:492-494); Blyth (2002:39-40).
[100] There are constructivists who highlight how the heterogeneous and contradictory nature of the system heightens domestic political conflict. See Bukovansky (2002:12); Barnett (1966:410, 444); Sheingate (2003).
[101] Berger (1998:18, 206).

2.3.2.4. *The Norm Instantiation Process*

The degree of norm contestation is high under a heterogeneous INS, with various factions competing for their particular positions. It is during the norm contestation process that international norms play critical roles in determining political outcomes, which I call "norm instantiation." Once actors take part in norm contestation, the INS again affects the course of the domestic power struggle by empowering various domestic groups. When an individual or group endorses a particular international norm, this domestic supporter of the norm attempts to push a policy agenda relevant to the principle during the decision-making process.

Ascending and descending norms in the heterogeneous INS affect the course of political contestation by legitimizing (in case of an ascending norm) or discrediting (in case of a descending norm) the domestic positions of particular groups. An ascending norm empowers a domestic faction that endorses that norm. Strengthened in its position through international legitimacy, this group has a better chance to win out over political rivals.[102] A descending norm, in contrast, diminishes the position of a domestic coalition that abides by the waning norm. As the group loses its credibility, it has a difficult time convincing the people of the legitimacy of its position. Through the norm instantiation process, the transformation of international norms has an effect on the domestic decision-making process, potentially determining the final policy outcome.

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[102] The mechanism of international normative influence on an actor's strategic capability has been one of the main research topics by constructivist scholars. Risse and Sikkink (1999:25) discuss how the increased international attention on human rights serves to create and/or strengthen local networks of activists whose demands are empowered and legitimized by the transnational/international network. For other constructivist works dealing with the political effects of international norms on changing the policy orientation of a state, see Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink (1999); Tannenwald (1999); Finnemore (1996i:30).

2.3.3. <u>The Causal Mechanism of the Norm-Driven Change Model</u>

The norm-driven change is a sequential model. The INS can affect domestic politics at different stages of the decision-making process. How the INS determines a political outcome depends on the nature of the INS. Under a homogeneous and stable INS with little uncertainty, the most critical impact of the INS takes place during the stage of *norm selection*, where a dominant international norm plays a key role in construction of domestic ideas about the world and self. In contrast, under a heterogeneous and unstable INS with high uncertainty, the INS's influence is most noticeable during the *norm instantiation* process in affecting the course of political contestation.

2.3.3.1. The Impact of International Norms under a Stable INS

A homogeneous and stable INS means that there is a dominant norm governing a wide-range of activities in the system. Under this less-uncertain normative environment, the domestic norm selection process tends to be dominated by the superior norm. The existence of a predominant norm provides domestic actors with a clear image about the international system while actors attempt to construct an image about the world and a national identity. As a result of norm selection, domestic consensus is likely to emerge, since different groups develop a similar worldview and national identity based on the dominant norm. For example, in the early twentieth century when the norm of imperialism and national expansion governed the international system, the homogeneous normative environment was reflected in Japanese domestic thinking. The majority was convinced that imperialism was the "rule of the world." *Genrō*, liberals, nationalists, as well as various ministries shared the belief in and support for imperialism. In sum, a homogeneous INS produced uniform domestic ideas reflecting the international system.

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Domestic agreement over the worldview and national identity, then, leads to a consensus over national interests and policy prescriptions, both of which are based on ideas about the world and self. As a result, the degree of norm contestation is low due to domestic consensus and a lack of alternatives in ideas and policy options. Figure 4 summarizes the sequence that links a homogeneous INS and domestic policy outcomes.

Figure 4: Homogeneous INS and Policy Outcome

As shown in Figure 4, policy outcome is almost solely determined during the norm selection process under a homogeneous normative system. This is an easy-to-understand environment for domestic actors in constructing ideas about the external world. Consequently, domestic ideas are likely to consolidate into a single view that directly reflects the dominant norm at the systemic level. The supremacy of one domestic position, and a lack of contending alternative views, means a low degree of norm contestation. Policy outcome is a direct result of the norm selection process, as norm contestation is non-existent.

2.3.3.2. The Impact of International Norms under a Heterogeneous, Uncertain INS

A heterogeneous INS is a condition where there is no distinct prevailing norm, but rather multiple conflicting or contradictory norms within the system. Under these uncertain normative conditions, the norm selection process is unlikely to produce a single

dominant domestic view as is the case in a homogeneous environment, but instead, a variety of potentially conflicting, domestic ideas emerge. After multiple domestic ideas are constructed, domestic groups, each adhering to a different world vision, form political coalitions and engage in norm contestation in their attempt to advance their own agendas. The norm *selection* process, therefore, does not by itself determine political outcomes in an uncertain normative environment, but rather serves as a foundation for norm *contestation* to determine the final policy outcome.

Figure 5 summarizes the sequence that links a heterogeneous INS and domestic policy outcomes.

Figure 5: Heterogeneous INS and Policy Outcome

When the INS is heterogeneous, it permits political actors to hold multiple viewpoints during the norm selection process. Actors rely on these visions to legitimize a certain course of policy in pursuit of their strategic interests. When numerous options are proposed, this intensifies the political struggle between different coalitions. It is during the norm contestation process that international norms play a vital role in affecting political outcomes. When the INS undergoes a transformation, a domestic coalition that

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endorses a rising norm at the systemic level gains legitimacy and has a better chance to emerge victorious from domestic political struggles.

2.4. Conclusion

In his investigation of the cause of the Pacific War, historian Akira Iriye emphasizes the role of the images held by the United States and Japan. He argues that, in the period before the 1890s, the two countries shared a similar image of international relations in general, as well as on their mutual bilateral relations. The congruence of these images contributed to the peaceful US-Japan relations during the period. After the 1890s, however, the bilateral relations started going downhill, and he points out two possible factors for this. The souring of relations resulted either from a growing gap between the images held by the two countries, or due to a new reality, which was followed by a change in the images accordingly.[103]

Reminiscent of Iriye's approach, the norm-driven change model emphasizes the role of ideas, both international and domestic, in determining political outcomes. Each stage of the model discusses different dimensions of ideational impact. They are: (i) how uncertainty in the INS triggers a new round of the domestic norm construction process, and the constructed domestic ideas serve as a foundation for national interests and foreign policy prescription (= norm selection), (ii) how domestic actors form political coalitions based on the different ideas, and are engaged in political contestation to advance their agendas (= norm contestation), and lastly, (iii) how international norms influence the course of domestic contestation by empowering or weakening particular domestic groups

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[103] Iriye (1966ii:3).

(= norm instantiation). As such, international and domestic ideas play a major role not only in triggering domestic political change, but also in determining the direction of this change.

From a theoretical viewpoint, the norm-driven change model seeks to overcome the problem of indeterminacy that is common in conventional studies. For example, consider structural explanations of Japanese revisionism, such as John Mearsheimer's "offensive realist theory" that great powers seek to maximize power and achieve regional hegemony, or the economic liberal explanation that Japan was cooperative when it had access to foreign markets, but uncooperative when the world economy was moving towards protectionism.[104]

When one simply looks at Japanese political development between the 1930s and 1940s, it might appear at first sight that these models might offer a viable explanation. Once one attempts to go beyond the single case, however, the explanatory power and empirical applicability of these structural explanations become questionable. One can easily find historical cases where states did not follow the path these models would predict.[105] Unless the structural theories provide some explanations regarding the source of variation in state behavior under the same structural circumstance, the validity of these models is disputable.

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[104] Mearsheimer (2001).

[105] For example, Mearsheimer's offensive realism becomes quite helpless when it is applied to Japan after World War II. Despite its advancement as an industrial nation and emergence as one of the leading economic powers in the world, Japan's postwar approaches to national security have been overly "antimilitarist," showing consistent reluctance to become actively involved in international military security affairs. See Beger (1998:1,202). Economic liberal explanation faces a similar problem as well. Its premise that Japan's cooperative stance changed when the world economy was heading towards protectionism after the Great Depression can be easily challenged, since other industrialized states did not react in a similar way as Japan, albeit facing the same structural change.

Compared to the structural theories as such, the norm-driven change model is a fine-grained analytical model examining not only structural effects but also the domestic political process. On the domestic front, the model investigates the norm construction process and how the constructed domestic ideas inform foreign policy. Examination of the role of ideas in the domestic context enables the norm-driven change model to gain insights into why some states act in a particular way, while others do not, even under the same structural conditions.

The norm-driven change model complements the weakness inherent in the structural explanations by focusing on the impact of the INS as well as scrutinizing the norm construction and decision-making process that are unique to each domestic context. In contrast to offensive realism that defines the international structure as constant anarchy throughout history, the norm-driven change model regards the international system as a dynamic one, governed by different normative principles over time. Treating the international system as a variable opens the door for accounting for the difference in Japan's behavior before and after World War II. The norm-driven change model also complements the indeterminacy of economic liberal explanation by looking into the impact of the normative uncertainty and the *meaning* of economic protectionism in the specific Japanese domestic context.

With its analytical strength listed above, the norm-driven change model provides a more comprehensive account of Japanese "revisionism" preceding World War II. Its scrutiny of domestic political processes sheds light on how each country might react differently to the same structural circumstance. Its focus on the *normative* system also compensates the offensive realist approach by offering an explanation of why a state

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pursues an aggressive, expansionist policy at one point of time, while not in other periods.

The next three chapters will examine the historical development of prewar Japanese politics and policy as viewed through the lens of the norm-driven change model. The investigated era is divided into three consecutive periods, one per chapter. Chapter three discusses the period, 1850s-1894, a period of low uncertainty in the INS that promoted stability in Japanese foreign policy. Chapter four examines the period between the Sino-Japanese war up to the outbreak of World War I, when the normative system slightly increased in heterogeneity, but was still dominated by the imperialist norm. Japan transformed into an imperial power and pursued a policy of continental expansion. Chapter five analyzes a period of high uncertainty, particularly between the late 1910s through the mid 1930s. This is the time when Japanese foreign policy underwent several changes; a shift to a multilateral cooperative policy based on Wilsonian principles, then a shift to traditional imperial diplomacy led by Tanaka Giichi, and finally a shift to an aggressive, over-expansionist policy pursued by the military-nationalists. Each of these chapters will examine the condition of the INS and its impact on the formation of domestic ideas. In scrutinizing the domestic decision-making process, the norm selection, norm contestation, and norm instantiation processes will be applied.

The three-chapter case study following this chapter is a critical measurement for determining the empirical validity of the norm-driven change model. In order for the model to be validated, several causal relations need to be discovered from the case study. They include, the link between the character of the INS and the domestic uncertainty, the relationship between normative uncertainty and domestic norm re-construction effort, and

the connection between the rise and fall of international norms to shifts in the relative power of domestic groups adhering to these norms. If these causal relationships hold, based on the findings, the proposed model will be legitimized. In contrast, if some of the links are lacking, or the relations appear to be contradictory to the hypothesis, it is fair to question the theoretical validity of the model, and assume that the cause of Japanese political shifts is something other than the INS.

3. JAPAN ENCOUNTERS THE WEST
From Early Meiji to the Russo-Japanese War

3.1. Introduction

This chapter discusses the period from the 1850s until the Sino-Japanese war. The international normative system in the latter half of the nineteenth century became increasingly homogeneous, with the influence of European imperialism spreading worldwide. In addition to the growing impact of the "new national imperialism" in Europe, there were changes both in Asia and the United States, which contributed to the homogeneity of the international normative system during this period. First, the United States began showing signs of abandoning its anti-colonialist tradition. US foreign policy was becoming somewhat closer to those of its European counterparts.[106] Secondly, this was also a period when European imperialism reached the Asian continent. The traditional regional system centered around China was in jeopardy, as European powers advanced into the region and gained political influence.

This was the international environment when Japan abandoned its two-century-long isolationist policy and joined the rest of the world. As Japan made a decision to have commercial relations with Western powers and became included as a part of the European international system, the Japanese tried to understand where Japan would fit into the new international environment, *i.e.*, its identity in European-led international politics. Two schools of thought emerged in Japan during this time. The first view, held by the "Westernizers," a group that included most of the Meiji oligarchs and westernized

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[106] Increasing domestic debate over imperialism and US expansion to Hawaii was one example.

intellectuals, understood the world as a hierarchy based on each state's power and the degree of civilization. In this view, "civilized" European states and America were positioned in an advanced level, while "half-civilized" Japan was ranked in a lower level.[107] The Westernizers viewed the Western states as Japan's rival. The Westernizers often analogized the international hierarchy to *sumo*'s ranking system, indicating their hope that Japan would catch up with the West in the future.[108] The view of the Westernizers was contradicted by another group, the Asian-nationalists, a minority group of radicals who emphasized the racial division of the world—West (Europe and America) versus East (Asia).[109] Supporters of this view stressed the threats and discrimination Asian states were facing from the West. The Asian-nationalists believed that the racial division between the West and the East was impossible to reconcile, and they viewed the West as Japan's enemy.[110] The two contrasting worldviews in Japan led to different interpretations of national goals. While the Meiji oligarchs suggested that Japan should focus on catching up with the West through modernization, the Asian-nationalists insisted on cooperation among Asian countries, or Japanese regional leadership in leading the East's challenge of the West.[111]

Despite the existence of these different views, however, the level of norm contestation during the decision-making process was surprisingly low. There were a couple of reasons for the absence of norm contestation in Japan during this period. First, the homogeneous international normative environment enabled the Meiji elites to form a

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[107] Most of the Westernizers had visited Western countries, which helped them gain knowledge about the western culture and civilization. Okazaki (1994:73); Klien (2002:46).

[108] Satō (1974:23).

[109] Satō (1974:26); Miwa (1973:403).

[110] Identifying others as "enmity," "rivalry," and "friendship" is an approach also taken by Alexander Wendt (1999) in his description of "three cultures of anarchy."

[111] Uete (1971:56-57); Miwa (1973:399-400); Satō (1974:26).

widely shared view of the world and of Japanese identity within it. The similar political and social backgrounds of these Meiji leaders, most of whom came from Satsuma and Chōshū regional domains, also helped them form a strong consensus over Japan's national objectives.[112] The new Meiji government with the German-style oligarchic structure also helped the Meiji leaders to pursue a coherent policy that was based on their single mission—to transform Japan into a full-fledged member of the European-led international system.

Secondly, the convergence of foreign policy goals between the Westernizers and the Asian-nationalists also contributed to lessen the political contestation between the two groups. Because of the large power gap between Japan and the Western states, Japanese policy options were quite limited. And because the Asian-nationalists foresaw an eventual and inevitable conflict between the East and the West, their view seemed to argue for (rather than contradict) the modernizing push being advocated by the Meiji leadership: Japan needed to catch up with the West before it could challenge it. In the end, Japan must modernize and strengthen its national power either to join the advanced group of states or to challenge the West. With regard to Japan's Asia policy, policy prescriptions suggested by the two groups were not far from each other. As both groups recognized that there was little prospect for collaborating with Asian neighbors, either in its effort to modernize the whole region (the Westernizers) or to collaboratively challenge the West (the Asian-nationalists), they reached the same conclusion—the only remaining

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[112] Both Satsuma and Chōshū had experience engaging in a military conflict with Western powers during the late Tokugawa period. The defeats in these battles not only had made them aware of the superiority of Western power, but also of the necessity of Japan's modernization. Soon after the Meiji restoration, most of Satsuma and Chōshū elites participated in the Iwakura Mission, a two-year-long diplomatic journey to America and Europe for the purpose of gaining knowledge of Western civilization. The common experience from the mission strengthened the participants' consensus about the future direction of Japan.

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option for Japan was to take an independent initiative in the region. By the 1880s, both groups supported Japan gaining control over Korea.

This low level of norm contestation in early Meiji Japan resulted in a coherent policy aimed at improving Japan's international status. With strong consensus within the government, the Meiji leaders had few political obstacles impeding its modernization project. Under the slogan of "rich nation, strong army," they attempted to strengthen Japan's industrial and military power bases. In terms of foreign and security policy, Meiji Japan's policy centered around two objectives: secure its national boundary and build a regional sphere of influence that increased its defense capability.[113] One of the notable features of this period was the congruence between the international normative system and the direction of Japanese policy. The effect of this policy brought Japan some major diplomatic victories by the end of the nineteenth century. In 1894, Japan improved its international position by successfully abolishing extraterritoriality with the United Kingdom, the first major step in revising unequal treaties. Japan also surprised the international community by achieving a quick military victory over China in the Sino-Japanese war of 1895.

3.2. Towards a Homogenous Normative System: "The Age of Imperialism"

The world in the middle of the nineteenth century lacked a cohesive normative system that covered the whole world. Rather, there were several independent orders

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[113] An expedition to Taiwan in 1874 and the signing of the bilateral treaty with Korea (1876) are examples of Japan's attempt to establish its regional sphere of influence.

existing in different regions, and the interaction among them was minimal.[114] In Europe, multiple sovereign states constituted a coherent regional system that had evolved over a few hundred years. Interstate relations were conducted according to common diplomatic procedures, and international laws and organizations also provided further guidelines for diplomatic practices.[115] On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean was the United States, a relatively new state that pursued a non-alignment, isolationist foreign policy, separated from its European ancestors.[116] In Asia, there was another system, a loose hierarchical regional order governed by the Chinese Empire.[117]

The coexistence of multiple orders began transforming in the latter half of the nineteenth century, and the international normative system became more homogeneous than in the past. The global normative shift was due to changes happening in each of the three regions. First, the European great powers renewed their interest in imperial expansion. Their technological and industrial superiority enabled expansion both in Africa and Asia, and increased their political and normative influence in wider areas of the world. Second, a shifting tone in its foreign policy debates signaled that the United

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[114] In the field of international relations, it is uncommon to recognize multiple international systems/orders existing at a given time. Until the nineteenth century, however, when the development of transportation enabled people to travel long distances, people's contacts were geographically limited and it was, therefore, a common phenomenon that multiple regional systems coexisted at one period. An older example, for instance, can be found in the period of the Roman and Mayan Empires. See Deudney (2000). With regard to the international order in the nineteenth century, Klien (2002:46) also argues that there were three orders, Chinese, Japanese, and European ones.

[115] These conventional customs were not only respected within Europe, but were also followed in their overseas colonies. Bull (1984:117-118,125).

[116] The historical process of American independence had a major influence in shaping its foreign policy principles. From the beginning, the United States had a strong tradition of non-alignment policy in order to avoid being dragged into European interstate conflicts. See Bull (1984:122).

[117] The empire was maintained by the relationship between superior suzerains, *i.e.* China, and vassals that paid tribute to the emperor. The level of kinship to the emperor varied greatly from country to country. On one side, there were countries like Korea, Vietnam, and Ryūkyū that had close tributary relations with China. On the other hand, there was Japan, which retained relative freedom and independence, maintaining non-hierarchical relations with China. See Bull (1984:118); Uete (1971:69-70); Yamamuro (1998:19). Highlighting the political independence of Japan from China at that time, Klien (2002:46-47) describes Asia during this period as being defined by the coexistence of the Chinese world order and the Japanese diplomatic system.

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States would become more interested in expanding its influence overseas in the future, increasingly resembling the policy of its European counterparts. Third, European advancement into Asia and its growing influence in the region contributed to the erosion of the traditional Chinese tribute system and its eventual replacement by the European treaty system.

3.2.1. "New National Imperialism" in Europe

Imperialism and overseas expansion were not new phenomena in Europe, but the 1880s appeared as a turning point in the history of European imperialism.[118] As Carlton Hayes argues "European flags were hoisted as a sport—a competitive sport;" major European powers, such as the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, competed and imitated each other in advancing colonial expansion during this period.[119] There was a strong sense of rivalry among these states, and their foreign policies came to resemble each other. The revival of "new national imperialism" in the 1880s was a clear contrast to the preceding decades, when anti-colonialist sentiment had been evident at both the public and the elite levels.[120] In Europe, colonial imperialism was increasingly perceived

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[118] The United Kingdom gained control over Egypt and India in 1882, and annexed Burma in 1886. France retained control of Tunisia in 1881, fought a war with China and made Vietnam its protectorate after victory in 1883. Germany hosted an international conference in Berlin, in which it claimed several territories in Africa. The conference, which was called the Berlin Conference (or West African Conference), was attended by the United Kingdom, Ireland, France, and Germany. The conference, where the participants divided up territories in Africa, played a major role in accelerating the Scramble of Africa. Prior to 1875 not one-tenth of Africa had been appropriated by European states. By 1895 all but a tenth of it was appropriated. See Hayes (1941:236).

[119] In France and Germany, supporters for colonial expansion referred to the British example in advocating their position, and, in return, French and German colonial expansion gave the United Kingdom pressure to take over more territory in order to prevent it from falling into the hands of rivals. Hayes (1941:228); Langer (1956:74-75).

[120] Hayes (1941:216); Langer (1956:70). At the level of decision-making, liberals and Churchill were originally opponents of imperialism in the UK. Joseph Chamberlain attempted to pull back in Afghanistan and pursued negotiations for a peaceful settlement with the Boer republics, which turned out to be in vain (May 1968:144-145). In Germany, left liberals and social Democrats (Marxists) were opposed to imperialism (May 1968:162).

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as a convention, becoming a dominant regional norm constituting of European states' policy.

In all three states, colonial expansion became part of the mainstream political agenda, and there was little resistance to pursuing the course. In the United Kingdom, for example, the movement for imperial federation won support from both liberal and conservative politicians. Political opposition was marginalized, and anti-colonialists were accused of being "Little Englanders."[121] Strong support for colonial expansion was evident not only among policy-makers, but also among intellectuals and the general public. During the 1880s and 1890s, a series of influential books was published in the United Kingdom praising the accomplishments of the British Empire. Newspapers and journals, such as the *Daily Mail* and the *Times*, became vigorously imperialistic in tone as well.[122] A number of organizations were established across Europe in support of colonial imperialism during this period.[123] The strong mass public support for colonial expansion was seen in the results of both the British and German national elections in 1884.[124]

Behind the growing popularity of imperialism was a set of domestic ideas that were widely shared among the population and served to justify overseas expansion.[125] First, nationalism in Europe was one of the prime normative sources of imperialism and a

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[121] Langer (1956:71,78). The political climate was similar in other European states. In Germany, newly crowned King Wilhelm II advocated a "new course," which put colonial policy at the center of an effort to transform Germany from a European hegemony to a world power. In France, Premiers such as Leon Gambetta and Jules Ferry were active in retaining control of territories in Africa and Southeast Asia. Townsend (1930:179-180); May (1968:159-160).

[122] Langer (1956:71,82-85). Examples are Charles Dilke's *Greater Britain* (1870); John Seeley's *The Expansion of England* (1883); and James Anthony Froude's *Oceana, or, England and Her Colonies* (1886). There was a similar phenomenon in France, where patriotic intellectuals published books in support of overseas expansion. See Hayes (1941: 220-222,252).

[123] In the United Kingdom, the Primrose League (1883) and the Imperial Federation League (1884) were founded. In Germany, the Colonial Society-*Kolonialverein*- (1882), Society for German Colonization (1883), and the Pan-German League (1890) were among the organizations established to advocate German colonialism. See Langer (1956:71); Hayes (1941:220-222,252); Townsend (1930:81,182).

[124] Langer (1956:80-81); May (1968:162-163).

[125] For a detailed analysis of Western discourse on imperialism, see A. P. Thornton (1965).

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strong nationalistic sentiment in Europe around this period was frequently encouraged by government policy. For example, the government of a newly unified Germany made a great effort to cultivate German nationalism in order to maintain national cohesion, and overseas colonization was advocated as one of the means to foster nationalism.[126] Emergence of a strong, unified Germany intensified competition and rivalry among European states, which fueled nationalism in other states, such as Britain and France.[127]

European governments relied on new national imperialism in order to gain political support from the working classes without undertaking any real effort of substantive social reform. As W.F. Monypenny described it in 1905, "power and domination rather than freedom and independence are the ideas that appeal to the imagination of the masses."[128] European political leaders pointed out the advantages of expansion for the workingman and how the acquisition of new markets would help employment, in order to draw the attention of the working classes away from socialism. In this sense, nationalism in the later nineteenth century was the product of a conscious effort by political elites to control the rise of socialism and working-class activism.[129]

Nationalism took various forms, one of which was "economic nationalism" in the United Kingdom. The popularity of the Manchester School that advocated for free trade declined, and, instead, mercantilism that suggesting active governmental intervention in

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[126] German nationalists such as Hübbe-Schleiden lobbied for overseas colonization. Townsend (1930:78-79). Hayes (1941:244) describes Germany in this period as a country of "totalitarian nationalism."

[127] Economic and industrial competition between Germany and the United Kingdom was particularly fierce. On German-British rivalry in the end of the nineteenth century, see Langer (1956:70-72,416-417,426-427,437).

[128] Langer (1956:81).

[129] In Britain, the Reform Act of 1867 enhanced the relative weight of working-class votes and made the statesmen more conscious about working-class demands. Hobsbaum (1999:103,216-217); Langer (1956:80-81); Bayly (2004:203).

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the economy took over as the mainstream economic doctrine in the 1880s.[130] The policy of new-mercantilism played a role in fueling imperialism.[131] When European governments applied tariff protections to colonies, it created conditions in which the more colonies a country had, the more favorable trade and investment opportunities were. In addition, when tariff protection restricted the customary markets of European capitalists, it impelled them to seek new ones, which also increased demands for overseas colonies.[132] As such, colonies became a crucial means of capital accumulation as well as capital export.

Another important normative base of imperialism was the sense of racial superiority held by the West, shown by the popularity of Social Darwinism during this period.[133] Originally influenced by Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer's evolution theory, intellectuals and statesmen in Europe applied it to human society and developed a doctrine of racial superiority. They argued that there was a law of natural selection among human societies, and it was a right and a destiny for superior civilizations to conquer and enlighten inferior ones. Natural selection became a vindication of

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[130] Iriye (1966i:23).

[131] Some scholars (Hayes 1941:219) refer to mercantilism in the late nineteenth century as "new mercantilism," in comparing it with the earlier mercantilism of the sixteenth century.

[132] Other factors, including the industrial revolution and domestic population overflow, contributed to creating higher demands for overseas colonies. Townsend (1930:33); Hayes (1941:204-209,219); Langer (1956:73,76). On mercantilism during this period, see Iriye (1966i:22-25); Abernethy (2000:207-209,217).

[133] The latter half of the nineteenth century witnessed a growing volume of publications across Europe insisting that it was a natural right that superior races colonize inferior races. For example, French economist Paul Leroy-Beaulieu argued in his book, titled *De la colonization chez les peoples modernes*, that everyone benefited when advanced nations took control of areas already populated by backward peoples. Many European politicians, including French Premier Jules Ferry and British statesman Joseph Chamberlain, also expressed a similar racial view. May (1968:122,160); Langer (1956:92); Townsend (1930:78-79).

imperialism, and imperialists called upon Darwinism in defense of the subjugation of weaker races.[134]

In the United Kingdom, Social Darwinism took the form of Anglo-Saxonism. As Wentworth Dilke described Anglo-Saxon race as "the predestined masters of the earth," many promoters of Anglo-Saxonism argued that it was a moral obligation, as well as a divine mission, to spread the features of "higher" civilization, such as Christianity, representative institutions, and the rule of law.[135] In fact, Christian missions provided an important adjunct to colonialism: colonialism was "spiritual salvation" to improve the world, and "any interference with the progress of British imperialism was an attempt to counteract the will of God."[136] The climax of the Enlightenment, combined with Social Darwinism, also encouraged European imperialism at the end of the nineteenth century. The belief in progress and stress on material achievement accelerated the competitive atmosphere, and imperial expansion was justified as the inevitable path for world progress.[137]

3.2.2. <u>Signs of a Shift to Imperialism in the United States</u>

Across the Atlantic Ocean there were also signs of change in American attitudes towards imperialism. Strong anti-colonialist sentiment was no longer unanimous, and there was a elite group of people who touted the benefits of expansion and supported a

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[134] Hofstadter (1956:170-171); Langer (1956:86-88,90,95); Hayes (1941:12-13,246,255,272-277). Social Darwinism also contributed to the prospect that the world would be divided between the three or four of the fittest nations, resulting in "pan-" movements, such as Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism.

[135] The quote is from Dilke's *Greater Britain* that was cited in May (1968:120). Also see Langer (1956:90,93-94); Hayes (1941:229); Curzon (1896:411-412); May (1968:120,154,128-132). Books advocating Anglo-Saxonism published in the United Kingdom include: Dilke (1869), Seeley (1883), Froude (1886), George Curzon's *Problems of the Far East* (1896), Rudyard Kipling's *The White Man's Burden* (1899).

[136] May (1968:132); Langer (1956:94,96); Hayes (1941:223-224).

[137] Hayes (1941:328-329).

new line of policy. As opposed to European states that had a long history of imperialism, American foreign policy historically had strong anti-colonialist elements.[138] Even in the 1880s, most Americans had doubts about the values of colonies and regarded colonialism as morally wrong.

This widespread anti-colonial mood in America began eroding, especially among educated Americans, in the 1890s; a period that marked a "sharp acceleration of the expansionist impulse."[139] The change of tone towards imperialism became evident in the domestic debate after the Hawaiian revolution in 1893. More heated debate over Hawaiian annexation made a contrast from a similar debate over the fate of the Dominican Republic in the 1860s, when there was a clear sign of strong disinterest in controlling the Republic among American people.[140] This time, eminent cosmopolitan Americans voiced opinions favoring the annexation, and supporters were found in big cities, like Boston, New York, and Chicago. In Washington, while President Cleveland was against the annexation, other statesmen, including Henry Cabot Lodge, Theodore Roosevelt, and Frederick Holls, advocated the annexation of the islands.[141] These evidences indicate that the blanket American non-imperialism was becoming less of a given than thirty years earlier.

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[138] May (1968:166,178). The key American foreign policy doctrines—non-alignment, isolationism, and anti-colonialism—all intended to separate the United States from its European predecessors. This was partly a reflection of American fear that European imperialists might carry their expansion into the Western Hemisphere. Historical memory of the struggle for independence from Great Britain also contributed to a strong anti-colonialist feeling in America. See May (1968, chapter V) for a detailed discussion of America's anti-colonialist tradition.
[139] Gardner et. al. (1973:212).
[140] May (1968:172).
[141] May (1968:167-170).

The transformation of American thinking in the late nineteenth century was partially a reflection of political developments in Europe at that time.[142] American elites in high society were familiar with contemporary European politics, and closely observed the conduct of European leaders, such as Winston Churchill, Lord Rosebery, Joseph Chamberlain, French Premier Jules Ferry, and Otto Bismarck. Growing support for imperialism among European leaders greatly influenced American elites' opinions towards imperialism. Such observation of European political affairs caused a frustration among American elites around the 1870s and 1880s. In their view, America lacked an effective imperial policy and was being left behind in European imperial race, while European states were actively expanding their territorial control in Africa and Asia.[143]

Convergence between European and American thought was evident in many areas. Similar to the European states, a perception of imperialism as a necessary economic tool contributed to the increasing support for imperialism in America. Industrial overproduction became a main concern among conservative businessmen and political leaders, and many addressed the need for market expansion overseas to relieve it.[144] There was a growing concern that imitation of American protective tariff policy by some European states, including Germany, Austria-Hungary, and France, would jeopardize America's future trade with Europe.[145] The fear led to desire for new overseas markets, and some viewed an annexation of Hawaii as a necessity for new markets.[146] As

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[142] Campbell (1976:149-150).

[143] May (1968:152-155,158-160,164,176). John Kasson, a former congressman from Iowa, for example, frustrated by the American absence in the International African Association held in 1876, made the remark that "Americans neglected both economic interest and moral duty by failing to take part in the great work proceeding in Africa." May (1968:158).

[144] Gardner et. al. (1973:213-218).

[145] For an account of debates over the tariff policy in America between 1894 and 1897, see Gardner et. al. (1973:219-220); LaFeber (1963:159-172).

[146] May (1968:174-175).

was the case in European states, the influence of Social Darwinism became strong in the United States, particularly after the 1870s. Social Darwinism helped Americans sustain a belief in Anglo-Saxon racial superiority and its destiny of world domination to spread peace and freedom.[147] Many books published in these decades insisted on the American destiny of ruling the world.[148]

By the end of the nineteenth century, there was a clear sign that America was slowly moving towards imperialism. Although there was a conscious effort made to differentiate its own imperialism from those of its European counterparts, there was an increasing resemblance between American and European attitudes towards imperialism.[149] Although the Spanish-American War officially shifted American policy to a path of overseas expansion, the real debate on expansion ended even before the war.[150]

3.2.3. An Asian Order in Jeopardy

One of the distinctive features of European imperialism in the late nineteenth century was that Asia was the new target of its expansion. As most of the African continent came under the control of the European states, Europeans shifted their interests

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[147] Hofstadter (1959:4-5,172) states that "the United States during the last three decades of the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth century was *the* Darwinian country." Also see Gardner et. al. (1973:220-222); May (1968:175); LaFeber (1963:95-101); Campbell (1976:149-150).
[148] Examples are John Fiske's *American Political Ideas Viewed from the Standpoint of Universal History* (1885) and Rev. Josiah Strong's *Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis* (1885). See Hofstadter (1959:177) and May (1968:132-133).
[149] In the United States, there was a general consensus that opposed territorial aggrandizement and costly overseas adventures. Instead, people advocated "liberal economic expansionism" and "liberal capitalism" a view that described the United States as an empire of free trade, linking all parts of the world through commercial expansion. In this liberal view of imperialism, the American mission was to "awaken" people in backward places, and the material and non-material benefits these places received were particularly emphasized. Iriye (1972:8-10,12,14-15,33-34); Gardner et. al. (1973:222-224).
[150] Gardner et. al. (1973:220).

towards Asia, and attempted to increase their influence.[151] The spread of European imperialism in Asia led to the corrosion of the traditional Asian order headed by China. East Asia had been governed by the "tribute system," where outlying regions gave China tributes in return for some domestic autonomy. As the European imperial powers advanced in the region, China gradually lost its regional influence as well as its own autonomy against Europe. A series of wars were fought during this process. Between 1840 and 1842, China engaged in the First Opium War with the United Kingdom. Upon China's defeat, the United Kingdom occupied Hong Kong, and China opened up several domestic ports, including Shanghai, to British trade and residence. China's defeat in the Second Opium War in 1860 resulted in the signing of an unequal treaty between China and the United Kingdom that granted a number of privileges to British subjects within China. Losing the Franco-Chinese War further cost China a number of its tributaries, giving up its suzerainty vis-à-vis Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, all of which came under French control.

Over a period of time, the Chinese tribute system was gradually replaced by the "European treaty system." The treaty system introduced a new model for international business relations between Asian and European states. European powers enforced unequal treaties that granted primary rights to Europeans.[152] These unequal treaties protected European trade and investment activities in the region, and treaty ports in major

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[151] The United Kingdom, which had founded the British East India Company more than two centuries before, used India as its base for further expansion in the region. British India was rapidly consolidated and extended, especially after 1884. France established French Indochina in 1885 after its victory in Franco-Chinese War. French Indochina, a federation of protectorates and one directly ruled colony in Southeast Asia, became the base of the French colonial empire in Asia. See Hayes (1941:236).
[152] European privileges included extraterritoriality, various trade terms like customs regulation, and the right to station their warships in Chinese ports. See Iriye (1972:4).

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cities gradually came under the control of European-dominated administrations.[153] As China lost its autonomy to European imperial powers, Asia as a region increasingly became an integral part of the European inter-state system: as the treaty system set the new governing principles for Europeans in dealing with Asian countries. This enabled the European states to establish a new normative structure favorable for the further development of such imperial projects.

3.3. Norm Selection Process in Early Meiji Japan

3.3.1. <u>The Japanese Encounter with the West</u>

As European imperial powers advanced to the Far East in the middle of the nineteenth century, Japan was isolated from the outside world under the Tokugawa shōgunate. This isolationist policy, called *sakoku*, not only banned foreigners from coming to Japan, but also forbade any Japanese to leave the country. Japan's two-century-long seclusion policy and this limited worldview had a tremendous impact on Japan's identity formation. Japanese identity during the Tokugawa era was mainly shaped in relation to China, the country with which Japan historically had the most intimate relations.[154] Historically speaking, there had been a widely shared sense of admiration for China as Japan's source of civilization and enlightenment. This respect for China developed a traditional view that positioned Japan in the periphery of the greater Chinese order.[155] Entering the nineteenth century, however, as a result of the *sakoku* policy that

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[153] Fairbank (1968ii:18).

[154] According to Klien (2002:31), identity formation essentially requires "the delineation of a self from an other" and "the existence/definition of an other is a vital condition for one's self."

[155] Samuels (2003:34). During the early Edo period, China under the Ming dynasty was commonly seen as civilization *per se* in Japan and the Japanese regarded themselves as underdeveloped by comparison. See Klien (2002:42).

strengthened consciousness of Japan's uniqueness and cultural particularism, a number of Japanese thinkers began claiming Japan's superiority and its place as the center of the world order.[156] Confucian scholars, such as Yamazaki Ansai and Yamaga Sokō, adapted the Chinese style *kai* (China-centered) concept to their own means and ends, creating a self-centered identity of *"Nihon Chūka Shisō"* (Japanese-centered ideology).[157]

Nonetheless, Tokugawa Japan's identity had been loosely related to its relations with China until 1800. Turning to the nineteenth century, however, the West replaced China as Japan's most important "other," both in the sense of security concerns as well as the source of civilization and enlightenment.[158] European states initially emerged as security threat for Tokugawa Japan. Russia attacked villages in the northern islands of Japan during 1806-1807 after Japan's rejection of open commercial relations. China's defeat in the Opium War of 1840-1842 raised great concern in a Japan that felt under increasingly threatened by Western powers. Japan was right to be worried, for it was only a decade later when American Commodore Matthew Perry sailed his four ships into Tokyo bay, and forced Japan to abandon its two-century-long isolationist policy. In 1854, Perry and the Japanese signed the Treaty of Kanagawa, the result of which made Japan open two ports to American vessels. By 1859, the British, Russians, French, and Dutch also issued successful demands for access to Japanese ports. After more than two

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[156] The fact that Tokugawa Japan avoided becoming a subordinate tributary country to the Chinese Empire, as well as its geographical condition, allowed Japan to develop a distinctive identity separate from China. Unlike Korea, Ryūkyū, and Vietnam, Tokugawa Japan refused to provide tribute to China, nor did the Chinese dynasty demand tribute to Japan. Satō (1974:2-3); Miwa (1974:18).

[157] Klien (2002:42-43,47); Miwa (1973:389); LaFeber (1997:8). Klien (2002:44) argues "Tokugawa Japan did not accept the Chinese world order but was too weak to actively challenge it. The distinct feeling of national cohesion and particularity shared by Tokugawa thinkers can only be interpreted as a sign of consciousness about Japan's cultural debts to China and its latent inferiority." For a similar account of Japan's inferiority complex in relation to China, see Uete (1971:40); Satō (1974:4).

[158] Satō (1974:24); Klien (2002:44).

centuries of seclusion from the world, these treaties brought Japan into relations with other states, and this was when Japan began searching for its identity in this new world.

3.3.2. <u>Consolidation of the Japanese Worldview and State Identity in Early Meiji Period</u>

Signing the treaties with Western powers integrated Japan into the European international system. Brought into the new international environment, the Japanese strove to gain knowledge of European interstate system, as well as Japan's position and identity within it. By 1868, the number of Japanese scholars who studied the West surpassed that of Sinologists or Japanologists.[159] Through interactions with European states and the United States, in addition to general observations of international affairs, the Japanese learned the European norms, and gradually constructed its image of the European interstate system. The following sections discuss two key ideas that emerged in Japan during the late Tokugawa and the early Meiji period. Each represents a distinctive worldview and Japanese identity that led to different policy prescriptions.

3.3.2.1. *The Mainstream View: The Worldview held by the Westernizers*

The first contending worldview at that time was the hierarchical international order. Supporters of this view included the Meiji oligarchs, who had been the architects of the Meiji Restoration and dictated the subsequent decision-making process throughout the Meiji period. Most Westernizers had the first-hand experience of Western countries, either by visiting or studying abroad, and shared a similar view towards the West. Influential Westernized intellectuals, such as Fukuzawa Yukichi and Nishi Amane, also held the similar view of the West to those of the Meiji oligarchs.

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[159] Satō (1974:24).

These political and intellectual elites with experience in and contact with the West understood the notion of hierarchy that created a boundary between European and non-European states. One example was the distinction between European colonial powers and non-European colonies (and half-colonies).[160] Two main criteria seemed to determine where a state was positioned in the hierarchy. One was the economic power, that includes and is often signaled by, military power, and the other was its level of civilization.[161] The very first issue of the government's official periodical, called *Meiji Gekkan* (Meiji Monthly), featured an articled titled a "List of National Power" that ranked states with which Japan had diplomatic relations based on military power, population, and territorial size. The second issue of the same journal ranked world regions into five groups based on the level of civilization.[162] Fukuzawa Yukichi also published a similar international ranking of states based on civilization. His rankings included three categories of "civilized," "half-civilized," and "uncivilized/barbarian"; he ranked Japan and Asia as "half-civilized."[163]

For the Westernizers, Europe symbolized power and civilization, and Asia, including Japan, represented backwardness.[164] They were also aware of the coexistence of double standards—one applied only among civilized European states, and the other included the rest of the world. International law was a good example. Even though international law guaranteed equal rights among states, it was only applied once a state

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[160] Iriye (1966i:35).
[161] Satō (1974:21-23). The concept of Western civilization included many features. It included a religious dimension, namely Christianity, science and technology, including military technology and war strategy, an institutional aspect, such as political institutions and constitution, and general aspects, like living standards. Sakuma Shōzan, an intellectual during the late Tokugawa period, highlighted Columbus's discovery of a new continent, Copernicus's heliocentric theory of the solar system, and Newtonian theory as the three inventions that accelerated the progress of European civilization. See Uete (1971:48-49).
[162] Satō (1974:22-23).
[163] Okazaki (1994:73); Klien (2002:46).
[164] Shibahara (1988:490); Uete (1971:58).

was recognized as sovereign. This conditionality implied that the security afforded by international law applied only to relations among European powers, while the relations between European and non-European states were typically regulated by unequal treaties, as was the cases of Japan and China. A number of the Meiji oligarchs, such as Kido Kōin, Yamagata Aritomo, Itō Hirobumi, and Iwakura Tomomi, repeatedly expressed a shared view that international law was used as a tool to exploit the weak by European states and power politics overshadowed international law. Intellectuals, such as Fukuzawa Yukichi and Kuga Katsunan, also claimed that international law was applied in a discriminatory way, only applied to Christian states.[165]

Although the Westernizers recognized the existence of discrimination within the international hierarchy, they did not view the European international order and Western civilization as something geographically or racially constrained. Rather, oligarchs, such as Ōkubo Toshimichi and Itō Hirobumi, viewed Western civilization in a universalistic way, something that any state, regardless of its racial composition, could aspire to.[166] As a natural consequence, the modernizers focused their energy on catching up with the West and improving Japan's position in the international hierarchy.[167] The Prussian example—its transformation into a powerful empire and its victory over France—was often referred by the Westernizers, including Ōkubo and Iwakura, as a good precedent for

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[165] Bismarck told the members of Iwakura Mission in person how international law was applied in a discriminatory way, based on the power of each state. See Tanaka (1984:123-124); Wattenberg (1998:117-118). Shibahara (1988:468,472-473,479,485); Yamamuro (1998:13-14); Uete (1971:68); Okazaki (1994:75).

[166] Shibahara (1988:490); Klien (2002:46); Satō (1974:24). The concept of this universality was itself a feature of Western civilizations' idea of its own imperial project (that everyone deserves freedom). Indeed, the Westernizers were repeating one feature of the Western view, its universality, even as they argued against its unequal practice. I am thankful for Dan Stout for pointing it out.

[167] The official report by the Iwakura Mission determined that the reason for Asia's backwardness was not because Asians were an inferior race or less intelligent than Europeans. Rather, it was due to different natural and social conditions. Tanaka (1984:189-190).

Japan.[168] *Naigai Heiji Shimbun*, a newspaper specializing in military-related information, carried a speech by Count von Moltke, the Prussian military General who led Prussia to a victory over France in 1876.[169]

The Westernizers viewed Western civilization not only as an advanced stage of historical progress, but sufficiently powerful to consolidate the world through its universalization.[170] Seeing that the familiar Chinese order was gradually dismantled by European states, the Westernizers understood the contemporary events as a part of the ongoing historical progress, where the unifying power of a superior civilization was absorbing other inferior ones. The increasing influence of Western powers seemed to suggest that any uncivilized country would move to the next stage of "half-civilized," then finally to "civilization," either forced by the Western states or on their own. Darwin and Spencer's evolutionary theories that were introduced in Japan also influenced the modernizers who applied the law of natural selection in order to argue for the survival of some civilizations over others.[171]

How did the Westernizers view Japan's position and identity in the new world? Since they believed in the inevitability of accepting Western civilization, Japan, too, was in the middle of this inevitable historical progress trying to elevate itself from it's "half-civilized" position to the "civilized" level of the European states. The notion of "joining the West" was most-well articulated by Fukuzawa Yukichi, a prominent westernized

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[168] During Iwakura Mission's visit in Germany, Bismarck gave a speech in which he referred to how a small country of Prussia was transformed into a strong German Empire. Bismarck's speech left a strong impression on the Japanese who took part in the Iwakura Mission. Tanaka (1984:122-123); Iwata (1964:158-159).

[169] Shibahara (1988:469-470); Katō (2002:36-40).

[170] Shibahara (1988:490); Okazaki (1994:73). An extension of this vision was known as *"Bunmei ichigen ron"* (Monism of civilizations), in which various civilizations were gradually assimilated into one, superior civilization.

[171] Weiner (1997:5-7). In this analogy, Japan belonged to the group of "half-civilized" and needed to move up to the next level. Miwa (1973:396).

intellectual in Meiji Japan. In his article called "*Datsu-A ron*" (On De-Asianization), Fukuzawa argued for the impossibility of resisting Western civilization and suggested that Japan should eagerly embrace it.[172] According to Fukuzawa,

> to anyone who has seen with his eyes the present state of world affairs and knows its actual impossibility there can be no other policy than to move on with the rest of the world and join them in dipping into the sea of civilization, joining them in creating the waves of civilization…[173]

In his mind, "if [Japan] were to resist civilization and prevent its introduction, Japan would not remain an independent state." Therefore, Japan had no choice but to commit itself to help its spread and the Japanese should be immersed in its ways as soon as possible.[174]

In this venture of westernization, Fukuzawa pleaded for Japan's complete detachment from other Asian countries, notably China and Korea. In his view, China and Korea were making a futile attempt to preserve their tradition "by shutting themselves up in a room with the result being that they are cutting off their supply of fresh air and asphyxiating themselves," and as a result, "those countries will meet their doom in but a few years, with their territories divided among the civilized countries of the world."[175]

> To plan our course now, therefore, our country cannot afford to wait for the enlightenment of our neighbors and to co-operate in building Asia up. Rather, we should leave their ranks to join the camp of the civilized countries of the West.[176]

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[172] LaFeber (1997:36); Klien (2002:32); Miwa (1973:409). The article was originally published in an independent newspaper, *Jiji Shimpō*, in March 1885. *Jiji Shimpō* that began its publication in 1882 had a circulation as many as 5000 by two years later.
[173] Fukuzawa (1972:129).
[174] Fukuzawa (1972:130).
[175] Fukuzawa (1972:132).
[176] Fukuzawa (1972:133).

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Fukuzawa advocated the discarding of the traditional Chinese-influenced Asian order, and fully join the European international order. For him, the ethnicity and culture of the Orient was not considered an integral part of the Japanese identity. For Fukuzawa and his followers, "Western civilization" represented universal human progress, and there was no doubt that Japan needed to identify itself with this higher civilization regardless of its Oriental background.

As the ideas of people like Fukuzawa took hold, Japan began a much more concerted project of Westernization. The domestic as well as the foreign policy of the Meiji oligarchs, supported by people like Fukuzawa, were geared towards a single objective: the modernization of Japan in order to catch up with the West and eventually become a full-fledged member of the Western international community. "*Datsu-A Nyū-Ō*" (Leaving Asia, Entering Europe) became a dominant political slogan under the Meiji government. The national project of "join the West" had many key components and they were all intertwined. With regard to domestic policy, westernization included reforms of various domestic institutions. Strengthening Japan's industrial and military bases, often referred to under the slogan "rich nation, strong army," was another core objective. In the foreign policy sphere, a policy of overseas immigration and regional expansion, an imitation of Western foreign policy, became a core strategy for national security as well as modern capitalist development. Treaty revision was one of the main foreign policy goals, since abolishing the unequal treaties was not only essential for Japan's economic progress, but also a milestone on Japan's path toward becoming an equal member in the international community. Lastly, in order to gain respect from the western states and

recognition as "civilized," the Meiji oligarchs were extremely careful to maintain peaceful relations with the West.

3.3.2.2. A Contending View: The Worldview held by the Asian-nationalists

The view described above, in which Japan accepted the Western-led international system, constituted the majority position in early Meiji Japan. The oligarchs who dominated the Meiji politics shared this view, as well as western-educated intellectuals and Japanese diplomats stationed overseas. Alongside this majority outlook, however, another worldview existed in Japan at that time. While the first view believed in the possibility of Japan's assimilation with the West, the second view emphasized the division between the East and the West. This minority view was characterized by strong anti-western sentiments, and was advocated by a group of nationalists who criticized their government's pro-Western policy.

The international normative order of the nineteenth century, with European imperial states' advancing into Asia, created a strong sense of threat, fueling anti-Western nationalism in Japan. A strong anti-Western doctrine was first developed by scholars in *Mito* school.[177] Similar to the analogy of *"Nihon Chūka Shisō* (Japanese-centered ideology)"* that was popular in the late Tokugawa period, *Mito* school scholars, such as Fujita Yūkoku and Aizawa Yasushi, emphasized the uniqueness of Japan's unbroken line of the divine emperor, which, they argued, places Japan in a superior position above any other state in the world and makes the western states seem "barbaric" by comparison.[178]

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[177] The *Mito* school, a school of thought dating from 1657, was formed in the process of compiling "*Dai Nihon-shi* (Great Japanese History)." Being highly adept at studying historical works, scholars in this school tend to be nationalistic, stressing the uniqueness of Japan.
[178] Miwa (1973:397-398); Okazaki (1994:64-65).

The Tokugawa government's decision to give in to Western demands and sign unequal treaties heightened Japanese nationalists' anti-Western sentiment even further. Gradually, Japanese nationalism began taking the shape of Asianism, an ideology that stresses cultural and ethnic kinship among Asian nations as opposed to the West. The Asianist ideology reflected a growing conviction among nationalists that culturally homogeneous Western powers had cooperatively attempted to invade Asia, and that Asian nations, such as Japan and China, faced common threats and discrimination from the West.[179] In the view of the Asian-nationalists, European states first advanced to China, defeated it in a series of wars, then eroded the ancient Chinese order which had prevailed for many centuries. Now, these European states came to Japan and forced it to open its ports with superior military technology. Incidents, such as the California Chinese Immigration Exclusion Law (1882) and the Normanton Incident (1886) further convinced the Asian-nationalists of the common fate of victimization Asian countries suffered at the hands of the West. For example, liberal-nationalist Sugita Junzan claimed, in his 1883 article, that yellow race was about to be wiped out by the white race, and critics like political activist Tarui Tōkichi stressed cultural kinship and a sense of shared Asian destiny in advocating regional cooperation.[180]

For the Asian-nationalists who highlighted the division between East and West, Japanese identity naturally belonged to Asia.[181] Japan's "Asian" identity vis-à-vis the West was primarily based on racial connotations, representing Japanese ethnic and cultural affinity. While the modernizers emphasized the prospect of Japan's assimilation

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[179] Miwa (1973:403); Satō (1974:26).
[180] Tarui (1975); Motoyama (1971:260-263,270-273); Yamamuro (1998:19); Klien (2002:33).
[181] This was a common feature found among *Mito* school scholars, including Ōhashi Totsuan. See Okazaki (1994:66-67).

with the West, the Asian-nationalists stressed the impossibility of reconciliation between East (Japan) and West. *Mito* school scholars, such as Fujita Yūkoku and Aizawa Yasushi, emphasized the image of barbaric West, and an agriculturalist Satō Nobuhiro argued that there were personality differences between the Asians and Westerners.[182] Asian-nationalists' racial vision of international politics and their emphasis on cleavage between East and West was also reflected in their view of the future. While the Westernizers argued for the conversion of different civilizations into one superior western civilization, the Asian-nationalists, instead, insisted on a future prospect in which different world civilizations would compete with one another.[183]

The antagonism of the Asian-nationalists towards the West resulted in the following three policy prescriptions. The first was an absolute rejection of any contact with the West. This was the objective of "*son'nō, jōi*" (Restore the Emperor and Expel the Barbarian), a protest movement that gained popularity after the Tokugawa government's decision to open Japan to the Western states. The motto of "*son'nō, jōi*" reflected a strong sense of cautiousness and enmity towards the Western states, with a particular emphasis on Japan's distinctive national identity based on its imperial system.[184] Mito school scholars provided an intellectual foundation of "*son'nō, jōi*" movement, and it spread rapidly among the anti-Tokugawa *samurai* (warrior) group.

The second policy advocated by the Asian-nationalists was collaboration among Asian countries to confront the Western powers. For the Asian-nationalists, the idea of

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[182] Uete (1971:35,44-45,58); Okazaki (1994:64-66).

[183] A nationalist intellectual and journalist, Kuga Katsunan, expressed this view. Klien (2002:57).

[184] Satō (1974:15); Okazaki (1994:64-66). The initial "*son'nō, jōi*" slogan was to a large extent a spiritual argument based on a chauvinistic view of Japan and a dismissive view of the outer world. The "barbarian" image of the West was especially stressed, and it applied a simplistic dichotomy of Japan as divine and West as evil. Uete (1971:45).

Asian cooperation emerged as the natural extension of ethnic and cultural kinship in facing the common Western threat. China's defeat in the First Opium War in 1842, in conjunction with the unequal treaties Japan signed with the Western states first led to the idea of Sino-Japanese cooperation. This was advocated not only by the Asian-nationalists, but also by some key policy-makers within the Tokugawa government.[185] Aizawa Yasushi and Hirano Kuniomi advocated Sino-Japanese cooperation based on the common Confucian religion. Katsu Kaishū, a navy officer and statesman during the late Tokugawa shōgunate, also wrote in his 1863 diary about the need for collaboration among Japan, Korea, and China.[186] Several scholars point out that the Sino-Japanese bilateral treaty (*Nisshin Shūkō Jyōki*) signed in 1871 was a product of the Meiji government's effort to seek a regional partner against the Western threat.[187] However, when the Meiji government distanced itself from Asian collaboration during the 1880s, the idea of building closer regional ties linked anti-government movements. The Popular Rights Movement (*Jiyū Minken Undō*) was one such example. Opposing Meiji oligarchic rule, as well as autocratic rule in other Asian countries, popular rights supporters sought Asian collaboration as a way to unite people across Asia in their effort to expand popular rights and promote democracy throughout the region. They believed that establishing democratic political regimes would strengthen Asian countries and eventually lead to their independence from the West.[188]

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[185] Uete (1971:56-57).

[186] Okazaki (1994:64-66,75); Yamamuro (1998:7-9).

[187] The objective of the Meiji government to sign the treaty is under debate among the Japanese scholars. Those who argue that Japan sought for a regional partner emphasize that Article Two of the bilateral treaty implied that the treaty was a military alliance between Japan and China, and it targeted the Western powers as hypothetical enemies. See Satō (1974:26); Miwa (1973:403). Others argue that the Meiji leaders attempted to increase Japan's influence over Korea by signing a treaty that assured the equal relations between Japan and China. See Shibahara (1988:473,480); Yamamuro (1998:16).

[188] Klien (2002:52); Motoyama (1971:261-264).

The third policy prescription of the Asian-nationalists was Japanese regional leadership in the Asian crusade against Western imperialism. The idea of Japanese leadership in Asia emerged in the mid-1880s as a result of the Asian-nationalists' growing disappointment with China as a potential regional collaborator. The trend was particularly evident among people's rights movement supporters, who had initially been very passionate about the regional collaboration. Sugita Junzan and Ōi Kentarō were among those who had originally attempted to "enlighten" Chinese and Korean people. Once they realized that there was little prospect to realize this goal, however, they converted their position, and began insisting on Japanese expansion and domination in Asia.[189]

3.4. Norm Contestation in Early Meiji Japan: The Victory of the Westernizers

This section deals with the norm contestation process. That is, how the aforementioned domestic ideas concerning "what to do in the world" informed policy prescriptions; and why the Meiji oligarchs' view of adopting Western civilization won out over other views in the end. In examining the process by which decision-makers sought to convince others of their positions, the effect of the international normative environment, including how the Meiji leaders exploited the normative system for their political gain, is carefully evaluated. During the late Tokugawa and the early Meiji periods, the degree of norm contestation among the decision-makers was relatively low. In short, at this time this consensus among the oligarchs dictating the Meiji governance resulted from the homogeneous international normative environment surrounding Japan at that time. The nationalist group that protested the policy of westernization were

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[189] Motoyama (1971:258,261-265,268).

thereby marginalized, and their protest movements did not have a significant impact on actual decision-making.

3.4.1. "*Kaikoku*" (Opening Japan) versus "*Jōi*" (Expel the Barbarians): The first period of norm contestation during the late Tokugawa period

The first episode of serious norm contestation took place when Commodore Perry sailed into Tokyo in 1853. Opinions within the government were sharply divided about whether Japan should continue its *sakoku* policy or abandon its isolationist past. On one side, both 13th *shōgun* Tokugawa Iesada (ruled between 1853-58) and Emperor Kōmei were anti-Western, and strongly hoped to keep foreigners off Japanese soil.[190] On the other side, most of the senior councilors (*rōjū*) who were in charge of conducting actual policy, as well as the enlightened elites who were knowledgeable about the West, were convinced that increased contact with foreigners was inevitable, and so should be turned to Japan's advantage.[191]

This sense of the inevitability of contact with the West was helped along by the sense that Japan was, in terms of its international power, in no position to remain isolated even if it wanted to. Those who supported the *kaikoku* policy (opening Japan) were fully aware that, because of the power gap between Japan and the Western states, Japan did not have much choice but to accept the Western demands. The fate of neighboring China in fighting the Opium War against Britain did not allow the Japanese elites to have any illusion that the Western powers would leave Japan unharmed in case Japan rejected their

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[190] Some argue that heads of *shōgunate* often considered Western pressure as a threat to the Tokugawa regime. Tokugawa Iesada's successor, 14th *shōgun* Tokugawa Iemochi (1859-1866) also supported the *jōi* policy. See Uete (1971:44); LaFeber (1997:17-18).

[191] Supporters of this view included: senior councilors Hotta Masayoshi, chief councilor Ii Naosuke, a naval officer and statesman Katsu Kaishū, 15th *shōgun* Tokugawa Yoshinobu (1866-1867), as well as Tokugawa intellectuals, such as Sakuma Shōzan, Yokoi Shōnan, and Hashimoto Sanai. See Uete (1971:50-51,60); Okazaki (1994:68-72).

demands. Over time, as more top officials acknowledged this reality of Western superiority over Japan and the West's persistence in opening up Japan, many who initially rejected the *kaikoku* policy, such as the lord of Mito clan Tokugawa Nariaki and Emperor Kōmei, changed their views and, through reluctantly, accepted Japan's changing course.[192]

As more and more Tokugawa officials accepted the inevitability of Japan's engagement with the Western powers, avoiding a military conflict with the West became Tokugawa government's highest policy priority. For example, as soon as the *shōgunate* learned of the British victory over China in 1842, it repealed the Expulsion law of Western vessels that had originally been issued in 1825.[193] The news that British and French warships blasted China open in 1857 and 1858 heavily influenced a decision of chief councilor Ii Naosuke to sign a bilateral treaty with the United States in 1858, which terminated the two-century-long *sakoku* policy.[194]

However, the abolition of the *sakoku* policy by the Tokugawa government escalated internal unrest and destabilized the already-weakened Tokugawa regime even further.[195] Financially impoverished samurai demanded the replacement of the corrupt Tokugawa regime with the new imperial rule. The protest movement also criticized the government's decision to abandon the *sakoku* policy. The unfair treaties the *shōgunate*

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[192] When Tokugawa Nariaki, one of the representative figures of the *jōi* movement, saw the Perry's actual vessels, he shifted his position and supported the government's decision to open up Japan. He considered the treaty with the West as "necessary evil." Even Emperor Kōmei, who was known to his conservative, anti-Western stance, finally submitted to Western demands and accepted the treaty in 1865, when the Western vessels sailed into Osaka bay and directly demanded a treaty with the emperor. See Klien (2002:48); Satō (1974:16-17); Uete (1971:46); Nish (1977:9-10).
[193] Klien (2002:41); Satō (1974:16-17).
[194] Satō (1974:15-16); LaFeber (1997:23).
[195] For example, having trade relations with the Western states increased commodity prices in Japan, which pressed particularly hard on samurai families due to their fixed income from stipends. The increasing prices contributed to the rise of anti-Tokugawa movement among the samurai. Beasley (1990:42-43).

signed with the Western powers and the increasing presence of westerners in Japan fueled the nationalism of the conservative samurai, who committed a number of assassinations of *kaikoku* leaders and foreigners in Japan during this period.[196] The growing anti-Tokugawa movement was gradually consolidated under the slogan of "*son'nō, jōi*" (Restore the Emperor, Expel the Barbarian). In this increasingly hostile atmosphere for the Tokugawa regime, two regional domains of Satsuma and Chōshū formed an anti-Tokugawa political alliance in 1866. With the support of anti-Tokugawa court nobles, they successfully toppled the two-century-long Tokugawa *shōgunate*, and replaced it with a new imperial rule under the Meiji Emperor in 1868.[197]

3.4.2. <u>The Victory of the Meiji Leaders [1]: Consensus among the Meiji Oligarchs</u>

The political leaders from the Satsuma and Chōshū domains, who played a central role in overthrowing the Tokugawa regime, dominated the new Meiji regime. The oligarchs from these clans shared many common features, which helped them build a strong consensus in conducting policy matters. For instance, both Satsuma and Chōshū experienced direct military conflict with the Western powers, which critically affected their worldview. For the Chōshū, a group that had traditionally been a strong power in the *jōi* group, the Bombardment of Shimonoseki was a critical turning point for internal political dynamics. Repeated attacks by the Chōshū clan on foreign ships invited allied naval forces from Britain, the Netherlands, France, and the United States, that jointly attacked and destroyed the forts in Shimonoseki in 1864. The devastation led to the fall of

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[196] Chief councilor Ii Naosuke was assassinated in 1860. Both Sakuma Shōzan and Yokoi Shōnan, intellectuals who supported for *kaikoku* policy, were also assassinated in 1864 and 1868.
[197] For a detailed account for the Meiji Restoration in 1868, see Klien (2002:49,51-52); Uete (1971:43-44,62); Nish (1977:10).

the *jōi* group in Chōshū. Since then, the Chōshū politics was dominated by the *kaikoku* group, such as Kido Kōin, Yamagata Aritomo, and Itō Hirobumi. Satsuma also suffered from the British bombardment in 1863 as retribution for a British merchant murdered by a group of fanatic Satsuma samurai.[198] The victories of the Western powers in both conflicts increased Chōshū and Satsuma leaders' awareness of the Western military superiority, which led to the conviction that Japan had no choice but to find a way to co-exist with the Western powers. Since them, both Satsuma and Chōshū actively tried to gain knowledge about the West. A number of elites were sent overseas to study Western civilization. In case of Satsuma, after the bilateral conflict was settled in 1863, it developed closer ties with Britain in its effort to overthrow the Tokugawa regime that was tied to France.[199]

Another important incident that contributed to the development of Satsuma-Chōshū elites' international view was the Iwakura Mission, a two-year-long official diplomatic journey to America and Europe between 1871 and 1873. This first-hand experience of Western civilization helped the participants develop a common view regarding Japan's external environment, its current position in the world, and its future objectives. The participants included key personnel in the Meiji government, such as Ōkubo Toshimichi (Satsuma), Kido Kōin (Chōshū), and Itō Hirobumi (Chōshū), all of whom became main architects of the Meiji government's domestic as well as foreign policy.[200] In addition to the consensus among the Satsuma-Chōshū elites, the fact that the

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[198] For a detailed account for the Bombardment of Shimonoseki and Anglo-Satsuma War, see Satow (1998: ch8,10).
[199] Okazaki (1994:78).
[200] For a detailed account for the Iwakura Mission, see Kume (1977-1982); Tanaka (1984); Nish (1998).

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initial Meiji state was an oligarchic system also lessened the norm contestation within the government.[201]

When the Satsuma-Chōshū alliance defeated the Tokugawa forces, and restored the Meiji emperor as the new ruler of Japan in 1868, there was little controversy among the Meiji oligarchs about the continuation of the *kaikoku* policy set by their predecessor. This caused a dilemma for the Meiji leaders, however. In their attempt to overturn the Tokugawa regime, they relied on the popular "*son'nō, jōi*" movement. Now that the *shōgunate* was gone, the Meiji leaders had to face the "*son'nō, jōi*" activists, who expected the new state to reverse Japan's course from the *kaikoku* policy.[202] In order to avoid the criticism from the "*son'nō, jōi*" followers and legitimate the continuation of the *kaikoku* policy, the Meiji leaders turned to European liberal thought as a means to highlight the justice of the Western states. Westernized liberal intellectuals, who supported the Meiji leaders, played a critical role in disseminating European liberalism in Japan in the 1860s. Scholars, such as Yokoi Shōnan and Fukuzawa Yukichi, stressed liberal European norms, such as freedom, democracy, republicanism, international reciprocity, liberty, and equality among nations.[203] Nishi Amane introduced European international law to Japan, and Yoshino Sakuzō reinterpreted Confucian concept of "*tenri*" (natural law) and applied it to European international law.[204] Most of the

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[201] The oligarchic ruling was also called *Hanbatsu seiji*, where Satsuma and Chōshū domains (*han*) monopolized the main governmental positions as well as the military. Richard Samuels (2003:48) describes the Meiji political system as "a *double* governing system---one that would harness the legitimacy of the emperor while simultaneously monopolizing the power to wield the emperor's prerogatives."

[202] Iwakura Tomomi expressed his concern about the public disappointment with the Meiji government's continuation of the *kaikoku* policy in an opinion paper written in 1869. See Katō (2002:29).

[203] Uete (1971:62-64); Okazaki (1994:71).

[204] In 1865, *Public Law of Nations* by American jurist Henry Wheaton was translated and introduced in Japan. Three years later, Nishi Amane translated Prof. Simon Vissering's lecture on natural law at Leiden University, which had a large impact on introducing and spreading the concept of international law in Japan. See Klien (2002:54); Uete (1971:60,64-65).

pragmatic Meiji leaders, including Kido Kōin, Yamagata Aritomo, Itō Hirobumi, and Iwakura Tomomi, were fully aware that international law was used in a discriminatory way, as a tool to exploit the weak by European states.[205] Nonetheless, the Meiji leaders emphasized European principles of equality and sovereignty in order to ease the domestic anti-western sentiment, and to increase hope that Japan would be treated fairly by the Western states.[206]

3.4.3. <u>The Victory of the Meiji Leaders [2]: The Role of Japanese Nationalism</u>

The previous section discussed the first reason for the relatively low level of norm contestation in the early Meiji period—the consent among the Satsuma-Chōshū Meiji leaders and their increasing power consolidation as they managed the affairs of state. This section deals with another important factor that restrained norm contestation; the political role of the nationalists during this period. As noted above, ever since the Tokugawa government's decision to sign unequal treaties with the Western states, a strong, anti-Western nationalism had emerged in Japan. It was first developed by the *Mito* school scholars, that provided an intellectual foundation of the "*son'nō, jōi*" movement. The early Meiji period saw a similar form of highly patriotic and anti-Western nationalism. The nationalists were particularly sensitive about the discriminatory treatment Japan endured with the Westerners, and the unequal treaties were one of the main targets of the nationalists. Any Meiji government failure in the negotiations over the treaty revision invited a strong national reaction, and cost high political price for officials involved in the

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[205] Shibahara (1988:468,472-473,479,485); Yamamuro (1998:13-14); Uete (1971:68); Okazaki (1994:75).
[206] Fairbank (1968i:9); Uete (1971:60-64); Katō (2002: 27-28).

negotiation.[207] The nationalists were also the main critic of the government's

westernization policy and its compromising stance vis-à-vis the Western states.

Throughout the period, however, the nationalist movement failed to become strong

enough to affect the official decision-making process. The political impact of the

nationalists was sporadic, gaining momentum only when a particular incident, such as the

Normanton Incident in 1886, occurred.[208]

3.4.3.1. The End of the "Son'nō, Jōi" Movement: The Challenge by the "Conservative-Nationalists"

The first serious domestic political challenge the Meiji oligarchs faced came from

its former ally in overthrowing the Tokugawa regime, the nationalist samurai. In fighting

a series of battles against the Tokugawa *shōgunate*, the Satsuma-Chōshū alliance relied

on samurai worriers from various regional domains. These samurai were conservative-

nationalists. They were conservative in their hope to restore the traditional social and

economic status of the samurai class, which increasingly eroded during the late

Tokugawa period. They were also nationalistic in stressing Japan's "national prestige" in

the world. The anti-Western sentiment originated from their view that the unequal treaties

the Western powers imposed on Japan were a great humiliation for the nation. These

samurai became antagonistic to the Tokugawa rule because of their decreasing social

status, increasing financial hardship, and their dissatisfaction with the way the *shōgunate*

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[207] Inoue Kaoru was forced to resign in 1887, and Ōkuma Shigenobu was attacked in 1888, both as a result of public dissatisfaction with little progress in the treaty revision. Shibahara (1988:484).

[208] In 1886, the English ship *Normanton* sank off the Japanese coast. While the English captain and all the foreign crew were saved, the Japanese passengers were left to drown. A consular court in Kōbe exonerated the captain and the crew of charges of criminal negligence. The Japanese public was outraged by this court decision. The Normanton Incident highlighted the Western discrimination against the Japanese, as well as the extraterritorial rights of these foreigners. See Klien (2002:53-54).

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was dealing with the Western powers. Fighting the *shōgunate* under the slogan of "*son'nō, jōi,*" they played a critical role in bringing about the Meiji Restoration.

Once the common goal of regime change was accomplished however, the samurai quickly realized the gap between their demands and the direction of the Meiji policy. First, to their disappointment, the Meiji government did not annul the *kaikoku* policy. In fact, its policy towards the West was quite reminiscent of the Tokugawa government's. Secondly, the Meiji policy of modernization, that gave rise to the abolition of feudalism as well as the establishment of a conscript army, worsened the general conditions for the samurai.[209] The growing number of dissatisfied samurai led to the first deep split in the Meiji oligarchic leadership, posing a serious threat to the still-fragile new government. Over time, the discontented samurai gathered under Saigō Takamori, a conservative Satsuma leader and one of the main architects of the Meiji Restoration, who was sympathetic about the deteriorating social condition of the former worrier class. Saigō increasingly distanced himself from, and became critical of, his former colleagues such as Ōkubo Toshimichi who employed modernization at the expense of the former samurai class.

The first episode of political contestation between the two groups took place over the Korean expedition. External expansion was seen as an ideal opportunity for thousands of out-of-work samurai who had lost their income and social standing. Korea's repeated rejection to open diplomatic relations with Japan, as well as its refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the Meiji Emperor, was seen as the perfect opportunity for discontented samurai to dispatch a military expedition to Korea for the sake of Japan's national

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[209] The loss of samurai status, with the reduction and then the commutation of hereditary stipends, greatly undermined their already tenuous financial position. Samuels (2003:51).

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prestige and proving the greatness of Japanese samurai worriers. Meiji oligarchs, such as Ōkubo and Kido, rejected Saigō's request to send him to Korea as an ambassador plenipotentiary, which would have been likely to escalate to the bilateral military conflict. Lost in the battle over the Korean expedition in 1873, Saigō left the government with six others, resigning from all of his official positions in protest, and returned to his hometown of Kagoshima, where he established a private military academy for his followers.[210]

The Meiji government's order for the samurai to discontinue wearing their swords in 1876, along with the elimination of samurai rice stipends in 1877, led to a series of samurai rebellions against the Meiji government. The largest revolt was Satsuma Rebellion led by Saigō. After a six-month campaign between the rebellious force and the imperial Japanese army, Saigō's force was finally suppressed. Success in suppressing the rebellious force of Satsuma eliminated the last prospect of armed counterrevolution by the former samurai class, which ended the challenge posed by the conservative-nationalists.

3.4.3.2. The Challenge by the "Liberal-Nationalists" and Their Conversion to Chauvinistic Asianism

Once the Meiji government had successfully contained this series of rebellions by the former samurai, it faced a new challenge—a protest movement from the liberals. Japanese liberals, such as Itagaki Taisuke and Gotō Shōjirō, were one of several dissident groups that split from the government in their protest over the development of a strong,

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[210] Banno (1993:35-38); Samuels (2003:51). Those who protested Saigō's request were Iwakura Tomomi, Ōkubo Toshimichi, Kido Kōin, and Ōkuma Shigenobu. Ōkubo argued that the war with Korea and China would cause national bankruptcy, worsen Japan's balance of payments, and in the worst case, invite Russia and/or Britain's interference.

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oligarchic governing system.[211] The liberal protest started by the minority members within the government gained momentum and became a nation-wide movement by the late 1870s, often known as the Popular Rights Movement (*Jiyū Minken Undō*).[212] While Itagaki and Gotō and their Liberal Party (*Jiyū tō*) allies focused their campaigns on *domestic* political reform, such as an elective assembly and constitutional reform, other liberal activists had a wider ambition to democratize other Asian nations as well.

Frustrated with the government's compromising stance with the West, some liberal-nationalists insisted on a more "positive" foreign policy that would resist the Western domination of Asia.[213] In their view, the liberation of Asian states, including Japan, from traditional and thereby autocratic regimes would be the first step to enhance their national strength in order to counter the Western threat. For this purpose, liberal-nationalists, such as Sugita Junzan and Ōi Kentarō, promoted a democratic revolution in China and Korea.[214] As the government's suppression of liberals intensified, the liberal-nationalists increasingly shifted their focus to the activity in Asia in the mid-1880s. Ōi Kentarō and his followers attempted to promote reformist governments in Japan's neighbors. They initiated a plot to bring about a *coup d'état* in Korea, hoping that the successful revolution in Korea would increase momentum for a reform movement in

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[211] Influenced by Locke, Bentham, and Mill, Itagaki and Gotō formed a liberal political party, *Aikokukōtō* (Public Party of Patriots), in January 1874. In the same year, they also demanded an elected assembly in their effort for greater popular control. Samuels (2003:51-52).

[212] The rise of the liberal movement was a result of government corruption scandals and the growing resentment of the centralizing control of oligarchs. The rising financial status of local landlords also contributed to their increasing demands for political participation. Adherents to the Popular Rights Movement had a variety of social backgrounds: former Restoration leaders and intellectuals, townspeople, radicals and farmers. Klien (2002:52); Samuels (2003:52); Banno (1993:60-61).

[213] Jansen (1952:305-306,314).

[214] Motoyama (1971:260-266).

Japan. In 1885, the Japanese officials uncovered the plot in time to prevent it, which resulted in the arrests of more than 100 activists, including Ōi (*Ōsaka Incident*).[215]

The mid-1880s was a critical turning point for the liberal-nationalists. The Franco-Chinese war of 1884-1885, the *Gapsin Coup* in Korea and the *Ōsaka Incident* in 1884, caused disappointment among the liberal-nationalists. Sugita Junzan, who had been a strong advocate for democratic revolution in China, changed his policy after having spent some time in China. His experience in China convinced him that there would be no hope of launching a revolution in China and that helping China would provide no benefit for Japan's future. He stopped advocating for Sino-Japanese collaboration, and, instead, suggested Japanese expansion into the region. Similarly, Ōi, after his coup attempt in Korea failed, gave up the idea of regional cooperation against the West, and instead, began insisting on Japanese domination of Asia as a way to counter the Western threat.[216]

As the hope of liberal-nationalists like Ōi and Sugita for Asian collaboration diminished, their disappointment led to their conversion to supporters of Japanese regional hegemony. Instead of regional cooperation based on equal partnership, the newly emerging pan-Asianists advocated Japan's expansion into the region and the unification of entire Asia under Japanese leadership. One example of pan-Asianism was *Genyōsha* (Dark Ocean Society) that had originally been established as a popular rights movement, but, by the late 1880s, had been converted into a movement for imperial pan-

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[215] Jansen (1952:309); Takeuchi (1963:28-32).
[216] Motoyama (1971:263-264,267-268); Toba (1999:40-43). Disappointment in Japan's neighbor states was also found in Itagaki's Liberal Party's party organ, *Jiyū Shimbun* (Liberty Newspaper). Around 1883, *Jiyū Shimbun*, that had formerly advocated for Sino-Japanese cooperation against the Western invasion of Asia, shifted its stance and its opinions towards China were increasingly characterized by disrespect and antagonism. Toba (1999:22).

Asianism. It was 1887 when *Genyōsha* claimed that "arms buildup was a necessity in order for the yellow race to counter the West."[217]

One of the important characteristics of Japanese pan-Asianism was its emphasis on Japan's uniqueness, often referred to as a justification for Japan's regional expansion. In 1893, the journalist Tokutomi Sohō praised Japan's unique "imperial expansionism," based on Emperor's moral, in contrast to the West's coercive, imperialism. In an essay published in the following year entitled "Japan's Expansionist Nature," Tokutomi argued that expansion had been "inherent in the character of the Japanese people," an argument under the heavy influence of Social Darwinism.[218] The prominence of the notion of a civilized Japan versus a primitive Asia within the popular discourse in Japan at that time also persuaded many in Japan that the peoples of East Asia could only achieve a civilized state through Japanese leadership.[219]

The Asian-nationalists supported the Meiji government's policy of increasing Japan's influence in Korea as well as the Sino-Japanese war. Unlike the Meiji oligarchs whose policy was based on cautious realism, however, the Asian-nationalists' argument was characterized by a spiritualism stressing imperial Japan's uniqueness. The pan-Asianism advocated by the Asian-nationalists would become the normative basis of the ideology of the Co-prosperity Sphere insisted on by right-wing nationalists in the 1930s.[220]

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[217] Takeuchi (1963:9).
[218] Tokutomi (1974:246-251). Also see Pierson (1980:232); Miwa (1973:429-436); Yonehara (2003:98-109, 115-117).
[219] Weiner (1997:11).
[220] Klien (2002:61).

3.4.4. Norm Adaptation: Westernization as a Goal for Japanese Modernization Project

The pragmatic Meiji oligarchs were fully aware that Japan could not afford to maintain its isolation from the Western states while building up enough military and economic power at home. Their national objective was simple. They accepted dominant European norms, committed Japan to the Western-based international normative system, and strove to improve its international position vis-à-vis the Western powers.[221] Both the domestic and foreign policies of Meiji Japan became synonymous with westernization. According to Eleanor Westney,

> in nearly all areas the nation's transformation relied heavily on the deliberate emulation of Western organizations. The navy was modeled on the British; the army first on the French and then on the German; the educational system on a series of models (the French, the American, the German); the communication systems on the British; the police on the French; the banking system on the American; the legal system first on the French and then on the German.[222]

Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru's insistence on "converting Japan and the people as if it was a European state and were European people" also summarized the Meiji leaders' passion for the westernization of Japan.[223] These Japanese ideas of civilization involved a whole set of understandings about how an international, imperial project was related to national economic power and cultural achievement. Modernization of its political and social system, the policy of "*fukoku kyōhei*" (rich nation, strong army), and the expansion of Japan's regional influence in Taiwan and Korea were all intertwined.

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[221] LaFeber (1997:31).
[222] Westney (1987:4-5).
[223] Satō (1966i:21-22); Uete (1971:47); Yamamuro (1998:14); Miwa (1973:405-406).

3.4.4.1. "Rich Nation, Strong Army"

For the Meiji oligarchs, the West represented *power* that was based on strong economic and military bases. The national project of "*fukoku kyōhei*" (rich nation, strong army) was a reflection of Meiji leaders' conviction that in order to gain respect from the Western states, Japan must strengthen its national power base.[224] Ōkubo Toshimichi played a pivotal role in pursuing the "rich nation" project.[225] In participating in the Iwakura mission and traveling around Europe, Ōkubo had been particularly impressed with the British and German economies.[226] Upon his return from the European tour, Ōkubo launched the modernization of Japanese industry. His plan for industrial nurturance (*shokusan kōgyō*) was a combination of German-style industrial autonomy and Britain's mercantilist policy that had been pursued to nurture its domestic industry before opening them to foreign competition.[227] In 1873, Ōkubo established a strong Ministry of Home Affairs (*Naimushō*) and appointed himself minister, which allowed him to be charge of conducting a variety of industrial policies, such as import substitution, technological borrowing, creation of state-run enterprise, and reduction of Japanese industry's dependence on foreign capital.[228]

In addition to their effort to build a strong industrial base at home, the Meiji leaders also sought to create economic opportunity overseas through emigration, which

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[224] Miwa (1973:391); Satō (1974:21-22).

[225] For a detailed account of Ōkubo's leadership in the nation-building of Meiji Japan, see Satō (1992:ch5).

[226] During the mission's visit to Germany, Bismarck personally tutored them on the German experience of industrial development; this led to an appreciation for Germany's centralized bureaucracy as an effective way for late-developing nations, like Germany and Japan, to catch up. Kume (1979:329-330).

[227] Ōkubo argued that "Britain prevented the inflow of foreign goods and promoted the development of local industries. It was not until local industries developed and their production capacity exceeded local consumption that Britain abolished its protectionist trade policy and allowed liberal free trade. This is why Britain emerged as a great power today." See Samuels (2003:82-83); Tanaka (1984:216).

[228] Samuels (2003:81-83); Iwata (1964:175-176).

would, in turn, help the domestic industry.[229] The idea of overseas emigration was originally introduced by Western intellectuals. The "Malthusian theory of population" developed by English demographer and political economist Thomas Robert Malthus, began appearing in Japanese newspapers and journals around 1877. The introduction of Malthus's ideas in Japan created an image of an overcrowded Japan, which encouraged overseas expansion as a solution for reducing the population in Japan and raising the standard of living at home.[230] By the 1890s, a number of books were published in Japan on overseas emigration, and there was widely shared domestic consensus for peaceful migration. Advocates, such as the politician Ōishi Masami and the economist Tsuneya Seifuku, argued that overseas settlement would contribute to the extension of trade by creating markets for Japanese goods, and that as Japanese abroad sent back their earnings, they would enrich the home country.[231] The increasing enthusiasm for overseas emigration resulted in the establishment of a Colonization Society in 1893. In addition to previously mentioned writers, Foreign Ministry officials like Komura Jutarō, politicians such as Shimada Saburō and Kaneko Kentarō were among the two hundred people who attended the first organization meeting, where they asserted that "overseas emigration and settlement as well as colonization were the means through which the European powers were competing with each other in a struggle for power and wealth," and "Japan must follow suit."[232] According to the statistics of the Foreign Ministry, the number of

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[229] Iriye (1972:37).
[230] Iriye (1972:18,36); Tōgō (1906:73).
[231] Tsuneya (1901). Other supporters for overseas emigration include Hattori Tōru, who suggested Japan's expansion into the south Pacific, Watanabe Shūjirō, who wrote the first comprehensive account of modern Japanese expansion, and Nagasawa Setsu, who recommended that Japan direct its emigrants to the United States. Iriye (1972:36-42).
[232] Iriye (1972:40-41).

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Japanese overseas emigrants in 1897 was over 13,000, more than doubled compared to the number in five years before.[233]

Building a "strong army" was another key component in strengthening Japan's national power. Impressed by Moltke's initiative to modernize the Prussian military system, Japanese military reform was primarily modeled after the Prussian example.[234] Yamagata Aritomo was the main architect of Japan's modern military organization.[235] After his visit to Europe between 1869 and 1870 to observe the Western military system, Yamagata engaged in the reconstruction of Japanese military, mostly modeled after the Prussian counterpart.[236] Yamagata introduced the system of conscription in 1872. Six years later, he established the General Staff Office, and made himself its first commander in chief. Yamagata made a consistent effort to create a strong, *independent* military that stood free from domestic politics. Along this line, he founded the General Staff Office directly under the emperor, and made the commander of the general staff the only one who, with the emperor's permission, could give orders to the armed forces.[237] Insisting that military development should be the first policy priority since the accomplishment of other domestic and foreign policy goals would be impossible without strong military,

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[233] Tōgō (1906:258).

[234] Members of the Iwakura Mission detailed Moltke's speech at the Reichstag, in which Moltke outlined why Germany needed the large number of standing army during the peacetime. Kume (1979:338-342). For the Meiji leaders, such as Ōkubo Toshimichi and Iwakura Tomomi, Prussia appeared to be a good example in its continuous military buildup even during the peacetime, which led, Ōkubo and Iwakura thought, to its victory against France. They often applied the German example to the Japanese context, arguing that it was vital for Japan to allocate enough of its budget for military spending. Katō (2002:36-40).

[235] For a detailed account of Yamagata's military modernization project, see Hackett (1971:50-89).

[236] Hackett (1971:82-83) discusses Yamagata's preference towards the German military system and how Yamagata built the Japanese military based on the German model.

[237] Samuels (2003:59).

Yamagata successfully managed to allocate more than 30 percent of national expenditure for military buildup by the 1890s.[238]

3.4.4.2. The Policy of Modernization as Westernization

In the view of Meiji oligarchs, Japan could not join the "western club" simply by developing a more powerful military; they needed also to reproduce Western levels of civilization. In ranking states in international hierarchy, Meiji government officials and intellectual figures, such as Fukuzawa Yukichi, often referred to the degree of civilization.[239] The notion of Western civilization covered a wide range of issues: economic, technological, political, and social modernization.[240] In order to gain knowledge of Western civilization, the Meiji government dispatched a number of administrators and scholars for a diplomatic mission to America and Europe in 1871 (*The Iwakura Mission*).[241] The Meiji government also invited a number of foreign advisors from Europe and America to conduct various reform projects. The number of foreign advisors reached its peak in 1875, with as many as 527 of them stationed in Japan.[242]

Political reform started with the abolition of feudalism. Political institutions within the Meiji government were transformed into European-like institutions, including the establishment of modern bureaucracies.[243] The semi-independent regional clans (*han*) was abolished, and replaced with prefectures that were under the control of a strong

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[238] Katō (2002:68-69,73).

[239] For example, the second issue of the government's official journal "*Meiji Gekkan*" (Meiji Monthly) used the political system and standard of living as a criteria for measuring the level of civilization. Satō (1974:22-23).

[240] Iriye (1972:21); Iriye (1966i:16-17).

[241] See Kume (1977-1982). For a detailed account for the Iwakura Mission, see Tanaka (1984); Nish (1998).

[242] They came from, among other places, the United Kingdom, France, the United States, and Germany, and helped Japan learn a variety of things, including the Western technology, military organization, intellectual trends, and political as well as social systems. See Umetani (1965:210,220).

[243] For a detailed account of the administrative reform, see Iwata (1964:146); Klien (2002:49-50); Samuels (2003:55).

central government.[244] The budgetary authority was also removed from the territorial lords and moved to a powerful Finance Ministry.[245] Tax and land reform was implemented in order for the government to acquire the stable tax revenue necessary for the modernization.

In terms of legal reform, there were a series of debates within the government as to whether Japan should emulate either the British or German constitution. In 1882, the Meiji government sent a group of envoys, including Itō Hirobumi, to Europe to study European constitutions. Through his encounter with Rudolf von Gneist of Berlin University and Lorenz von Stein of University of Vienna during the visit, Itō was particularly influenced by the German constitution. Upon their return, the Meiji government launched into the writing of its own constitution. A German professor of law and economics Hermann Roesler, hired by the Meiji government, was heavily involved in this writing process.[246]

The strong German influence was also evident in Japan's state-led social reform project. *Shakai Seisaku Gakkai* (Society for Social Policy), founded in 1896, was the Japanese equivalent of the *Verein für Socialpolitik* in Germany. In creating a Prussian-style civil service in Japan, Lorenz von Stein again played a critical role, giving advice to

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[244] During the Tokugawa period, *han* was a regional domain controlled by a territorial lord (*daimyō*). During the 15th century, local *daimyō* gradually came into military and civil control of his own domains, attaining some degree of independence from the Tokugawa *shōgunate*. (Encyclopedia Britannica online at www.britannica.com) When the decision for *haihan chiken* (the abolition of feudal regional domain—*han*—and the establishment of modern prefectures—*ken*—) was announced, the English minister, Sir Harry Parkes, noted that that was "a resolute step which would accrue to Japan's benefit." Iwata (1964:144).

[245] Banno (1993:23-26,29).

[246] Katō (2002:85-86); Shibahara (1988:493); Samuels (2003:54-55); Banno (1993:74,78-79).

the Meiji leaders, notably Itō Hirobumi. As a result, similar to Germany, a strong social

policy bureaucracy was developed within the powerful Home Ministry (*Naimushō*).[247]

3.4.4.3. Security Policy of Meiji Japan

Japan's effort to westernize itself took place not only in terms of domestic policy,

but also within the foreign policy sphere. Here, the focus was imperial expansion. The

policy of imperialism was understood as vital for two main reasons. First, there was a

widely shared idea among intellectuals in Japan that imperial expansion through trade,

colonization, and emigration, was the main contributor to European states' power.

Tokugawa economist Honda Toshiaki wrote in 1798 that Japan should become "oriental

Britain" by establishing shipping, commercial, and transportation systems and expanding

overseas. In 1879, Fukuzawa Yukichi pointed out the relations between the overseas

expansion and capitalism of the West, and argued that the former was an inevitable result

of the latter.

Secondly, the Meiji leaders considered imperial expansion vital in order to

survive and maintain national independence for a state.[248] The introduction of Social

Darwinism in Japan also contributed to the increasing support for expansion. Journalist

and critic Tokutomi Sohō published *Dai Nihon Bōchō ron* (Expansion of Great Japan) in

1894. In the book whose thesis was heavy influenced by European Social Darwinism,

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[247] One of the main objectives of the Meiji leaders was the preservation of stability and social harmony while pursuing the social reform. Those who visited Europe in the late nineteenth century observed the social conflicts accompanying the process of industrialization, such as in France. German style statist social reform was chosen as a way to avoid similar social conflicts in the process of modernization. Lehmbruch (2001:59-62).

[248] The idea that expansion was the only way to avoid the downfall of a nation went back to the Tokugawa period. In fact, many Japanese intellectuals advocated Japan's expansion into neighboring Asia even before Japan abandoned its *sakoku* policy. As early as 1790, a critic Hayashi Shihei developed a military strategy for Japan by arguing that Japan should annex Korea and Ryūkyū (Okinawa) before they were invaded by either China or the Western powers. Late Tokugawa intellectual Yoshida Shōin claimed that Japan should compensate itself for the loss imposed by the unfair trade with the West by expanding into Korea, Taiwan, and Manchuria. Yamamuro (1998:6-7); Okazaki (1994:63); Klien (2002:45); Katō (2002:43-44).

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Tokutomi argued that continuous national expansion was the only way for a nation-state to survive.[249]

Meiji Japan's concept for national security was first articulated in Yamagata Aritomo's opinion paper in 1890. Yamagata stated:

> The independence and security of the nation depend first upon the protection of the line of sovereignty (*shuken-sen*) and then the line of advantage (*rieki-sen*)…If we wish to maintain the nation's independence among the powers of the world at the present time, it is not enough to guard only the line of sovereignty; we must also defend the line of advantage.[250]

Yamagata's definition of national security was influenced by his encounter with Lorenz von Stein of University of Vienna in 1889. Giving an advice to Yamagata, Stein not only introduced the concepts of "the line of sovereignty" and "the line of advantage," but also warned that independence and neutrality of Korea is extremely vital for Japan's national security.[251] Consequently, in discussing the "line of advantage," Yamagata clearly had Korea in his mind.

The Meiji leaders moved quickly to secure Japan's "line of sovereignty."[252] In 1875, as an attempt to lock its northern borders, Japan signed a bilateral treaty with Russia, which granted the Kurile Islands to Japan, in an exchange for the island of Sakhalin off Siberia's coast to Russia. The Meiji state also established a colonial order in Japan's northern island of Hokkaidō.[253] On the southern side, Japan seized the Ryūkyū islands (Okinawa) in 1879. In gaining control of the Ryūkyū islands, Japan deliberately

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[249] Tokutomi (1974:245-274). Similarly, the geographer and critic Shiga Shigetaka published a report of the extinction of certain southern islands in 1887 in conjunction with Social Darwinism. Shiga (1927:3-7).
[250] Hackett (1971:138).
[251] Katō (2002:85-97). Iriye (1966i:30-32); Shibahara (1988:483). Stein defined "the line of advantage" as the area that critically determines one's (this case Japan's) national security.
[252] Besides Stein's influence, Tanaka (1984:220) discusses how the members of the Iwakura Mission learned the necessity of a "national boundary" for a modern state.
[253] Weiner (1997:10).

applied European-style diplomacy in its dealing with a weaker China. Japan insisted on the lack of Chinese jurisdiction in the islands by citing the relevant provisions of international law to support its case.[254]

3.4.4.4. Japan's Regional Policy: Replacement of the Chinese System with the European System

Independent, neutral Korea was the main focal point in securing Japan's "line of advantage." Since Korea was a part of the Chinese tribute system, an independent Korea automatically meant a Korea freed from the Chinese influence, which then implied a challenge to the traditional Chinese regional system. As early as 1888, Yamagata argued that Japan should aim to free Korea from the Chinese tribute system and make it independent, in order to prevent an European nation from invading Korea. Politician Inoue Kowashi also claimed that Japan should cooperate with America, Britain, and Germany, to guarantee Korea's independence and neutrality. Fukuzawa Yukichi advocated for transforming Korea into a modern nation under Japanese leadership, which would strengthen Japan's regional position.[255]

Korea under the Joseon Dynasty instituted *sakoku* policy. Since 1868, Japan had repeatedly sent an envoy to Korea, demanding that Korea open commercial relations with Japan, demands which only met with a strong rejection. Its fruitless attempts to deal directly with Korea led the Meiji leadership to shift its focus. Rather than engaging in direct negotiation with Korea, the Meiji leaders approached Korea's superior suzerains, China, and tried to establish the equivalent relations with China as the first step to free Korea from Chinese political influence. The result was Sino-Japanese Treaty of

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[254] LaFeber (1997:43-44); Shibahara (1988:477).
[255] Ōyama (1966); Fukuzawa (1972); Katō (2002:73-74); Shibahara (1988:481); Miwa (1973:408).

Friendship and Commerce signed in 1871. This was similar to the Western alliance treaty, and guaranteed an equal partnership between China and Japan. The treaty was the first *Western-style* treaty China signed with another Asian country. The fact that the treaty assured the equal relations between two sovereign nations, Japan and China, the treaty contributed to the erosion of the Chinese tributary system.[256]

After signing the bilateral treaty with China, the Meiji government continuously pressured Korea demanding for opening commercial relations with Japan. In 1875, Japan increased its pressure by dispatching warship to Korea. Provoked by the action, Korean forts opened fire, which invited the Japanese warship to attack Korean ports in retaliation. The military clash led to the Korean government's acceptance of Japanese demands, and the two countries signed a commercial treaty in 1876 (Treaty of Ganghwa).

In its attempt to separate Korea from the Chinese control, Meiji Japan adopted Perry-style gunboat diplomacy. During the entire negotiation process, Japan closely copied Western diplomacy, treating other Asian countries in the same way the Western states had treated Japan.[257] Japan forced Korea to sign an unequal treaty—the first unequal treaty Korea signed—that granted the Japanese many of the same rights, including extraterritoriality, that Western states enjoyed in Japan. The treaty also ended Korea's status as a tributary state of China.[258]

Japan's assertive policy towards Korea, as well as its advance into Taiwan and Ryūkyū (Okinawa) during the 1870s, strained Sino-Japanese relations. In the 1880s, Li

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[256] Shibahara (1988:473,480); Yamamuro (1998:16).
[257] There were many examples that showed the Meiji leaders' conscious efforts to transform Japan into a Western-like nation. When the Korean mission came to Japan to exchange instruments of ratification in 1876, the Japanese on the street watching the procession of the Korean mission laughed at their barbaric manner, just as Europeans laughed at Meiji emperor's procession several years before. Miwa (1973:406).
[258] Klien (2002:50).

Hongzhang, a leading statesman in China, resisted Japan's increasing regional influence by strengthening Chinese control over Korea to counterbalance Japan. In the outbreak of Korean insurrection in 1882, for example, Li immediately dispatched Chinese troops to Korea, preceding the Japanese counterpart, and restored order. The decisiveness of the Chinese action not only reassured Chinese influence over Korea, but also resulted in the conversion of Korea's Queen Min from a pro-Japanese to pro-China stance.[259] In the outbreak of the Gapsin (Kapsin) Coup two years later, Li again quickly intervened to suppress the revolt.[260]

Li's resolution to retain control over its traditional sphere of influence led to the growing anti-Chinese sentiment among the Meiji leaders, such as Yamagata Aritomo and Iwakura Tomomi.[261] Their estrangement from China reached a critical point after the Franco-Chinese war between 1884 and 1885. The war had a decisive impact on the Meiji leaders' view towards China. China's reckless move of fighting the risky war against a much stronger France in order to maintain its sphere of influence created a new type of concern among the Meiji leaders. In the past, they perceived China as a threat because of its relative military superiority over Japan. Now, China came to be seen as a threat because of its stubbornness in clinging to the traditional order despite its inferiority vis-à-vis European powers.[262] The British invasion in 1885 of Port Hamilton, an island off of

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[259] Katō (2002:70-71).

[260] This was the *coup d'état* initiated by a Korean reform activist Kim Okgyu and other progressives, many of whom had studied in Japan. With assistance from Japanese liberals, they sought to take control of the Korean government and change its course to follow its Japanese predecessor. Katō (2002:77-78).

[261] In 1882, immediately after the Chinese intervention in the insurrection in Korea, Yamagata and Iwakura requested further Japanese military buildup sufficient to counter China's reestablished influence. Inoue Kowashi suggested that Japan should cooperate with America, Britain and Germany in its attempt to guarantee Korea's independence and neutrality; this cooperative strategy became official policy in 1882. Katō (2002:72,74); Shibahara (1988:480-481).

[262] *Jiyū Shimbun*, a liberal newspaper, carried an editorial in the outbreak of the Franco-Chinese war, saying that in case of French victory, the United Kingdom, Russia, and Germany might take advantage of a

Korea, confirmed the Japanese leaders' apprehension over China's potential negative impact on Japanese security. The very fact that China gave its approval for the invasion to Britain, which would open up a possibility for other powers to control Korea, particularly concerned the Meiji leaders.[263] Yamagata Aritomo and Nishi Amane expressed their anxiety that China would create an opportunity for Britain or Russia to gain control of Korea in the future, which would significantly compromise Japan's national security.[264]

3.4.4.5. Battle over Regional Leadership: Growing Tension between China and Japan

The year 1885 marked a critical turning point with regard to Sino-Japanese relations. By then, those who had sought a reform movement either in China or Korea gave up hope. Instead, China was increasingly seen as a rival for, and obstacle to Japan's national security as well as its Asia policy. Fukuzawa Yukichi published an article in 1885 titled *Datsu-A ron* (De-Asianization of Japan), arguing that Japan should give up its hopes of modernizing its neighbors and should, rather, pursue its own course. Journalist and historian Tokutomi Sohō warned that China would inevitably become a future rival of Japan as Japan increased its regional influence. Other Japanese intellectuals, such as Sugita Junzan and Kitajima Saburō, went as far as predicting a future military conflict between Japan and China over Korea.[265]

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weakened China by dividing Korea among themselves in order to counter France's territory. See Toba (1999:35).

[263] Port Hamilton is a small group of islands in the strait off the southern coast of the Korean peninsula. Britain decided to occupy Port Hamilton in a move which would prevent the Russians taking a port on Korea's northeastern coast. As Anglo-Russian tension over Afghanistan reduced in 1886, Britain withdrew its force, ending its occupation of the island in 1886.

[264] Katō (2002:76-77).

[265] Motoyama (1971:264,276-277); Miwa (1973:413-414).

A decade prior to the Sino-Japanese war of 1894, an increasingly dominant view in Japan contrasted Japan and China as an "enlightened reformer" (Japan) and a "conservative anti-reformer" (China). This simple dichotomy was extended in order for the Meiji officials to justify the coming military conflict between the two countries over the fate of Korea. In 1894, Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu defended the continuous stationing of the Japanese military in Korea as a way to guarantee Korea's domestic reform. By 1894, both conservative and liberal newspapers supported the war, arguing that it was Japan's mission to spread the advanced civilization into Korea by getting rid of Chinese influence.[266]

3.4.4.6. Japan's Status-Quo Foreign Policy

Japanese foreign policy during this period was conducted with careful consideration not to provoke the Western states. Japan's conciliatory approach towards Russia over its territorial disputes was one example. Iwakura Tomomi, the first Foreign Minister of the Meiji government, took a moderate approach in the territorial dispute with Russia. Under his guidance, Japan backed off from its original claims and signed a compromise agreement with Russia in 1875.[267] The Meiji government basically inherited the policy of its Tokugawa predecessors in avoiding a military confrontation with the West, which would risk Japan's independence considering the huge military, industrial, and technological gap that remained between Japan and the Western powers. For the

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[266] Katō (2002:110-116).

[267] Japan had originally argued that it had rights to half of Sakhalin or at least to a joint occupation of the island. Convinced that Japan should not dispute Russia, Iwakura accepted to accord the Russians the whole of Sakhalin in return for the central and northern Kuriles. Nish (1977:23).

Meiji leaders, expansion was considered a form of self-defense, as well as a way to join the European power politics, *not* as a challenge to the West.[268]

Japan's increasing sphere of influence in Korea was pursued under a careful calculation to see to what extent European powers would accept Japanese regional expansion.[269] Yamagata Aritomo also took a conciliatory approach in a dispute with Russia over Korea. When he was dispatched to Russia to find a solution for the clash of interests over Korea, he was under specific instructions that his mission was to avoid a military clash between the two countries.[270] The Yamagata-Lobanov Agreement, the compromise between the two governments made Korea a joint protectorate under both Russia and Japan. The virtue of the agreement was to avoid the imminent military conflict with Russia and give Japan some time to complete its military buildup program. The main motivation of Yamagata signing the agreement was to avoid an encirclement of Japan by united European powers. For him, signing treaties would be a good remedy for this objective.[271]

As a British historian Ian Nish describes, the Meiji government foreign policy was a cautious one based on realistic calculation and the avoidance of any overly adventurous overseas move.[272] While making every effort to strengthen its national power base and modernize Japan, Meiji oligarchs took a conciliatory approach towards

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[268] Yamagata Aritomo and Itō Hirobumi summarized the government opinion on security policy in this way—Japanese defense would be ensured by establishing superiority in the region, preventing other powers from gaining control of the region, and building up its sphere of influence whenever possible. Iriye (1966i:35).

[269] Iriye (1996i:36-37).

[270] Hackett (1971:171-175).

[271] Akita/Itō (1985:101). A similarly restrained attitude was also found in the Japanese media. While agreeing with the necessity of preserving the Korean independence for Japanese national security and advocating emigration to Korea, newspapers suggested caution over the annexation of Korea. If Japan annexed Korea, the argument went, it was likely to invite an intervention from other powers, such as the United Kingdom, Russia, and China. Katō (2002:106-108).

[272] Nish (1977:24-25).

the West in order to avoid a confrontation. The Iwakura Mission quickly abandoned pressing the issue of treaty revision—one of its original objectives—once the participants realized that they were unlikely to achieve these revisions at that time. Japan was very keen on abiding by international law, as the Meiji government often referred to relevant international law to justify its foreign policy.[273] All the evidence indicates that massive Westernization was taken very seriously as a way to improve Japanese international status. Westernization was considered the first step in convincing the Western states that Japan was no longer barbaric but had turned itself into a civilized county and deserved a fair treatment.[274]

3.5. Conclusion

When Japan abandoned its long-term isolationist policy and joined the rest of the world in the middle of the nineteenth century, the INS became increasingly homogeneous, with the influence of European imperialism spreading worldwide. With their technological and industrial superiority, the European great powers renewed their interests in imperial expansion and increased their political and normative influence in wider areas of the world, including Asia. As European influence grew in Asia, the traditional Chinese tribute system eroded and was gradually replaced by a European treaty system.

The homogeneous normative circumstance provided a less-confusing external environment for Japanese domestic actors to interpret the system, helping a general

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[273] This was particularly the case in terms of Japan's policy towards Asia. During the Sino-Japanese war, Japan demonstrated its strict adherence to international law. During the military campaign, the Japanese military took the two most-well respected Japanese international law scholars to the war front during the military campaign. See Miwa (1974:22); Tamura (2002:28).
[274] Satō (1974:23); Klien (2002:53).

consensus emerge in Japan. A majority of foreign policy groups, including the decision-maker *genrō* and westernized intellectuals, interpreted the structure of the international system as a hierarchical order divided between European and non-European states. Since they understood that the determinants of a state's position in the hierarchy was national power and level of civilization, Japan's national objective was set as transforming a "half-civilized" Japan into being "civilized" through modernization, ultimately joining the West.

The above position of the Westernizers was so dominant in early Meiji Japan that the level of norm contestation was maintained low and the westernization policy did not meet strong resistance. The anti-Western nationalist view marginally existed, but this protest movement did not have any real significant impact on actual decision-making. As a result, *genrō*, supported by the national consensus, pursued a policy of westernization. As Japan's national powerbase grew, *genrō* attempted to expand Japan's regional influence, which satisfied the nationalist group and helped further consolidate the Westernizer group.

4. JAPAN JOINS THE WEST
From the Sino-Japanese War to World War I

4.1. Introduction

This chapter covers the period from the Sino-Japanese war until the breakout of World War I. During this period, Japan fought two wars, one against China and the other against Russia, and, with its victories in both, emerged as a new imperial power in Asia. The Russo-Japanese war, in which a Western state was defeated by a non-Western state for the first time, had an important impact on the international normative system. Japan's rise as a new regional power in Asia caused fear in the Western world. Racialized discourse became more common and a number of writers in Europe and the United States discussed a clash of civilizations between East and West. In California, there was a movement against Japanese immigrants, which even led to increased American fears of a war between Japan and the U.S.. Under the Taft administration, the United States more aggressively challenged Japan's increasing influence in Manchuria relying on the Open Door principles. In the non-Western world, Japan's victory against Russia raised hope among early colonial leaders in Asia. Japan's success inspired the anti-colonial movement in countries like Vietnam, and heightened anti-Western nationalism. The rise of these norms contributed to the increasing uncertainty in the normative environment around the turn of the century.

The victories in the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese wars had an enormous impact on the Japanese national psychology. There was a strong national sense that Japan had joined the world of civilization, becoming a power in league with, if not exactly

equivalent to, the Western states. Parallel to this new national identity, people at all different levels shared the view that overseas expansion was an international trend and that Japan should pursue this course as well. The strong conviction in the advisability of imperial expansion was shared by liberals and nationalists and received wide support from both popular and governmental sectors. The national consensus over Japan's new identity as a new imperial power overshadowed other ideas. Japanese reaction to the racial discourse in the West was one example. Officials were convinced that Japan should be welcomed into a group of civilization by showing its goodwill, proving its civilized manners, and working hard to resolve the Western misunderstandings of Japan. Although the notion of an inevitable clash between Eastern and Western civilization would, as I discuss later, come to greater prominence, at this time there were few who saw this clash as a foregone conclusion. Both the Japanese policy towards Chinese nationalism and the American open door policy reveal Japanese officials' belief that these new challenges were not serious enough to require a significant shift in Japan's continental policy.

As a result, the level of norm contestation in Japan during this period was relatively low. The stable domestic political environment, which allowed for strong executive leadership, also helped maintain a consistent policy. There was a consensus on power-sharing between the two main political groups; one group was made up of conservative bureaucrats as well as the army led by *genrō* Yamagata Aritomo and the other was made up of a coalition of various political parties, supported by *genrō* Itō Hirobumi and Saionji Kinmochi. These leaders, as well as a strong foreign minister Komura Jutarō, all agreed on the importance of Japan's continental expansion, especially in Korea and Manchuria, and the importance of collaboration with other imperial powers

in pursuing this goal. These two themes were central to *Komura Diplomacy*, the policy widely credited with increasing Japan's sphere of influence in Manchuria, while gaining other powers' acceptance of Japan's special interests through a series of bilateral agreements. Japan's continental policy faced little domestic opposition. Liberals endorsed the policy of overseas expansion, especially in the economic/commercial realm. Nationalists also supported the government's policy, and engaged in political maneuvering in the background in order to increase Japan's political influence in Asia. In facing the obstacles to Japan's continental expansion, such as Chinese nationalism and the American effort to open Manchuria to "fair" and more open competition, Komura relied on the same approach; fighting back by winning approvals from other imperial powers, such as Russia, Britain, and France.

In summary, Japanese domestic ideas and foreign policy to a large extent reflected the international normative environment. The military victories contributed to the validation of the Westernizers' approach. The policy of modernization, based on a connection between "rich nation" and "strong army," had paid off, and now Japan successfully joined the group of advanced civilizations. In this domestic atmosphere, Japan's new mission was to conduct itself as an imperial power to maintain and strengthen its national power base. After securing its control over Korea, Manchuria emerged as a new target for Japan's continuous continental expansion. Japan's continental expansion was in accordance with the policy of other imperial powers, with the possible exception of the United States. European great powers generally supported Japan's position. This was also the case when four states, Britain, Russia, Japan, and France, stood together to block the American attempt to challenge Japan's and Russia's special

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interests in Manchuria. In facing Chinese nationalism and anti-Western sentiments, Japan and other imperial powers reacted similarly. These incidents indicate that Japan's new identity and its imperial policy were accepted in the existing international system, and imperial Japan in this period was a status quo power.

4.2. Increasing Uncertainty: Signs of the Heterogeneous Normative System

4.2.1. <u>The Sino-Japanese and the Spanish-American Wars: Their Impact on Accelerating Imperialism</u>

The previous chapter discussed how the international normative system became increasingly homogeneous as the European imperialist norm spread to Asia and the United States. In the last decade of the nineteenth century, there were two inter-state wars, one in Asia and the other in the American continent, both of which contributed to the further consolidation of the international normative system under the norm of imperialism. In Asia, the victory of Japan over China accelerated the imperial efforts in China as Russia and Japan joined the traditional European colonial powers. On the other side of the Pacific Ocean, the victory of the United States over Spain undoubtedly made the United States a new imperial power. With its acquisition of the former Spanish colonies in Latin America and Pacific, the United States emerged as a new imperial power shifting away from the traditional, isolationist approach.

4.2.1.1. Asia: The Sino-Japanese War and the "Scramble of China"

The Sino-Japanese war changed the power distribution and brought about two new powers in the Far East. With the surprise victory of Japan, the Western states began

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recognizing Japan as a new regional power.[275] Another important regional impact of the war was the rise of Russia. After Japan gave up the Liaotung Peninsula, yielding to the pressure by Russia, France and Germany, Russia moved almost immediately to occupy the peninsula and began the fortification of Port Arthur. Russia, being a major land power in the Far East, now acquired strategic ports and appeared as a regional naval power as well. Russia also occupied southern Manchuria in 1900 after the military expedition in the wake of Boxer Rebellion.[276] States, such as Britain and the United States, were increasingly concerned with the rising Russian threat in the Far East.[277]

Japanese victory not only shifted the power balance in Asia, but also had a tremendous impact on the regional order itself. In a narrow sense, the Sino-Japanese war concluded the power competition between China and Japan over regional leadership. China was obligated to renounce all claims to Korea and recognize its independence. Japanese control over Korea was symbolic in the sense that the traditional Chinese leadership in the region was replaced by Japan's. In a broader sense, the Shimonoseki Treaty transferred the regional system from the old hierarchical tributary system to a new system composed of nation-states.[278]

The weakening of the Ch'ing dynasty and the power vacuum in the region caused what has been called the "Scramble of China," as European imperial powers sought to

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[275] In Britain, for example, there was a good deal of admiration for Japan. George Curzon, a conservative statesman, described Japan as "the Britain of the Far East," indicating a growing respect for the Japanese military, and in particular for the global ambitions of its naval power. See Langer (1956:175); Curzon (1896:392); Hirama (2000:34-36). Across the Atlantic, American naval strategist, Alfred Thayer Mahan, also observed that Japan had suddenly become a strong ambitious state. See LaFeber (1997:56); Iriye (1972:49).
[276] Katō (2002:138); Hirama (2000:32,40).
[277] Kitaoka (2001:233); LaFeber (1997:78); Iriye (1972:72-74).
[278] Katō (2002:126-129); Kitaoka (2001:236).

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extend their influence there.[279] Due to its large post-war indemnity to Japan, China was forced to take loans from European states, which demanded control of Chinese markets in return. Emphasis was shifted from commerce and trade based on open door principles, to competition over an exclusive sphere of influence. European economic activities increasingly focused on building railroads and mining in leased lands.[280] Within three years after the end of the war, Germany, Russia, France, and Britain had one by one obtained leases and concessions from China, accelerating the partition of China.[281]

While European imperial competition over China intensified, America was also becoming increasingly interested in China. More and more American leaders were attracted to China's future economic and commercial potential. William Taft viewed China as a key for America's economic expansion into the region, and Woodrow Wilson recognized China as one of the central pieces of what he called the "new functions of America in the East."[282] Secretary of State John Hay's "Open Door Note" in 1899 increased America's interest in getting involved in the Chinese affair. America's shift from the isolationist policy was also evident in its participation with other European imperial powers in forcefully suppressing the rebel uprising in Boxer Rebellion in 1900.[283]

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[279] The historian William Langer (1956:167) has argued that the Sino-Japanese war "marked the transition of the Far Eastern question from a state of quiescence to one of extreme activity."

[280] Katō (2002:134-136).

[281] Iriye (1972:60). Russia secured a charter for a Russo-Chinese bank and the "Chinese Eastern Railway." Russia also got the lease of Port Arthur and consolidated its position in Manchuria. In 1898, China leased the port of Kiaochow to Germany and reserved the strategic province of Shantung as a German sphere of influence. France obtained a "sphere of influence" in three Chinese provinces, as well as receiving a lease of Kwangchow. Britain got a lease of Weihaiwei, and the Kowloon Peninsula opposite Hong Kong, and a "sphere of influence" in the Yangtze valley. Japan also joined the race and requested a sphere of influence in Fukien Province as well as railway concessions. See LaFeber (1997:58); Hayes (1941:310-311); Hirama (2000:20-21).

[282] Iriye (1972:67-68,91); LaFeber (1997:66-67).

[283] Iriye (1972:64).

4.2.1.2. America: The Spanish-American War and America as a New Imperial Power

The United States also played a major role in intensifying the norm of colonial imperialism at the end of the nineteenth century. The London *Times* carried the following editorial in predicting a change that would take place in the United States in the aftermath of the Spanish-American war:

> This war must in any event effect a profound change in the whole attitude and policy of the United States. In future America will play a part in the general affairs of the world such as she has never played before.[284]

As the London *Times* accurately foresaw, the war marked a critical turning point in American imperial policy. Having gained control over the former colonies of Spain both in Latin America and the Pacific as the result of the war, America engaged in a more active imperialist policy in both regions. In Latin America, the United States made an intervention in Cuba in 1902, established virtual control over Panama in 1903, and instituted customs receivership in Santo Domingo.[285] America pursued a more active foreign policy in the Pacific as well. The United States occupied the Philippines in 1898 as a result of the victory. In the following year, American formally annexed Hawaii, which integrated both Hawaii and the Philippines into the American tariff system.[286]

Another notable phenomenon in postwar America was a surge of domestic support for imperialism. After the victory in the Spanish-American war, the American attitude towards imperialism became overwhelmingly positive, and people widely supported the acquisition of former Spanish colonies resulting from the war.[287] There

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[284] May (1968:221).
[285] Iriye (1972:66); Gardner et. al. (1973:2251-252).
[286] Iriye (1972:55,67); LaFeber (1963:407-408).
[287] Newspaper editorials were increasingly supportive of colonial expansion, and the public gradually increased interests in Hawaii in the postwar period. May (1968:187,191).

were several reasons behind the change in the American attitude towards imperialism. First, American supporters of imperialism often gave economic justifications—such as the necessity of overseas coaling stations and the use of expansion as a solution for domestic overproduction—for their positions.[288] There was increasing interest in overseas markets and new commercial opportunities in the business sector. Prominent businessmen came out in favor of expansion into the Pacific, and put an emphasis on investment in profitable fields overseas.[289]

Secondly, *norm instantiation* was another cause of America's increasing support for imperialism. American knowledge of contemporary European thoughts critically influenced American attitudes towards imperialism, in general, and it's own imperial project, in particular. American supporters of Philippine annexation made extensive use of England's example and frequently justified their policies with words taken directly from British imperialists.[290] In addition, Social Darwinism also played a role in American justification of imperialism, as it did in Europe.[291]

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[288] The importance of overseas coaling stations in distant seas was due to the navy's shift from sail to steam. The war created an opportunity for the United States to acquire such stations, one in the Pacific, and one in the Caribbean. May (1968:193). Entrepreneurs, such as Andrew Carnegie, emphasized the problem of overproduction and the necessity of overseas market for exports. LaFeber (1997:34,41). Also, on overproduction, see LaFeber (1963).

[289] May (1968:5-6,187,193-194); Iriye (1972:68); Hofstadter (1959:181); Langer (1956:68); Conant (1901).

[290] Among them was an American philosopher and historian John Fiske. Books published in the United Kingdom also had an impact on American thought. They included: *Greater Britain* by Sir Charles Wentworth Dilke (1869); *The Expansion of England* by Sir John Seeley (1883); *Oceana or England and Her Colonies* by James Anthony Froude (1886). May (1968:128,131-133,198,228); Hofstadter (1959:176-177).

[291] Iriye (1972:26); LaFeber (1963:95-101); Campbell (1976:149-150). Theodore Roosevelt was one of those who relied heavily on Social Darwinism for his understanding of political situations, referring to the international struggle for existence and the national elimination of weaker race. See Hofstadter (1959:180). Julius W. Pratt, "The 'Large Policy' of 1898," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XIX (Sep. 1932:219-242); Pratt, "The Ideology of American Expansion," in Avery Craven ed., *Essays in Honor of William E. Dodd by His Former Students at the University of Chicago* (Chicago, 1935:335-353), both of which are cited in May (1968:8-9).

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Thirdly, increasing amounts of discourse dealing with matters of race and civilization also contributed to the shifting American view towards imperialism. Imperialism was rationalized as a necessary measure for the sake of Western civilization, as a part of the West's struggle to maintain its strength and superiority. This kind of rhetoric that portrayed Western civilization as under threat was often used in stressing the virtue of the Western civilization.[292] The ideology of Anglo-Saxonism was also gaining popularity in American thought. The voices of Anglo-Saxonism were heard both within and outside the government and a number of politicians referred to Anglo-Saxon world-rule as if were an inevitable destiny. Scholars and writers discussed the Anglo-Saxon mission to rule the "lesser" races, a mission which, in their eyes, realized "law of economic and race development."[293]

"Manifest Destiny" was another ideological term frequently employed to emphasize American particularism and the virtues of its expansionist policy, distinguishing American liberal imperialism from European imperial practices.[294] Stressing America's mission as the exemplar of democracy and individual liberty, Manifest Destiny rose as an effective counter-ideology to offset the strong anti-colonial tradition in the country.[295] Politicians justified American expansion in a following manner. American policy was not imperialist expansion, expansionists argued, but "the

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[292] Examples include: J.A. Jameson, "Is our Civilization perishable?" and "Shall our civilization be preserved?" in *North American Review 138* (January-June 1884: 205-215,336-348). In his *National Imperialism*, the American diplomat Paul Reinsch argued that American imperialism fosters commercial relations, the gradual globalization of the world, and the industrialization of the non-West through the expansion of Western ideas and technology. Iriye (1972:27,32,35,51-52,69).

[293] They included Senator Albert Beveridge, Senator Henry Lodge, Secretary of State John Hay, and President Theodore Roosevelt. Iriye (1972: 15-16,27-28,68); Hofstadter (1959:179-181); Langer (1956:68); Conant (1901); May (1968:201).

[294] For the purpose of differentiating these two versions of imperialism, the American liberal imperialism was often referred to as "The New Imperialism" as opposed to old European imperialism. May (1968:184-186).

[295] May (1968:7-8). Originally in Frederick Merk, *Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History: A Reinterpretatio*n (1963:228-266).

extension of civilization," not intended "to achieve maximum relative power," but to exemplify "destiny, charity, duty, and moral self-fulfillment," as they argued that most material benefits would go to colonials.[296] It was the connection between international expansion and moral virtues that caused large number of clergymen to become pro-expansion and religious journals to describe overseas rule as one of the Christian duties and one of the "responsibilities which god lays on."[297]

4.2.1.3. Europe: Height of European Colonial Imperialism

As imperialism was becoming a dominant norm both in Asia and the United States toward the end of the nineteenth century, rivalry over overseas territories intensified among the Great Powers of Europe and African and Asian questions came to play a greater part in European politics.[298] There were a number of signs that indicated the revival of colonialism in Europe at that time. In Britain, many books, articles, and pamphlets were published advertising the positive virtues of colonies.[299] Across Europe, several social organizations were established in support of colonialism.[300] In Germany, the new Kaiser's advocacy for "world policy" testified to Germany's increasing interest in colonialism. Organizations, such as the Colonial Society, developed chauvinistic arguments in support of Germany's further colonial expansion.[301]

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[296] The quotes were from Assistant Secretary of State Hill and Senator Henry Lodge. May (1968:184,186-187,207).

[297] May (1968:5,187); May (1961:257).

[298] With the demise of the Spanish Empire, Britain, France, Russia, and Germany emerged as great powers in Europe. Langer (1956:190); Hayes (1941:314,322).

[299] They include: Lord Curzon's *Problems of the Far East* (1894), Alfred Milner's *England in Egypt* (1893), and Benjamin Kidd's *Social Evolution* (1894). See May (1968:134-135,137-138). Also see, Louis L. Snyder, ed., The Imperialism Reader: Documents and Readings on Modern Expansionism (1962).

[300] They include: *Colonial Society* and *Pan German League* in Germany, *Committee for French Africa* and *French Colonial Union* in France, and *Primrose League* and *Imperial Federation League* in Britain. See May (1968:135).

[301] May (1968:177).

The turn of the century saw increased investment, on the part of many countries, in their navies, a phenomenon that signaled increased imperial competition.[302] Writings about navies and their impact on the balance of power increased in both number and popularity. One of the most famous of these works was American naval strategist, Alfred Thayer Mahan's *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783*, published in 1890, in which, Mahan highlighted the domination of the sea as the most decisive factor for world power.[303] The 1890s witnessed the competition in naval establishments among European powers.[304] There was a new spurt of naval construction in both Russia and France, while the German navy was strengthened in accordance with action of the Reichstag in 1898, an increase followed by the additional enactment of 1900.[305] While other European powers were desperately trying to catch up with Britain's first-class naval power, Britain itself was also active in expanding its colonial empire in Africa, during what Carlton Hayes called the "height of British naval imperialism."[306]

4.2.2. <u>Signs of Normative Uncertainty in the Post Russo-Japanese War Period</u>

The Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905 marked a critical turning point for the international normative environment. The normative landscape became progressively more heterogeneous and uncertain, with the emergence of multiple norms, some directly challenging the dominance of European imperialist norm. The Russo-Japanese war had a major impact on this systemic transformation. Japan's victory over Russia nullified the

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[302] Hayes (1941:238-241); Langer (1956:ch.XIII). On navalism in the United States, see Tsunoda (1967:630-639); Iriye (1966ii:3).
[303] Tsunoda (1967:640-647).
[304] Langer (1956:420,425).
[305] Hayes (1941:322). Also see Langer (1956:431) for an account of Germany's quest for naval supremacy.
[306] In eastern Africa, Britain scored a victory over France in the 1898 Fashoda Crisis and in southern Africa, the British Empire fought the second Boer War against two independent Boer republics. These conflicts resulted in the absorption of these republics into the Empire. See Hayes (1941:316, 319,321-322).

previous international hierarchy, in which a strong, civilized, West was set against a weak, non-civilized East. Now the international system entered a new stage, where the West faced the emergence of strong, civilized, non-Western nation. In the West, the fall of the traditional dichotomy caused concern, which intensified the discussions on race and the future of the Western civilization. The non-Western nations were also influenced by the Japanese victory. Japanese diplomatic success encouraged many Asian nations under the European imperial control, and fueled the anti-colonial, nationalist movements in these countries.

4.2.2.1. New Norms in the West: Racism and "Clash of Civilizations"

The Western realization that civilization was no longer a monopoly of the white man first emerged with Japan's victory over China, which made Japan's potential to become an international power realistic.[307] The Sino-Japanese war changed the Western view towards Japan. Europeans increasingly recognized Japan as "westernized," in contradistinction to other Asian countries, which continued to be seen as less developed.[308] At the same time, Japan's transformation was also perceived as the end of Western supremacy, which increased concern over the future of Western civilization.[309] Many people foresaw eventual conflict between the West and the East (Asia). The following view by a European is a good example.

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[307] LaFeber (1997:49).

[308] The British statesman George Curzon highlighted the differences between Japan and China by attributing the Chinese loss to its backwardness, pointing to things such as civil corruption and the incapacity of the military. In comparison with his native Russia, Lenin also appraised Japanese modernity highly. Iriye (1972:72); Curzon (1896:366-367,395); Katō (2002:149-150).

[309] Klien (2002:59).

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[Japan] is to be the triumphant bearer of the Yellow flag, which she has torn from the hands of China, in the impending campaign against the White ensign in the Asiatic tropics.[310]

The theme of conflict between East and West was commonly found both in Europe and America. Many viewed the ongoing "Scramble of China" as the most recent example of the Western penetration of Asia, a penetration which, in the views of some, would invite non-Western counter-expansion and eventually make the conflict between them inevitable.[311] The Russo-Japanese war, thus, intensified an already growing Western concern over the clash of civilizations. Both Western and non-Western nations regarded the Russo-Japanese war as a "war of civilizations." This was one of the first wara in modern history in which a non-Western nation had defeated a Western nation.

Western reaction to the rise of Japan took a form of racial discourse. In 1902, a German writer, Hermann von Samson-Himmelstjerna, published a book titled, *Die gelbe Gefahr als Moralproblem (The yellow peril as a moral problem)*, and suggested that "both Chinese and Japanese hated the whites and that if they combined the danger to the West would be formidable."[312] Since then, Yellow Peril became a common phrase in Western discussion about the Japanese threat.[313] The German Kaiser Wilhelm II relied on Yellow Peril in his initiative to attack an Asian race that posed a challenge to Christian culture. As the tension between Japan and Russia intensified before the outbreak of Russo-Japanese war, Russia launched a racial propaganda campaign and framed the

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[310] Curzon (1896:412).
[311] A similar view was shared by American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan and British historian Charles H. Person. Iriye (1972:29-32,61).
[312] Iriye (1972:104).
[313] Abbott (1916); Gulick (1914:ch.12, 13).

coming war as a crusade between Christian and non-Christian.[314] In his support for Russia, the German emperor, Wilhelm II, also developed the Yellow Peril argument, warning that once Japan became dominant in Asia, Asia would be unified by Japan, which would pose a great threat to Europe. Hatred towards Japan developed during the course of war, and as Japan became victorious Wilhelm's Yellow Peril argument spread among other Western states.[315]

In the United States, the notion of a "clash of civilizations" was also becoming popular in discussions of US-Japan relations. The American attitude towards Japan shifted quite dramatically after Japan's victory over Russia. Before and during the Russo-Japanese war, the American policy-makers, like the American public, were more occupied with the Russian threat, a position that made the American attitude towards Japan rather friendly and positive.[316] Japan's rise as a chief naval power in the Pacific, however, had a major impact on American view towards Japan.[317] Now that Japan had replaced Russia as a chief regional power, America's main concern shifted to Japanese expansion into Asia and its potential to disturb American interests in the region. The Taft administration's renewed interest in China, under the newly established Far Eastern

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[314] Yamamuro (1998:27); Iriye (1972:104-105).

[315] Regarding the Western fear of Japan, genrō Ōkuma Shigenobu showed his concern that Japan's rise had invoked the long forgotten memory of Asia's threat to Europe in the medieval period and that the West had begun seeing Japan as heirs to Genghis Khan. Iriye (1966i:45-47); Hirama (2000:142-143); Iriye (1972:104,108-109); Matsumura (1982:44-46).

[316] Before the Russo-Japanese war, many Americans, including President Theodore Roosevelt, recognized that Russia was a main threat to American Open Door policy in Asia. Some Americans referred it to as a Slavic challenge to the Anglo-Saxon race. An American diplomat, Paul Reinsch, suggested that the "semi-Asiatic" character of Russia presented "the greatest menace to the continued vigor and supremacy of Western civilization." Columbia University professor Franklin Giddings argued similarly that the great question of the twentieth century was whether the Anglo-Saxon or the Slav was to become prominent in the world. Under this circumstance, Japan was regarded as an American ally, helping to hold off Russia's growing power. Many Americans even characterized Japan as more Westernized than Russia. Iriye (1972:70,72); LaFeber (1997:78); Tsunoda (1967:234-235).

[317] The US navy was considered second in the region after the main portion of British naval force was moved back to Europe. Iriye (1966ii:5); Hirama (2000:59).

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Bureau of the State Department, coincided with Japan's increase in continental foothold.[318] The simultaneous expansion of the two countries across the Pacific contributed to and increased likelihood of a colliding interests and, possibly, of a military clash between the nations.[319]

The California immigration crisis also escalated the bilateral tension between the United States and Japan. After the American annexation of Hawaii in 1899, many Japanese immigrants in Hawaii moved to California. Massive Japanese emigration in the direction of the American continent caused a scare in California, where the number of Japanese immigrants reached as many as 20,000-30,000 by 1905.[320] The immigration crisis was triggered by San Francisco's segregation of Asian children in separate schools in 1906, as well as by numerous attacks on and boycotts of Japanese businesses in California.[321] The Japanese government's concession to restrict emigration to the United States caused a sharp decrease in Japanese immigration to California after 1908. Popular agitation against the immigrants did not cease, however, and the California State Congress passed the Alien Land Law (Webb-Heney Bill) in 1913, denying Japanese immigrants right of land ownership.[322]

When tensions rose between Japan and American over various issues, the political discourse of race and civilization was commonly heard in descriptions of the strained

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[318] For a detailed account of the State Department's Asia policy during this period, see Kitaoka (1989); Tsunoda (1967:368-378).
[319] Iriye (1972:171,206).
[320] Iriye (1995:60-61). For detailed numbers on the Japanese emigration to Hawaii and California, see Iriye (1972:132-133).
[321] Iriye (1972:133). The San Francisco school board decided to segregate 93 Japanese school children in October 1906. See Klien (2002:63). In 1906, the great San Francisco earthquake destroyed many schools. In October the Board of Education ordered, allegedly because of lack of space, that all Chinese, Japanese, and Korean children go to a segregated Oriental Public School. This happened right after Japan's Red Cross had sent a quarter-million dollars to help California's earthquake victims. (LaFeber 1997:89)
[322] LaFeber (1997:106); Iriye (1995:61); Tsunoda (1967:380-386).

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bilateral relations.[323] The clash of Japanese and American interests in China was also viewed, as a question of "whether the institutions and ethical standards of East or West shall shape the course of civilization" in China.[324] Japan's continuous expansion into Asia, the first such expansion undertaken by a non-Western state, was regarded with some ambivalence by Americans. Thomas Millard, in his *America and the Far Eastern Question*, described what he saw as the dangers of Pan-Orientalism and stressed the racial competition between the white and yellow race for dominance.[325] Theodore Roosevelt's belief that "the white and the Asian races could not coexist peacefully anywhere in the world" represented American public sentiment at that time.[326]

The image of US-Japan rivalry escalated to a war scare around 1907.[327] The rising vogue for fictions and non-fiction writings dealing with the danger of Japanese hegemony in Asia, or an imaginary war between the two countries indicated the national sentiment in the United States at that time.[328] People also understood the California immigration crisis in the context of this war scare.[329] Not confined to the public, a similar concern was

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[323] The bilateral tension over the American annexation of Hawaii was one example. The Foreign Relations Committee's report stated that "the present Hawaiian-Japanese controversy is the preliminary skirmish in the great coming struggle between the civilization and the awakening forces of the East and the civilization of the West." Iriye (1972:51-53).

[324] Iriye (1972:226). The racial view of Japan was also evident in the State Department. See Iriye (1972:109-112) for an account of William Straight's racism against Japan.

[325] Millard (1909:13,353).

[326] Iriye (1972:151-152). On Roosevelt's image in Japan, also see LaFeber (1997:79); Iriye (1972:111-112,229); Iriye (1966ii:16).

[327] Iriye (1972:73,188-191) discusses the role of image in this bilateral relationship, arguing that the Americans created an imaginary collision of interests between the two nations. Iriye highlights the growing economic interdependence between Japan and the United States to show that the sense of impending conflict was more imaginary than real.

[328] The writings included; Ernest Hugh Fitzpatrick, *The Coming Conflict of Nations/The Japanese-American War* (1909); Homer Lea, *The Valor of Ignorance* (1909). These writers stressed the struggle between the Eastern and Western civilizations, and classified Japan as non-Western despite its successful Westernization. For a detailed account of these literatures, see Iriye (1972:16-17,105,109,153-154,164-167,185-187,225); Iriye (1966ii:6); LaFeber (1997:89); Tsunoda (1967:384-386).

[329] Some went so far as to suggest Japanese collusion with American blacks in the South and the West. Others believed Japanese immigrants to be collecting strategic information in order to help their native country to prepare for a future war that seemed increasingly inevitable. Iriye (1972:158-159).

growing among the American military as well. In 1907, then Secretary of War, Taft, approved sending high-ranking American military personnel on a confidential mission to Japan and other parts of Asia for information gathering. The American navy also dispatched part of its fleets for a world cruise, which was designed as part of a preparedness exercise for a possible war with Japan.[330] Within the American army after 1908, there was a continued flow of memoranda and telegrams on Japan that indicated the seriousness of Japanese question within the army. By 1910, there was a widely shared view that Japan was a potential military antagonist in the Pacific.[331] The nearly unanimous American consensus that war with Japan was a possibility resulted in a concrete military plan. Both the navy and the army launched a study of military strategy against Japan, which later evolved into what was known as the "Orange Plan."[332] The Pearl Harbor naval port was also built in 1908.

4.2.2.2. Normative Challenge to European Imperialism [1]: Nationalism and Anti-Colonialism

While the collapse of the traditional hierarchy between the West and the East intensified the discussions on race and civilization in the Western world, the period following the Russo-Japanese war also witnessed new normative trends from the non-Western world that challenged the dominance of European imperialism. The rise of

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[330] The mission to Asia did not find any relevant facts supporting the growing likelihood of war between the United States and Japan. The military mission could not find any evidence to support their fear that Japanese agents were in touch with the Pilipino insurgents. No anti-American feeling or signs of unusual activity at Japanese naval bases were found. The US fleet met a friendly welcome in Japan. See Iriye (1972:160-161,163).

[331] One of the War College's memoranda written in 1910 suggested that Japan's ongoing military build-up was aimed primarily at preparedness against the United States. The American navy had a less alarmist view than that of the army, but the Japanese navy's decisive victory against Russia's Baltic fleet certainly made the world aware that the Pacific was contained two major naval powers, the United States and Japan. Iriye (1972:161-162,215-216,219-220).

[332] President Roosevelt and his military advisers began their first systematic planning for war against Japan in 1906. At the same time, the United States had no desire to dominate the Pacific militarily, and the defensive strategy of the Orange Plan remained in 1913. See Iriye (1972:163,216,223); LaFeber (1997:90).

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Chinese nationalism posed a great obstacle to the imperial conduct of both the Western states and Japan. Western penetration of China, begun with the Opium Wars and continuing in a series of unequal bilateral treaties, had weakened the legitimacy of the Ch'ing dynasty, and contributed to the rise of anti-Western sentiment and nationalism among the Chinese public. Chinese hatred of the "foreign devils" intensified after the crisis of 1897 and 1898. The anti-foreign rage reached its summit in 1900 and resulted in a mass-scale anti-foreign movement, often known as the Boxer Rebellion, which invited foreign intervention in the form of the Eight-Nation Alliance. The rebellion was quashed, and the government was compelled to sign more unequal treaties with foreign powers.[333] The Ch'ing dynasty's failure to defend the country against the foreign powers contributed to a further growth of Chinese nationalism.

The Russo-Japanese war had a profound impact on the Chinese public, fueling their already growing nationalism by increasing its confidence. For the Chinese, who had been suppressed by European imperial powers, Japan's victory meant "a setback for the white race" and "the end of the myth of the invincibility of Western powers."[334] Chinese nationalism targeted foreign nationals from many countries, including Japan and America. The nationalistic reaction to the *Tatsu Maru* incident resulted in an anti-Japanese boycott.[335] The immigration dispute between China and the United States also led to an anti-American boycott.[336]

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[333] Langer (1956:692-693).
[334] Iriye (1972:116-117,181).
[335] The *Tatsu Maru* incident began when a Japanese freighter intending to smuggle arms into China was seized by Chinese officials and its arms were confiscated. The Japanese government claimed its right to engage in legal trade and compelled the Chinese side to agree to humiliating terms, including an apology and reparations for damages, which aroused strong popular reaction in China, including an anti-Japanese boycott. For a detailed account of the incident, see Iriye (1972:182-183).
[336] The renewal of the American law excluding the Chinese in 1902 made America the main target of Chinese nationalism. See Iriye (1972:115,118-123).

The Japanese success inspired other Asian nations beyond China. In Vietnam, for example, anti-French colonialist leaders and nationalists Cuong De and Phan Boi Chau came to Japan asking for support for their independence movement.[337]

4.2.2.3. Normative Challenge to European Imperialism [2]: American "Open Door" Policy in China

Another challenge to the European imperialist norm was posed by the newest imperial power, the United States. In expanding its international influence in Latin America and the Pacific, the United States endorsed a course of expansionism different from the traditional model of European imperial expansion. Instead of stressing the acquisition of an exclusive sphere of influence, Americans advocated "peaceful expansion," which they saw as a more commercially oriented, non-exclusive kind of expansionism.[338]

Liberal expansionism was the normative foundation of American imperial expansion. John Hay's *Open Door Note*, issued in 1899, and William Taft's *Dollar Policy* were both part of the same ideological line. President Taft supported active participation in international affairs, believing that this America could be a provider of international order and a source of benefits for other civilizations. The State Department and the newly established Far Eastern Bureau frequently referred to the virtues of "liberal expansionism" in justifying its policies.[339] Taft's foreign policy was a precursor of

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[337] Yamamuro (1998:25); Kitaoka (1978:21).
[338] Iriye (1966i:34-36); Iriye (1972:66,230).
[339] For example, Secretary of State Knox argued that American capitalism and economic expansion helped link countries and peoples closer together and make war obsolete. Huntington Wilson also emphasized the difference between the "old-fashioned selfish exploitation" of European imperialism and the "new and sincere and practical effort" of American liberal imperialism. See Iriye (1972:21,206-208).

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Woodrow Wilson's diplomacy, that reaffirmed the basic principles of liberal

expansionism.[340]

The American insistence on new principles, such as the "Open Door" policies that

stressed equal commercial opportunities, introduced a new feature in Western imperial

policy, particularly in China. American concern that the European imperialist "Scramble

of China" threatened the open-door policy led to Secretary of State John Hay's Open

Door Note in 1899, in which he demanded "equal treatment in trade and navigation for

the commerce and industry for the Untied States and all other nations be guaranteed."[341]

Hay's Open Door Note was important in its challenge to the increasing trend of European

states' exclusive spheres of influence in China.[342] American attempt to limit the

particularistic type of expansion created a gap between European and American policy

towards China, creating multiple standards with regard to the Great Powers' governance

of China.[343]

4.3. Norm Selection Process in Late Meiji through Early Taishō Japan

Japanese worldview around the turn of the century was to a great extent congruent

with that of Western powers. As had been the case in the previous period, the

Westernizers' worldview had widespread support in Japan. Reflecting the dominant

position of imperialism in the international normative system, Japanese decision-makers,

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[340] Iriye (1972:232).
[341] LaFeber (1997:49,69). Katō (2002:137-138) points out the British influence in Hay's Open Door Note. According to Katō, British interest groups who were against their government's shift to territorial acquisition of China exercised political influence to encourage Hay's Open Door Notes.
[342] For example, in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese war, Britain was increasingly concerned about Russia's increasing naval superiority in China. Russia's strategic superiority in China both in land and sea caused a shift in the policy of both Britain and other European powers, from support for the open-door policy in trade and commerce to the acquisition of an exclusive sphere of influence. Katō (2002:135-136).
[343] Iriye (1972:65-66).

intellectuals, and nationalists collectively supported imperialism as a necessary condition for continuous national development. They also highlighted the positive contributions of imperialism to human progress.[344] This widespread endorsement for imperialism served as a normative foundation for Japan's interest in overseas expansion, especially Korea and Southern Manchuria. A major difference between this and previous periods lay not so much in Japan's worldview as in its international identity. Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars transformed Japanese international status from a weak, backward nation into strong, civilized state. Gaining a new national identity as a great power, Japanese foreign policy establishments, both government officials and intellectuals alike, were increasingly occupied with the long-term prospects for Japan's overseas expansion.[345]

In the following section, I will discuss the general consensus that existed among key political players in Japan during this period. Particular attention will be paid to government officials, including *genrō* (senior statesmen), military, and foreign ministry. Outside of the government circle, the worldview of both Japanese intellectuals and journalists, both from the liberal and nationalist perspectives, will be analyzed in order to show that this official attitude held wide purchase even both outside of government circles and within circles that had wide influence on public opinion.

4.3.1. <u>Military Victories and Japan's New Identity</u>

Japan's victories against China and Russia brought about a revolutionary change in Japanese psychology. These military victories led to a national consciousness that

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[344] Japanese liberal philosophers, such as Ukita Kazutami and Kayahara Kazan, especially stressed the universal virtue of imperialism as a justification. Iriye (1972:79,98-99,103).
[345] Iriye (1972:205).

Japan had entered the higher levels in the international hierarchy formerly reserved for the Western states. The national excitement of Japan becoming a "first-class country" was evident in the postwar period. The *Social Education Association*, Japan's most distinguished authorities on foreign affairs, declared "Japan had joined Britain and the United States as the great powers."[346] Journalist, Tokutomi Sohō, expressed Japan's growing self-confidence as follows:

> We are no longer ashamed to stand before the world as Japanese… The name "Japanese"…now signifies honor, glory, courage, triumph, and victory. Before, we did not know ourselves, and the world did not yet know us. But now that we have tested our strength, we know ourselves and we are known by the world.[347]

Japanese pride over the achievement of great power status was strengthened by a series of other foreign policy accomplishments alongside the war victories. For example, the leveling of previously unequal treaties was considered as another validation of Japan's equal status with the Western powers. Unequal treaties with the West had long been a symbol of Japan's inferiority vis-à-vis the Western states and the cause of serious public outrages whenever the government failed to negotiate their revision. The Japanese public's extreme sensitivity about these unequal treaties resulted in an attack on Foreign Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu by a nationalist after the minister had failed to improve treaty conditions in 1888.[348] In addition to the finally successful treaty revision, an invitation to the International Peace Conference at the Hague in 1899 and the Anglo-Japanese alliance

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[346] The *Social Education Association* had a variety of people as its members, including Ōkuma Shigenobu, Tokyo mayor Ozaki Yukio, and liberal intellectual Ukita Kazutami. Iriye (1972:98,100,126-128). Also see Klien (2002:59); Satō (1974:29).

[347] Klien (2002:58). Journalist Kayahara Kazan also expressed a similar view that Japan had transformed into a world power as a result of the war. Iriye (1972:45).

[348] Kimura (1966:61,74-75).

of 1902 also signified that Japan was recognized and treated more equally by the Western states than before.[349]

Japan's military victories and its elevation in the international hierarchy had two important normative implications. First, Japanese triumphs against China and Russia was seen as "a victory of the forces of progress and civilization over those of reaction and backwardness."[350] Before and during the military clashes, the Westernizers frequently portrayed the conflicts as "modernized" Japan fighting against "conservative" China or Russia.[351] Fukuzawa Yukichi described the Sino-Japanese war as the result of an "uncivilized" China's rejection of development.[352] Similarly, *genrō* Yamagata Aritomo recognized the Russo-Japanese war as the conflict between new Japan, which had abolished its feudalism and undergone democratization, versus old Russia, which had maintained its aristocratic government.[353]

Second, as a Meiji intellectual Kayahara Kazan argued, Russia's defeat against Japan symbolized that civilization and power were not the monopoly of the Caucasian race.[354] Fukuzawa Yukichi pointed out that Japan was no longer limited by its geographical and racial connection to Asia, but had proved its modernity.[355] Similarly, politician Ōkuma Shigenobu claimed that "men were all equal, that their racial differences were immaterial and what counted was their power, intelligence, and

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[349] Klien (2002:57); Hayes (1941:325); Satō (1974:29).

[350] Quote is from Iriye (1972:127-128). Also see Banno (1978:445).

[351] Japanese history textbook in 1896 also made a contrast between Japan and China (Matsumoto 2000:52).

[352] Fukuzawa (1894).

[353] Ōyama (1966:294,301-307). Yamagata's view was echoed by many Japanese intellectuals. Liberal philosopher Yoshino Sakuzō (1995:7-10), for instance, criticized Russia's rejection of Open Door policy in Manchuria as proof of its "uncivilized" manners. A local newspaper, *Chiba Minpō*, as well as a political party, *Jiyū tō (Liberal Party)*, also viewed the wars in a similar way. Nomura (1970:54); Kitaoka (2001:247).

[354] Iriye (1972:128,141).

[355] LaFeber (1997:49).

morality."[356] In the regional context, however, Japanese identification with other Western nations signified Japan's unique position in Asia, being the only "civilized" country in the region.

4.3.2. <u>Japanese Worldview: Strong Consensus on Imperialism</u>

In Japan following the Russo-Japanese war, great power and imperialism were inseparable concepts for two reasons. First, there was a strong national consensus in Japan that imperialism was a dominant international trend at that time. Tōgō Minoru wrote in his *Nihon Shokumin-ron (On Japanese colonization)* that imperialism and colonialism were "the great currents of the world today, and the nation must develop in accordance with the currents."[357] Second, imperialism was widely recognized as an foundation essential for becoming a great power. Various domestic groups, from the government officials to liberal intellectuals and nationalists, endorsed this imperial-centered worldview, making for nearly unanimous support for Japan's overseas expansion in the post Russo-Japanese war period.

4.3.2.1. *The Official Position: Genrō, Military, and Foreign Ministry*

For the Japanese army as well those statesmen who had a strong connection with the army, such as Yamagata Aritomo and Terauchi Masatake, Japan's imperial expansion, especially into Korea and southern Manchuria, was closely related to its national defense. Ever since Yamagata had presented the "line of advantage" argument insisting on the importance of Korea for Japan's national security in 1890, a secure Korea and its

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[356] Iriye (1972:98).
[357] Tōgō (1906:354). Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō also expressed a similar view. See Iriye (1972:93-94).

independence from Chinese control had been the top priority for the army.[358] Freeing

Korea from Chinese control was the main Japanese objective in the Sino-Japanese war,

and the fear of Russia's eventual advance into Korea also pushed Japan to go to war with

Russia a decade later.[359] In the Japanese army's view, the foremost advantage of having

Korea and southern Manchuria under Japanese control as a result of the war victories was

the establishment of the regional defense system for Japanese security.[360]

Seeing Japan's continental expansion from a national security viewpoint,

however, was rather rare in Japan at that time. Instead, most political leaders and key

figures in Foreign Ministry stressed the economic advantages of imperial expansion, and

they were more interested in engaging in overseas economic activities than in territorial

control. For them, southern Manchuria appeared primarily as an economic opportunity

rather than the defense system.[361] According to Ōkuma Shigenobu:

> …with the signing of the new treaties of commerce the Japanese were guaranteed
> freedom of residence to engage in business throughout the world. Therefore,
> there was no need to undertake colonial settlement; what was needed was
> overseas settlement without colonialism or territorial control.[362]

Acknowledging imperialism as a international trend, Foreign Minister Komura

Jutarō argued that economic expansion through emigration and settlement was the

backbone of national power and wealth, and suggested increasing national strength

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[358] See Chapter Three for a detailed account of Yamagata's "line of advantage" argument.

[359] Before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war, Major General Iguchi Shōgo, chief of the general affairs bureau of the General Staff, stated in a memorandum "securing our occupation of Korea in order to prevent Russia's southward thrust." Iriye (1972:82).

[360] The army's defense-oriented thinking became apparent in the domestic debate over the establishment of the Manchurian railway. Army leaders, such as Yamagata Aritomo, Terauchi Masatake, and Tanaka Giichi, viewed the railway as means for transportation of military personnel and equipment in case of a future war with Russia; this view as completely different from that of the Foreign Ministry and Finance Ministry that regarded the railway for economic opportunity. Kitaoka (1978:35-40,103).

[361] Iriye (1972:96-97).

[362] Iriye (1972:213). Other genrō, Itō Hirobumi and Saionji Kinmochi, also shared Ōkuma's view of liberal imperialism. LaFeber (1997:87).

through economic means, including trade, navigation, emigration, and joint ventures.[363] The navy, as well as Gotō Shinpei, the first president of the Southern Manchuria Railway, also supported the idea of commercial imperialism.[364]

4.3.2.2. Japanese Liberals

Commercial imperialism and the policy of overseas expansion gained the support of liberal intellectuals as well. Kayahara Kazan described the impact of the Sino-Japanese war as follows:

> The result would make Japan a world power, enabling it to expand into and dominate the Pacific while at the same time carrying out the mission of transmitting modern civilization to the Asian continent.[365]

For the Japanese liberals, like Kayahara, Japan's expansion into Asia would contribute to the development and progress of the entire region. Ukita Kazutami asserted that Japan was in the process of emerging as a model nation in Asia, just as Greece had become the model for Western civilization after defeating Persia. Yano Ryūkei made a similar claim that "Japanese influence in Asia should be like the influence of the Untied States in South America and that of the British in Australia and Africa."[366]

In the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese war, there was a growing sentiment in Japan that war was unlikely for at least the next ten years and that the new international trend was peaceful commercial competition among states.[367] Gotō Shinpei, for instance, claimed that "physical warfare was being replaced by economic competition and that the

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[363] Iriye (1972:170); LaFeber (1997:87).

[364] Before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war, the navy was not interested in territorial expansion. Leading naval strategists emphasized the crucial importance of the Chinese market for the development of the Japanese economy and of keeping the door of trade open in China. Iriye (1972:83,173).

[365] Iriye (1972:45).

[366] Kano (1971:298-300); Iriye (1972:98-99).

[367] The prospect for peace resulted from the Russia's defeat in the war as well as the renewal of Anglo-Japanese alliance that should deter future military conflict. Iriye (1972:131,204).

world powers were spending more and more on commercial expansion and less and less on armament."[368] Out of this anticipation of peace, liberal philosophers developed the pacifist version of pan-Asianism. People, such as Yano, Satō Torajirō and the Socialist Abe Isoo, advocated expansion through peaceful means, and emphasized Japan's new mission, as the only civilized state in Asia, to use its power for the welfare of the entire region by bringing Asia under the influence of Japanese civilization.[369]

4.3.2.3. Japanese Media and the Public

Strong interest and excitement about overseas expansion was a national phenomenon in Japan following the Russo-Japanese war. A number of books and new journals on emigration and colonialism were published.[370] The number of overseas Japanese kept expanding. Around 1905, there were over 50,000 in Taiwan and over 40,000 Japanese emigrants in Korea. The United States and its possessions, such as Hawaii, remained the place with the largest number of overseas Japanese. In 1906, the number of Japanese emigrating to Hawaii reached an all-time high with 30,393, brining the totaling number of Japanese there to as many as 70,000.[371] The government's promotion of the study of colonialism encouraged universities to treat it as a serious academic subject. The American-trained Nitobe Inazō was appointed a chair in colonialism at the Tokyo Imperial University in 1908. The post Sino-Japanese war period witnessed the publication of a number of new journals that stressed Japan's new identity

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[368] Iriye (1972:173). For a detailed account of Gotō's view on imperial expansion, see Gotō (1944).
[369] Iriye (1972:80-81,98-99,102-103).
[370] Ōkawahira Takamatsu's *Nihon imin-ron (Japanese emigration)* was published in 1905, and Tōgō Minoru's *Nihon shokumin-ron (Japanese colonization)* was published a year later. A new magazine, *Shokumin sekai (The world of colonialism)*, was published in 1908, which was followed by other magazines; *Kaigai no Nihon* (Japan overseas) and *Sekai no Nihon* (Japan in the world), both of which were published in 1911. Iriye (1972:130,204,212).
[371] Iriye (1972:100-103,132).

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as an expansive nation.[372] *Tōyō Keizai Shinpō,* a journal that reflected the opinion of the Japanese business community, insisted on peaceful economic expansion through free and fair competition.[373] Major national newspapers, such as *Tokyo Asahi* and *Tokyo Nichinichi,* also suggested the extension of Japanese intellectual and economic influence through peaceful migration.[374]

4.3.2.4. The Chauvinistic Asianism of Japanese Right-Wing Groups

In addition to the advocacy of the groups described above, Japanese imperialism and continental expansion were also strongly advocated by Asian-nationalists. Unlike the liberal-nationalists in the 1880s, such as Ōi Kentarō and Sugita Junzan, who sought Asian collaboration as means to promote the movement for popular rights, Asian-nationalists in the later period were more aggressive in their promotion of Japanese expansion and characterized by a chauvinistic nationalism. The change in character of Asianism in Japan was due to several factors, such as waning prospects for the liberal version of Asian unity and China's determination to maintain the traditional regional order to maintain a traditional order that presented a major obstacle to Japan's foreign policy ambitions. The new form of Asianism, represented by "patriotic societies" such as *Genyōsha* (Dark Ocean Society) and *Kokuryūkai* (Amur River Society), was more nationalistic in its insistence on Japan's active expansion in the region.[375] *Genyōsha,* a group that had originally been a supporter of the people's rights movement, revealed its

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[372] This includes: *Taiyō* (Sun), *Tōyō Keizai Shinpō, Sekai no Nihon* (Japan in the World), and *Chūō Kōron.* Kano (1971:287-288).
[373] *Tōyō keizai shinpo* (1907:5), No.417 (June 25).
[374] Iriye (1972:130,148-149,176).
[375] The term "patriotic society" in describing the right-wing groups was used by Norman (1944:261).

conversion to a more expansionist stance in 1887.[376] Outraged and insulted by the Chinese officials' treatment of Japanese people at Nagasaki, *Genyōsha* declared that "its only interest was to preach uncompromising nationalism and to demand greater armaments."[377] Starting in the 1880s, *Genyōsha* and its leader Tōyama Mitsuru, used various tactics to encourage Japan to go to war against China.[378]

Tōyama Mitsuru's *Genyōsha*, as well as *Kokuryūkai* (Amur River Society), a spin-off organization from *Genyōsha* established by Uchida Ryōhei in 1901, continuously worked on to expand Japan's continental foothold. Uchida viewed Russia as a barbaric, authoritarian nation with no future and insisted on the necessity of war with Russia as civilization's challenge to barbarism.[379] *Genyōsha*, and the *Kokuryūkai* led the pro-war public opinion and were major critics of the Japanese government, led by *genrō* Itō Hirobumi and Yamagata Aritomo, who were quite cautious about launching a war against Russia.[380] Uchida's *Kokuryūkai*'s pro-war stance led to the establishment of an intimate connection with the General Staff, a portion of the government that also supported Japan's continental expansion.[381]

After Japan's victory against Russia, *Genyōsha*, and *Kokuryūkai* continued to support the idea of Pan-Asianism, focusing their efforts on the annexation of Korea as well as Japan's expansion into Manchuria. In 1913, Uchida published *Shina kan* ("A

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[376] The original philosophy of the *Genyōsha* was similar to Ōi Kentarō's people's right movement. Some of the early members of the *Genyōsha* flirted with the idea of joint action with other liberal groups in their effort to oppose the Meiji government. Takeuchi (1963:9-10); Norman (1944:275-276).

[377] In 1886, a Chinese naval squadron under the command of Admiral Ting Ju-ch'ang put in at Nagasaki. During its stay, some of the Chinese sailors became involved in a street fight in which Japanese police suffered casualties. The incident triggered *Genyōsha*'s anti-Chinese campaign. Takeuchi (1963:24); Norman (1944:276).

[378] Members of the *Genyōsha* interviewed the Foreign Minister and the military official to persuade a war with China. In addition, it created a subsidiary society of the *Genyōsha* in Korea to encourage the war. Norman (1944:281); Takeuchi (1963:27).

[379] Uchida (1994i:10-68). Takeuchi (1963:54).

[380] Takizawa (1976:189).

[381] Norman (1944:280,282).

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View towards China"), in which he predicted that there would be no prospect for national unity for China due to its inferior national character. Since China could not, he thought, avoid being divided by the Great Powers, he argued that, in this international circumstance, Japan should pursue independence for both southern Manchuria and Inner Mongolia by making them protectorates of Japan.[382] Tōyama and Uchida's view was strongly anti-Western. Tōyama often told his foreign guests from Asia the importance of Asian states' cooperation with Japan, especially in driving Western interests and influence out of Asia. In 1887, *Genyōsha* argued for the necessity of armaments "in order to counter the Westerners as a yellow race."[383] Through the active networking with politicians and military officers in Japan, and the cultivation of relationships with the leaders of dissident groups who might be of service in Japanese continental ambitions in Korea and China, these new Asianist groups played an important role in realizing Japan's continental expansion.

4.3.3. <u>Japanese Reaction to the Normative Uncertainty</u>

As has been discussed so far, one can find two notable features of Japan's identity and worldview in the post Russo-Japanese war period. The first is the growth of Japanese self-confidence that Japan caught up with the Western states. Japan no longer belonged to the group of its weak and backward Asian neighbors, but rather to the group of civilized Western powers. Secondly, postwar Japan was characterized by a strong faith in economic imperialism, eager to adopt a policy of overseas expansion through emigration, settlement, and trading activities.

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[382] Uchida (1994ii:268-304).
[383] Takeuchi (1963:9); Norman (1944:274).

While late Meiji Japan strongly identified itself with Western powers and was ready to engage in peaceful economic competition with them, the Japanese faced a challenge resulting from the normative uncertainty in the international system. New elements in the international normative environment, such as Western racism and nationalism in China, posed an obstacle for Japan's ambition to join the "Western club" and pursue a policy of imperialism following the European precedents.

4.3.3.1. Western Racism and the California Immigration Crisis

For Japanese Westernizers whose efforts focused on assimilation with the West, the rise of racist discourse in Europe and the United States posed a serious threat. One such Westernizer, Yamagata Aritomo, even went so far as to argue that the racial war was a scenario Japan must avoid at all costs.[384] Meiji officials lost no time combating this racism. During the Russo-Japanese war, as a counter-strategy to Russia's Yellow Peril propaganda, the Meiji leaders dispatched Suematsu Kenchō to Europe and Kaneko Kentarō to the United States for public relations campaigns designed to ease anti-Japanese racism in the West.[385] The Meiji leaders made a great effort to characterize the war not in racial terms, but as a national conflict, portraying the war as fight between Japan and a country that was ethnically Western but inferior to Japan in many respects.[386]

The question of racial conflict remained in the postwar period as well. In 1908, the influential magazine *Taiyō (Sun)* issued a special supplement titled "The collision between the yellow and white races." Its lead article stated:

> [T]he history of the future will be a record of a primitive struggle between the
> yellow and white races. It was evident…that all outstanding international

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[384] Akita/Ito (1985:100).
[385] See "Yellow Peril—Kaneko's views" *New York Times* (2/21/1904, 3/20,1904). Iriye (1966ii:12-13).
[386] Iriye (1972:98).

questions could be reduced to racial competition. It was most urgent that the Japanese, as they undertook global activities, should understand that their presence overseas posed a threat to the West's white civilization, just as the coming of the West had threatened Asian civilization.[387]

The Westernizers continuously made an effort to reconcile Western racism and an increasingly powerful Western fear of Japan. Ōkuma Shigenobu articulated the growing Western concern by saying that some Westerners considered Japanese victory as the beginning of the yellow domination of the globe, and the only way for Japan to cope with the phenomenon was to trust in the developing cosmopolitanism of the world.[388] In order to reconcile the racial barrier, Japan's "west-ness" and the importance of equality between Japan and others were often stressed. Fukuzawa Yukichi argued that Japan was spiritually much closer to the West, despite its geographical location in Asia.[389] Ōkuma Shigenobu claimed that the "[Japanese] were equal to any race, any nation in the world;" and "men were all equal, that their racial differences were immaterial and what counted was their power, intelligence, and morality."[390]

A majority of Japanese shared optimism in the face of the California immigration crisis. The overwhelming response of Japanese leaders—government officials, military, business, and press—was dismay that Japanese emigration posed a threat to the United States and disbelief that these tensions should lead to anything more serious conflict

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[387] Iriye (1972:214).

[388] Iriye (1972:104).

[389] Klien (2002:61). A more-extreme argument was made by the distinguished economist Taguchi Ukichi, who sought to demonstrate from history, literature, and phonetics that Japanese were really ethnically Western. Iriye (1972:105).

[390] Iriye (1972:98); Iriye (1966ii:13). Ōkuma Shigenobu also argued, "[Japan] had every right to be treated the same way as Europeans and Americans." The newspaper *Tokyo Asahi* similarly asserted that "Japanese-American relations are naturally relations involving mutuality, but mutuality consists of civilized, moral mutuality" illustrate this point. Iriye (1972:134, 148-149).

between the two countries.[391] The Japanese government tried to ease the immigration crisis by voluntarily restricting emigration to the United States and hoped for the best "by trusting in the good sense of the federal government under President Roosevelt, and by cultivating the good will of Americans so as to isolate the prejudiced few."[392]

While the government officials took a relatively calm response to this racism and concentrated its efforts on lessening the racial hysteria in the West, other Japanese viewed the immigration crisis as a test case by which to see whether Japanese immigrants would be treated equally with whites and to judge the fairness of the United States, a country generally taken to represent equality. As it became increasingly clear that the United States was failing to live up to it's ideals, however, the official conciliatory approach to the immigration crisis invited mounting criticism of the government.[393] *Yorozu chōhō*, the liveliest daily and the most prominent of anti-government papers of the time, accused the government's policy as humiliating to Japanese "national pride." Kayahara Kazan wrote in *Yorozu chōhō* that the United States "continued to regard the Japanese as children…[and that] if war should come it was bound to be with the United States, to determine which country was the strongest and most civilized in the world."[394] Similarly, even a moderate newspaper, *Tokyo Nichinichi*, resented the Japanese

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[391] Unlike in the United States, the California episode did not lead to the type of war hysteria in Japan. Iriye (1972:145).

[392] Iriye (1972:142).

[393] Iriye (1972:211-212) cites Ōtsuka Zenjirō's *Nichi-Bei gaikō-ron (on Japanese-American relations)* and *Shinsekai (New World)*'s editorial as such examples.

[394] Iriye (1972:135-136, 139). Kayahara interpreted the meaning of the immigration crisis as determining "how far the two races would expand." For him, the Pacific, the main target of Japanese emigration, represented "a theater of racial confrontation as a result of the expansion of the white and yellow races." San Francisco would be a test case in "determining whether the future world is still to be dominated by the white race, or whether the [white race] is to be replaced by the Japanese race." Iriye (1972:140).

government policy as "the legitimization of race prejudice."[395] As the immigration crisis persisted, more and more Japanese shared Kayahara's conviction that fundamental and irreconcilable differences existed between the two peoples.[396]

The increasing racial discourse in Japan and the rise of nationalism contributed to the growth of a Pan-Asianist view in Japan. Iriye Akira has pointed out the relation between the spread of anti-Japanese sentiment in the West and Japan's pan-Asianist response.[397] Tōgō Minoru's argument in *Nihon shokumin-ron (On Japanese colonization)* represents the anti-Western aspect of pan-Asianism.

> Japanese expansion into white countries was being thwarted by yellow-perilist and white-supremacist talk; should it persist, the Japanese as a last resort would have to be prepared to champion the yellow race and compete with white peoples…Our country embodies all the virtues of East and West, and it is destined to coalesce and harmonize them in order to create a great Asian civilization.[398]

Other right wing nationalist groups, such as *Genyōsha and Kokuryūkai*, also advocated the unification of Asia under Japanese leadership, a plan that aimed at liberating Asia from Western control and influence.[399]

4.3.3.2. Chinese Nationalism

Most in Japanese decision-making circles did not take Chinese nationalism very seriously. Foreign Minister Hayashi Tadasu (1906-1908)'s remark that "[t]he way to deal with China…is for the Powers to combine and insist on what they want and to go on insisting until they get it" represented the mainstream view among Japanese leadership at

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[395] *Tokyo Nichinichi* asserted that "the Japanese could never accept the position of inferiority compared with European immigrants to the United States." Iriye (1972:136).
[396] Iriye (1972:142-143).
[397] Iriye (1972:171).
[398] Tōgō (1906:361-362,384-385).
[399] Klien (2002:61).

that time.[400] Hayashi believed that the Chinese had always been and remained essentially an anti-foreign people, due to their confidence in their superiority. Hayashi, therefore, showed little sympathy to the currents of nationalism in that country. Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō (1901-1906, 1908-1911) shared a similar view in dealing with Japan's continental policy. For Komura, Chinese nationalism was no more than an obstacle for Japan's continental expansion. The central thrust of *Komura Diplomacy*, the approach that dominated Japan's foreign policy for a decade after the Russo-Japanese war, was to rely on collaboration with other powers and pressure China in order to establish Japan's special interests in Manchuria. In Komura's view, it was the Great Power politics that ultimately determined the fate of China, and Chinese nationalism was not thought to have any impact since it was always subject to the intentions of the Great Powers.[401] The Japanese military's view towards Chinese nationalism was also similar to that of the Foreign Minister's. Rather than seeing China as an independent power that could be Japan's friend or enemy, the hawkish group within the army, including figures such as Tanaka Giichi and Uehara Yūsaku, viewed China simply as a subject of Japan's expansion of interests. Army's China policy memoranda in 1910 followed this line as well.[402] Similarly, young naval strategist, Satō Tetsutarō, regarded China as the ground of imperial competition among powers.[403]

Although the majority of Japan's decision-makers did not take Chinese nationalism seriously, there was a minority view that contrasted with the official approach. Minister Hayashi Gonsuke who served in Beijing between 1906 and 1908

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[400] Iriye (1972:184).
[401] Kitaoka (1978:23-24).
[402] Kitaoka (1978:14,66-67).
[403] Iriye (1966i:61).

represented an alternative approach to Chinese nationalism. Minister Hayashi took developments in China more seriously than his superiors in Tokyo. He believed that Japan should pay the utmost attention to China's growing nationalism and critical political conditions. Hayashi wrote that the rights-recovery movement was a natural sentiment accompanying the rise of national self-awareness and that it was futile to suppress it. With this conviction, Hayashi argued that Japan should seek to take advantage of this nationalism by respecting this sentiment and working with the Chinese. Minister Hayashi took a different approach from his Tokyo superiors by showing a greater appreciation for the force of nationalism in China.[404]

4.3.3.3. The American "Open Door" Policy and Strained US-Japan Relations

Historically speaking, the overall Japanese view towards American imperialism had been more positive than negative. Intellectuals, such as Kōtoku Shūsui, stressed the difference between European powers and the United States.[405] The sympathetic policy the United States had toward Japan after the Sino-Japanese war, evidenced in part by its non-participation in the Triple Intervention, also helped improve the Japanese image of the United States.[406] Even after the Spanish-American war and the American acquisition of the Philippines, there were voices in Japan, including Fukuzawa Yukichi, which welcomed this American move. Fukuzawa Yukichi argued that "the American incorporation of the Philippines might be a good thing as the United states was not the

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[404] Iriye (1972:184-185)

[405] While the European powers were recognized as aggressive imperialists, the United States was often understood as more liberal, respecting the equality among nations, and as more economically oriented in pursuing the imperial policy. Kōtoku Shūsui also found parallels between Japan and the United States, in their fate as the two latecomers to the formerly all-European ranks of imperialists. An influential magazine *Taiyō* also presented its pro-United States view, emphasizing the commonness between Japan and the United States as a naval power. Kitaoka (2001:246); Iriye (1972:75).

[406] LaFeber (1997:49,51,59).

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avaricious imperialist that other powers were." Similarly, a 1907 editorial in *Tokyo Nichinichi* claimed that the fact that the Philippines were the East Asian base for American civilization "perfectly suits our policy that the United States, a nation noted for its fair-minded foreign policy, should have a base in East Asia and concern itself with Asian problems."[407]

In the immediate aftermath of the Russo-Japanese war, the general perception of the United States in Japan was still positive. Unlike in the United States, there was little anticipation on the Japanese side that the two countries were fated to clash in China, and the writings of influential Japanese intellectuals illustrate strong domestic skepticism about an eventual US-Japan collision over China. The best official expression on this point is a memorandum written by Foreign Minister Hayashi Tadasu in 1907. Hayashi wrote that "[t]he expansion of our commerce and industry in China…is a natural development as a result of the extension of our national powers. We should not therefore worry about foreigners' complaints and jealousies so long as we engage in competition by fair tactics."[408] While admitting Japan's need to undertake continental expansion, many Japanese, such as Foreign Minister Hayashi, believed that it would not affect the amity and understanding between the United States and Japan.

It was only after the California immigration crisis that the President Tuft's "Dollar Diplomacy" and State Department's repeated initiative to introduce a more open, multilateral framework in China, was received in Japan with some mixed feelings. Shaken by the California immigration crisis that damaged the American image as the most enlightened and fair state among Western countries, the historian Asakawa Kan'ichi

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[407] Iriye (1972:58,149).
[408] Iriye (1972:193-194).

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asserted that "[t]he Japanese should not let the Americans speak for the principles of justice and fair play."[409] Asakawa's claim represented the Japanese dissatisfaction with the unfairness or double standard implied in American policy. In Asakawa's mind, Taft-Knox "new diplomacy" should apply not only to Japanese policy in Manchuria but also to the immigration policy of the United States.[410]

Asakawa's position—the Japanese should be allowed either to expand universally or to have special interests in selected areas of the world was one of the principles of *Komura Diplomacy*. Komura's basic stance advocated making a concession to the United States in the form of a voluntary restriction on Japanese emigration to the United States, while attempting to turn down any American proposal that risked jeopardizing Japan's sphere of influence in Manchuria.[411] As such, the Japanese government's resistance to America's "Open Door policy" was closely related to its experience in the California episode, which had revealed that no matter how peacefully the Japanese expanded abroad, their encounter and interaction with the host country were bound to give rise to mutual suspicion and misunderstanding.[412]

4.4. Little Norm Contestation in Late Meiji Japan: The "Vogue of Continentalism"

This section discusses domestic competition between different ideas/policies as well as how these ideas were translated into foreign policy opinions and decisions. As was discussed in the previous sections, foreign policy establishments both within and

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[409] Iriye (1972:209-210).
[410] Asakawa (1909).
[411] This policy was pursued through the joint collaboration with other European powers. Kitaoka (1978:31-32); Satō (1969:102-104); Iriye (1972:208).
[412] Iriye (1972:214).

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outside of the government shared a faith in the benefits of economic imperialism through overseas expansion in the post Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese war period. There was also a strong sense that Japan had joined an elite group of "civilized" nations. Following the Russo-Japanese war, these dominant domestic views shaped foreign policy, often known as Komura Diplomacy after Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō. Reflecting this strong domestic consensus over imperialism, Komura's continental policy, which laid out plans to expand through collaboration with the Great Power, met little resistance.

4.4.1. <u>Stable Domestic Politics: The Influence of *Genrō*, and the Rise of Political Parties</u>

The post Russo-Japanese war period witnessed some transformations in domestic politics. The first was the changing role of *genrō* in domestic politics.[413] *Genrō*, the original founders of the Meiji government, had had unquestioned power that derived from their personal connection with the emperor. These figures dominated early Meiji politics. Not only did *genrō* serve as prime minister, but they also gained the privilege of intervening in affairs at moments of emergency.[414] *Genrō* still maintained their political influence in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese war, but with their advancing age they gradually began operating behind the scenes and influencing events through juniors, rather than heading the ministries themselves.[415]

The second change in domestic politics was the emergence of political parties. Even after the establishment of the parliament in 1890, the Meiji government consistently

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[413] Nish (1977:62) defines *genrō* as "a collection of Elder Statesmen, who, having been associates of the emperor since the time of the Restoration, were called on by him for advice on an ad hoc basis." Among the political leaders active in this period, Yamagata Aritomo, Itō Hirobumi, Katsura Tarō, Saionji Kinmochi, Inoue Kaoru, Matsukata Masayoshi are classified as *genrō*.

[414] With only one exception, the position of prime minister had always been occupied by one of *genrō* until 1913.

[415] Nish (1977:62-63).

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took an antagonistic posture toward the parliament, trying to minimize its political influence. After the Sino-Japanese war, however, the unanimous support for the war from the political parties softened government's position vis-à-vis parties, opening a door for the government-party cooperation. One of party leaders, Itagaki Taisuke, joined the Cabinet as Home Minister in 1896. With their increasing influence and support from sympathetic *genrō*, such as Itō Hirobumi, political parties began demanding that the premiership should pass to party leaders. In 1898, a political party, *Kenseitō*, formed the very first party-Cabinet, led by prime minister Ōkuma Shigenobu, though it lasted only four months.[416]

The growing influence of political parties changed the nature of domestic politics. In the past, the *genrō* had dominated the decision-making process and most. The main political contestation took place between the *genrō*-controlled bureaucracies and the legislature (political parties). In the new political landscape, political confrontation occurred within the government. Two groups emerged. On one side, there was a conservative group of bureaucrats who were not interested in collaborating with the new political parties. They gathered under *genrō* Yamagata Aritomo, were therefore sometimes called the *Yamagata faction*. The Yamagata faction, mainly consisting of leaders from the Chōshū domain, had a strong influence in the Army as well as the Home Ministry. Terauchi Masatake and Katsura Tarō, both of whom were from the Chōshū domain and had had careers in the army, were considered the two top leaders in the faction and the protégés of Yamagata.[417] The Yamagata faction had a strong ally in the Foreign Ministry as well. Komura Jutarō had had a long partnership with Katsura Tarō,

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[416] Banno (1993:98-102); Nish (1977:62).
[417] Kitaoka (1978:60,63); Nish (1977:62).

who had twice appointed Komura to his cabinet as his foreign minister (1901-1906, 1908-1911).[418] On the other side, there was a group of bureaucrats who were more inclined to work together with political parties. *Genrō* Itō Hirobumi and Saionji Kinmochi, as well as former popular rights leader Ōkuma Shigenobu took leadership roles in this pro-party political group.[419] Since Itō's opponents were headed by Yamagata, who dominated the army, the leaders in the navy tended to be aligned with Itō's faction. Admiral Yamamoto Gonbei was such an example.[420] Japanese domestic politics after the Sino-Japanese war were characterized by a relatively stable balance of power between these two political factions that shared similar power and leadership structures. Between 1898 and 1914, the two groups traded control of the Cabinet.[421]

4.4.2. *Komura Diplomacy* and Norm Adoption: Continental Expansion through Imperial Collaboration[422]

Japan's victories over China and Russia provided a continental foothold for the newly emerging power of Japan. Japan gained control over Taiwan and eliminated Chinese influence over Korea after the Sino-Japanese war. The defeat of Russia made Korea an undisputed protectorate of Japan; Japan also gained control over southern Manchuria, which emerged as the new target of Japanese postwar expansion.[423] Facing new opportunities and challenges in the postwar period, key political groups—the two main political factions as well as the Foreign Ministry—generally agreed on the future direction of Japan's foreign policy. First, the policy of continental expansion, especially

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[418] Nish (1977:64).
[419] In 1900, Itō founded a political party, *Seiyūkai*, with pro-Itō bureaucrats, such as Saionji Kinmochi, Hara Takashi, and Kaneko Kentarō. Ōkuma's *Kenseitō* party was merged with *Seiyūkai*. Banno (1993:105).
[420] Banno (1993:100-101); Kitaoka (1978:2,61).
[421] Arima (1999:40).
[422] For a general description of Komura's policy, see LaFeber (1997:81,87,94).
[423] Iriye (1972:93,172); Kitaoka (1978:6).

into southern Manchuria was almost unanimously supported. Second, different political groups acknowledged the importance of Japan's acting in concert with other Great Powers. These two criteria became the central theme of *Komura Diplomacy*; maintaining and, if possible, expanding Japan's special interests in Manchuria through great power collaboration.

Japan gained the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula and the Russia rail system in southern Manchuria in the postwar settlement with Russia. Although there were differences in opinion over the primary benefit of Manchuria for Japan, virtually everyone was agreed that Japan's new empire was extending its limits to Manchuria as a result of the war.[424] The Yamagata faction, and especially the army, regarded southern Manchuria primarily as Japan's defense post against a possible Russian counterattack. For a majority of officials, such as Ōkuma Shigenobu, Kaneko Kentarō, and Gotō Shinpei, however, Japanese interests in Manchuria was mainly economic, as a new frontier for capital investment and emigration.[425]

Avoiding international encirclement of Japan was a primary concern for both Yamagata and Itō, the two *genrō* who led the opposing political factions. Triple Intervention after the Sino-Japanese war was a painful reminder about the dangers of Japan crossing the borderline beyond the level the Great Powers could tolerate. After the Sino-Japanese war, both Yamagata and Itō continuously worried about Japan's isolation. Yamagata feared possible collaboration between Britain and Russia or between China and Russia against Japan. Bilateral agreement was considered an effective way to avoid Japan's international encirclement. Itō sought Russo-Japanese cooperation. Komura's

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[424] Iriye (1972:94).
[425] Iriye (1972:94-95,128-129,173,213); Kitaoka (1978:35-36,40,103,106); Tsunoda (1967:432-433).

initiate to sign the Anglo-Japanese alliance was strongly endorsed by the Yamagata's group. Yamagata also realized the bilateral agreement with Russia that was known as the Yamagata-Lobanov agreement, signed in 1896, as a part of his effort to avoid a war with Russia. Yamagata and Itō were two of the last people to be convinced that the war with Russia was inevitable, having concentrated their efforts on avoiding a military clash with a much stronger Russia.[426]

For Yamagata and Itō, who had been fearful of Japan's international isolation, postwar continental policy had to be pursued with great caution so that it would not invite a counteraction by other great powers.[427] This cautious approach to Japan's continental expansion was shared by the two political groups, the army that was within the Yamagata faction, and other main political groups, such as foreign ministry and the navy. Even Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō (1901-1906, 1908-1911), who had a relatively hawkish stance towards Japanese expansion into Asia, still supported the idea of peace with other powers through alliances, ententes, and other kinds of traditional diplomacy.[428] The Japanese navy was primarily concerned with keeping peace with other powers, asserting that Japan needed to show its sincere interest in maintaining peace.[429]

4.4.2.1. Policy of Accommodation towards Western Racism

Fighting against Western racism was a crucial foreign policy task for the Japanese leaders who were convinced that Japan's fate was to join the Western powers and act as

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[426] Akita/Ito (1985:101-103,106,108); Tsunoda (1967:35-36,68-69,89-90,125-126); Nish (1977:65).
[427] Even after Japan's victory over Russia, Yamagata was continuously concerned about Russia's revenge. (Katō 2002:163).
[428] Iriye (1972:170). Komura also took a great care in maintain friendly relations with the United States, Japan's most important trade partner. Nish (1977:80). Foreign Minister Hayashi Tadasu (1906-1908), advocated expansion through unilateralism, but he did not neglect the importance of acting together with other Western powers. Iriye (1972:184-185).
[429] Iriye (1972:146-147).

one of them. The government's effort focused on easing racism by clearing up the Western misunderstanding of Japan and showing Japan's good will. Ōkuma Shigenobu, for instance, articulated the West's fear of Pan-Asianism, and insisted on gaining trust by demonstrating Japan's "western-ness."[430] During the Russo-Japanese war, the government launched a large-scale public relations campaign in key western states, particularly in the United Kingdom and the United States, to fight against the Yellow Peril argument.[431] As one way to contain the racism, the government made a conscious effort to refrain from making Asianism an official policy.[432]

The Japanese government took a similar approach in the wake of the California immigration crisis by attempting to maintain good relations with the United States and suppress the rising bilateral tension. *Genrō* Itō Hirobumi, Foreign Ministers Hayashi Tadasu and Komura Jutarō, the Japanese ambassador to the United States, Aoki Shūzō, politician Hara Takashi, and Kaneko Kentarō, among others, recognized the economic interdependence between the two countries and insisted that Japan had to take all necessary steps to prevent a rupture in the bilateral relations.[433] Throughout the whole crisis, the government made every effort to reformulate national principles in order to convince Americans of Japan's goodwill and to contain the growing anti-Japanese movement in the United States. Japanese actions on this front included: voluntary restriction of Japanese immigration to the United States; Japan's acquiescence in the new

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[430] Ōkuma discussed the West's fear of Japanese collaboration with China as an attempt for "yellow domination" of the globe. He also pointed out that some in the West regarded the Japanese as the heirs to Genghis Khan. He argued for the developing cosmopolitanism of the world and sought to prove that men were divided not by race but by different degrees of advancement. Iriye (1972:104-105).

[431] Kaneko Kentarō, who had studied at Harvard Law School and known Theodore Roosevelt in person, was dispatched to the United States, and Suematsu Kenchō, a graduate of Cambridge University, was sent to the United Kingdom. Matsumura (1982:40-47).

[432] Yamamuro (1998:26-27). At the same time, the Japanese government provided some financial support to domestic Asianist groups.

[433] Iriye (1966ii:9).

immigration act that authorized the President to restrict immigration in 1907 and led to the signing of the "Gentlemen's Agreement" *(Shinshi Kyōtei)* in 1908.[434] And Japan renewed its promise to continuously restrict emigration to the United States when it signed a new bilateral commercial treaty in 1911.[435]

The California immigration crisis had an important side effect on Japan's continental policy, by shifting Japan's primary focus to the Asian continent as a destination of emigration. As a way to reduce friction with the United States as well as expand Japan's influence in Manchuria, Foreign Minister Komura, argued that forcing Japanese immigrants on unwilling hosts was not wise, that the Japanese should first settle the beckoning continent of Asia.[436] *Genrō* Yamagata Aritomo also suggested limiting emigration to the United States, and directing it instead toward Latin America, Korea, or Manchuria, in order to maintain good relations with the United States.[437] After 1909, as a result of the voluntary restriction of Japanese emigration to the United States, there was a great surge of migration and business engagement in Korea and Manchuria. By 1911, the Japanese population in Korea had outstripped that in the United States.[438] Over time, a domestic consensus was gradually formed that Manchuria and Korea were the most suitable for Japanese colonization and settlement. As Iriye Akira argues, "[E]xpansion

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[434] Iriye (1972:135-136,147,149); Iriye (1966ii:15). In this informal agreement, Japan agreed not to issue passports for Japanese citizens wishing to work in the United States. In exchange, the American side agreed not to discriminate against Japanese students in schools in San Francisco. This was a Japanese effort to eliminate new Japanese immigration to the United States, nullifying the free immigration from Japan that had been assured in the treaty of 1894. The agreement was not made open to the public, however, and did not do much to calm down the crisis in California. Iriye (1995:61); Klien (2002:62).
[435] LaFeber (1997:97); Iriye (1972:211).
[436] In Komura's mind, concession over the immigration crisis and the building of a sphere of influence in Manchuria as an alternative place for Japan's expansion were vitally connected. Komura disclosed his idea of concentrating Japan's emigration on Korea and Manchuria in 1909. Japan annexed Korea in 1910, as well as secretly joining Russia in partitioning Manchuria into two sphere of influence. These efforts took place along side Japan's deferral to the United States on the immigration question, which resulted in the bilateral treaty of 1911. Kitaoka (1978:24-25): Iriye (1972:170,210).
[437] Akita/Ito (1985:104-105).
[438] Iriye (1972:172).

into China meant not simply [Japanese] determination to spread their power and influence on the Asian continent, but also a forced alternative to expansion eastward across the Pacific."[439]

4.4.2.2. Imperial Collaboration [1]: Continental Expansion

Japan's continental expansion prior to World War I was not a renegade move in the sense that the expansion was carried out under consultation with other great powers. The government made a great effort to gain international approval of its special rights in southern Manchuria, as Japan was increasing its political and economic influence in this new continental frontier. Continental expansion conducted by gaining either the support or, at least, the tacit approval of the great power was a consistent policy of Japan between 1906 and 1911, despite the change in leadership from the first Saionji cabinet (1906-1908) to the second Katsura cabinet (1908-1911). During this period, a series of bilateral and multilateral agreements were made, guaranteeing Japan's special interests in Manchuria. A couple of factors contributed to this accommodation of Japan's expansion in the continent. First, Yamagata, Itō/Saionji groups, as well as foreign ministry unanimously supported the expansionist policy, particularly for economic reasons. Second, army leaders in the Yamagata faction, such as Yamagata, Terauchi, and Katsura, maintained a strong grip even during the Saionji cabinet, thus causing very little policy shift in the after the cabinet change.[440] Third, the Yamagata faction worked as a constraint on foreign minister Komura's relatively hawkish stance towards Japanese

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[439] Iriye (1972:170,204,222,227,230). The quote is from Iriye (1972:227).
[440] Kitaoka (1978:24,31). The Yamagata faction managed to send many of its personnel as cabinet members to the first Saionji cabinet, therefore retaining political control. Banno (1993:112).

expansion into Manchuria, so that Japan's move would not be perceived too aggressive, provoking other powers' intervention.[441]

Komura Diplomacy's main objective was settling once and for all Japan's special rights in Korea and southern Manchuria through bilateral and multilateral agreements. In terms of Korea, by signing the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902 Britain recognized Japan's right to safeguard its interests in Korea.[442] With the United States, the Japanese government signed the Taft-Katsura agreement in 1905, in which "the Japanese recognized America's hold on the Philippines while the United Stats recognized Japan's full control of Korea."[443] Japan later gained the Roosevelt administration's acceptance of its special interests in Manchuria. In 1908, Washington and Tokyo signed the Root-Takahira Agreement that acknowledged Japan's right to annex Korea and its special position in Manchuria.[444] In 1907, Japan and Russia signed a fisheries agreement that contained a secret provision in which Russia recognized Japan's special interests in Korea and southern Manchuria.[445] In the same year, France also moved to recognize Japan's control of these two regions. Other great powers, such as Britain, Germany, and the United States, gradually accepted Japan and Russia's special interests in Manchuria by

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[441] Komura's more persistent attitude towards Japan's special interest in Manchuria was evident as early as 1904. While both Yamagata and Itō were satisfied with opening Manchuria up for fair competition after removing Russia's influence, Komura insisted on establishing Japan's sphere of influence there. During the peace settlement in Portsmouth, Komura defended Japan's special interest in Manchuria to the last and finally won approval from the moderator, Theodore Roosevelt. Tsunoda (1967:237-240,244-247,285).
[442] Nish (1977:69).
[443] LaFeber (1997:85-86). During the bilateral negotiation, Secretary of War Taft expressed his opinion that Japanese troops should establish a "suzerainty" over Korea. The agreement made the United States the first Western nation to withdraw its diplomats from Korea in 1905 at Japan's request.
[444] Kitaoka (1989:14). LaFeber (1997:91). In the wake of the Japanese immigration crisis in California, Roosevelt's administration was convinced that recognizing Japan's special interests in East Asia would provide it with sufficient reason to abstain from threatening the West coast and American possessions in the Pacific. President Roosevelt's idea of trading Manchuria as a solution for the immigration crisis was also shared by Secretary of State Huntington Wilson, and the US ambassador in Tokyo Thomas O'Brien. Iriye (1972:169,191).
[445] In exchange, Japan recognized Russia's special interests in northern Manchuria and outer Mongolia.

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1911.[446] Meanwhile, the Japanese government took action to secure its control over these regions. Japan began the annexation of Korea in 1910. Japan also signed a series of agreement with China to obtain economic rights in Manchuria, which ensured Japanese control of the region and made Japan the predominant foreign power in the region.[447]

The civilian government in Tokyo opposed the military government established in southern Manchuria in 1906 and managed to close down this military rule only a year later. The military government established in 1905 was opposed by the civilian government in Tokyo as too militaristic, resulting in the closing down of military rule only a year later.[448] This retrenchment of the military government was originally brought up by *genrō*, Itō Hirobumi, who was particularly wary of Komura Jutarō's aggressive policy in Manchuria.[449] Itō's proposal gained wide support from a majority of government officials.[450] They argued that the military government might intensify the Chinese nationalism, which could increase a chance of another war between Russia and Japan. Britain's complaint about the Kwantung government also increased the domestic opposition to the military regime.[451] This official decision was strongly supported by the press as well as the business sectors, both of which were in favor of the economic rather than military dimensions of imperialism. The newspaper *Tokyo Nichinichi* advocated

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[446] LaFeber (1997:92-93); Kitaoka (1989:25); Tsunoda (1967:556,558-560,566).

[447] In mid-1909, Komura compelled the Peking government to consult Japan before undertaking construction of a railway between Hsinmintun and Fakumen, as well as granting the right to mine coal at the two most important mines of southern Manchuria. These rights ensured Japanese control of that region, and made Japan the predominant foreign power in that part of China. Iriye (1972:203); Kitaoka (1978:24); Tsunoda (1967:295).

[448] Iriye (1972:173-174).

[449] Itō expressed his concern that if Japan "ignores the proper rights and interests of other nations and behaves outrageously…national ruin is certain." He warned that "if this Manchurian problem was mishandled, the penalties could be severe." LaFeber (1997:87).

[450] The supporters included: *genrō* and army leader Yamagata Aritomo, Terauchi Masatake from the army, Prime Minister Saionji Kinmochi, Foreign Minister Hayashi Tadasu, and General Staff chief Kodama Gentarō. Tsunoda (1967:309-322).

[451] Tsunoda (1967:358-359,367).

curtailing the personnel of the Kwantung government, arguing that the Japanese national interests could expand economically and peacefully without government protection and particularistic arrangements. *Toyo keizai shinpō*, the journal which represented the opinion of the business sector, also supported the reduction of armaments, insisting that Japanese interests could be promoted without enlarged military establishments.[452] The example demonstrates the amount to attention Japanese officials were paying to other great powers' perception of Japanese continental expansion.

4.4.2.3. Imperial Collaboration [2]: The Curtailment of Chinese Nationalism

In order to deal with the problem of Chinese nationalism, Japanese leadership in the late Meiji period relied on a policy of imperialist collaboration that was based on bilateral treaties in order to mutually ensure special rights. The policy was derived from the majority view among the decision-makers, including the military and Foreign Minister Komura, both of whom regarded China as merely a subject of great power politics.[453] This line of policy was clearly evident during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. When the anti-Western Boxer movement erupted in China, the Japanese government's initial fear was that "the Powers were treating the disturbances as a moment of opportunity…and that it might have serious repercussions for Japan if she too were not on the scene."[454] In deciding whether to dispatch military forces to China, the government took a cautious approach by awaiting a request for support from other powers, as well as asking for an expression of world opinion regarding Japan's sending troops for

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[452] *Tōyō keizai shinpō,* 403:3-7 (2/5/1907); 404:3-5 (2/15/1907). Iriye (1972:176-177). There was a group of people who opposed this position and called for increased government supervision of Japanese interests in Asia. A monthly journal, *Jitsugyō sekai Taiheiyō (The Pacific Ocean: the business world)*, was one such example.

[453] The army's Tanaka Giichi and the navy's Satō Tetsutarō, new leaders in the military, were among others who had this view. Iriye (1966i:61).

[454] Nish (1977:52).

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suppressing the riot.[455] The Foreign Minister Aoki Shūzō ensured that Japan acted

modestly, and when Germany asked for an approval for a German Field-marshal to

assume the allied command, Japan agreed despite the fact that the Japanese had

contributed the most numerous force.[456] The military, including Yamagata, Katsura, as

well as the navy, held the view that Japanese troops should withdraw from China

immediately after the rebellion was suppressed, so as not to invoke Western countries'

fear in the way that had happened in the Triple Intervention. In 1901, the Yamagata

Cabinet decided to withdraw the bulk of the Japanese forces that had been notable for its

restrained behavior in Beijing.[457]

In the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese war, foreign minister Komura compelled

the Peking government to sign a series of new agreements taking advantage of the

temporary disarray of its leadership. While securing Japan's control in Manchuria through

these agreements, the Katsura Cabinet secured Japan's control in Manchuria by making it

impossible for China to regain its right even after the original term of lease was over.[458]

The Yamagata faction put an emphasis on Russo-Japanese cooperation as a way to

counter Chinese nationalism and to encourage Chinese concession. The suppression of

Chinese nationalism was the central objective of Russo-Japanese cooperation under

Komura Diplomacy.[459]

Japan's official approach to the Xinghai Revolution in 1913 followed the same

policy line as previously. When the revolution first took place, Japanese officials agreed

to take a neutral stance, which allowed them to avoid criticism by other powers that Japan

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[455] Nish (1977:53).
[456] Nish (1977:53).
[457] Akita/Ito (1985:108); Nish (1977:54).
[458] Kitaoka (1978:24); (Katō 2002:168): Iriye (1972:203).
[459] Tsunoda (1967:21,24,711); Kitaoka (1978:21,24).

supported the breakup of China to protect its interests in Manchuria.[460] The Cabinet, the Yamagata faction, and the Foreign Ministry shared a common interest in valuing the imperial cooperation among great powers in increasing Japan's influence in China where possible. After Yuan Shikai was sworn in as the provisional president of the new Republic of China in 1912, Japan joined international loan consortium for China in order to have a hand in Chinese finances maintain its influence on China vis-à-vis other powers and avoid being left behind in the imperial competition.[461]

4.4.2.4. Imperial Collaboration [3]: Reaction to the U.S. Open Door Policy

The rise of Chinese nationalism was one of the challenges Japan faced in its pursuit of continental expansion, and the government officials coped with this obstacle by strengthening Japan's cooperative relations with other European powers, hoping that the increased pressure from imperial powers might reduce the room for Chinese maneuver. Another challenge to Japanese continental policy came from the United States. After William Taft took office in 1909, the United States renewed its interest in China. Challenging Japan's and Russia's building of exclusive commercial zones in Manchuria, the Taft administration supported Open Door principles, insisting on opening business opportunities to fair and general competition.[462]

The Japanese government's initial approach was to suggest that Washington accept mutual spheres of influence, so that the two countries might maintain peaceful relations. Both the Taft-Katsura Agreement in 1905 and the Root-Takahira Agreement in 1908 were intended to send a message to the United States that Japan had no intention of

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[460] Katō (2002:169). Nish (1977:90).
[461] Kitaoka (1978:30,91,97-98).
[462] Nish (1977:81); Iriye (1972:171,185).

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menacing American interests in the Philippines and Hawaii, as long as Japan's sphere of influence in Korea and southern Manchuria was respected.[463] When the State Department under Philander Knox continuously challenged Japan's and Russia's expanding colonial empires in Manchuria, the Japanese government turned to Russia to take joint action against the American challenge. The American attempt to work with Chinese officials to build another railway to counter the Japanese railroads failed in 1908, meeting opposition from both Japan and Russia. Two years later, America suggested neutralizing the railroads in Manchuria, a suggestion that also failed to be realized due to resistance by Japan, Russia, Britain and France.[464]

Foreign Minister Komura played a central role in taking a joint approach with other powers in order to offset these American initiatives in China. The renewed bilateral treaty between Moscow and Tokyo in 1910 had a clear implication that the two countries would work together to secure their special interests in Manchuria.[465] In 1911, Komura's last foreign policy accomplishment was to prevent the four-power international loan consortium for China from jeopardizing Japan's special interests in Manchuria.[466] With the added support of France, Japan and Russia managed to introduce a draft amendment, so that the loan consortium would not harm their commercial interests in Manchuria.[467] During the negotiation process of taking part in the consortium, the Japanese officials declared for the first time Japan's special interests in Eastern Inner Mongolia, in addition to southern Manchuria, and won the tacit approval of Japan's special interests from other

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[463] LaFeber (1997:86); Iriye (1966i:8); Iriye (1972:135,150).
[464] Kitaoka (1978:26-27); Tsunoda (1967:446-459).
[465] Kitaoka (1978:28); Tsunoda (1967:581-585,596); Arima (1999:77).
[466] The consortium consisted of Britain, France, Germany, and the United States.
[467] Kitaoka (1978:29-30); Tsunoda (1967:479-491). Komura retired from the Foreign Ministry the same year and passed away shortly after.

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powers.[468] Ironically, this series of American attempts to block Japan's and Russia's exclusive spheres of influence in Manchuria only resulted in strengthening their regional control and confirming international acceptance of the two countries' special position in Manchuria.

4.5. Conclusion

The norm of imperialism became even more dominant in the early twentieth century. Rivalries for overseas territories intensified among the Great Powers of Europe. The United States after the Spanish-American war engaged in a more-active imperialist policy both in Latin America and the Pacific. In Asia, China's defeat by Japan created a power vacuum in the region. As European imperial powers intensified their competition over extending their influence in China, Asia became the new target for imperial partitioning.

The Japanese worldview was to a great extent congruent with that of Western powers. Reflecting the dominant position of imperialism in the INS, decision-makers, intellectuals, and nationalists were collectively convinced that imperial expansion was a necessary condition for continuous national development, and now that Japan amassed a strong enough powerbase to conduct commercial expansion and overseas emigration, there was little doubt that Japan should utilize its national resources and join the imperial race with the Western powers.[469]

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[468] For a detailed account of the negotiation process, see Kitaoka (1978:30-31).
[469] The Foreign Ministry stressed the economic advantages of imperial expansion, and charismatic Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō argued that economic expansion through emigration and settlement was the backbone of national power and wealth. Liberal intellectuals also supported commercial imperialism, arguing that Japan's expansion into Asia would contribute to the development and progress of the region.

The widespread endorsement for imperialism served as a normative foundation for Japan's imperial policy in the post Russo-Japanese war period. Strong interest and excitement about overseas expansion was a national phenomenon, and the domestic decision-making process was characterized by a minimal amount of norm contestation. While the Japanese decision-making system became more de-centralized than in the past, this did not lead to increasing political contestation. On the contrary, all major parties—*genrō*, political parties, Foreign Ministry, and the military—were unified in their position of endorsing overseas expansion through commercial means, emigration, and settlement, which was embodied as "Komura Diplomacy" under the strong leadership of Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō.

The nationalist group suggested the idea of Pan-Asianism, the most aggressive version of imperial expansion among all political groups.

5. JAPAN LEAVES THE WEST
From World War I until the 1930s

5.1. Introduction

This chapter covers the period between the two world wars, a time that was characterized by considerable turbulence both in terms of the international normative system and Japan's foreign policy. From the immediate aftermath of World War I until the mid-1920s, Wilsonian internationalism dominated the normative system. In the context of Asia, Wilson's initiative changed Great Power politics in China. The loose imperial bloc consisting of Britain, France, Russia, and Japan based on the traditional balance of power was rejected, and a new multilateral order put in place by the United States, Britain, and Japan was set up for the purpose of ensuring China's political stability and economic development.[470] Postwar reform movements in Europe, such as pacifism and the rise of the political Left, also contributed to the spread of the Wilsonian liberal order.

Wilsonian liberal internationalism faced a number of challenges throughout the 1920s, and ultimately failed to become a dominant international norm. Even in Europe and the United States, Wilson's "New Diplomacy" did not win unanimous support. In addition, the Washington system faced strong opposition, notably from the Soviet Union and China. In Asia, the Washington system slowly disintegrated as the disagreement among the United States, Britain, and Japan widened over the treatment of Chinese nationalism. Last, but not the least, the Great Depression and the rise of economic

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[470] As a result, traditional bilateral treaties, such as the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the Russo-Japanese treaty, were eliminated. Satō (1969:105); Hosoya (1988:6).

protectionism in Europe and the United States damaged economic internationalism. The depression also led to the rise of authoritarian regimes and fascism. When the major powers failed to counteract and protect the norm of liberal internationalism, Wilsonian idealism was dead in both name and reality.

Japan elevated its international position as a result of the war, being recognized as one of the five powers on the victorious side. With this new Great Power identity, Japan actively participated in the U.S.-led postwar order.[471] Japan's commitment to the New Diplomacy was realized by two domestic groups. The first group were "Wilsonian internationalists," a liberal group of scholars and policy-makers who strongly endorsed the new U.S.-led order. The second were "realists," who accepted the Washington system because it was the order endorsed by the most powerful states after the war. Until the late 1920s, these two domestic groups prevailed over the nationalist group that criticized the New Diplomacy as a selfish attempt by Anglo-Saxon states to satisfy their national interests and insisted that Japan should take an autonomous path to protect its interests in Asia.

Japanese foreign policy during the war was mostly a succession of the previous imperialist line, and there was little sign of policy-makers' realization of the shifting international normative trend. Once World War I was over, Japanese foreign policy gradually shifted in accordance with the new Wilsonian multilateral framework. Events, such as the Washington Naval Conference (1921-1922) and the abolition of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, had major impacts on the thinking of Japanese policy-makers. While the liberal group actively endorsed the idea of New Diplomacy, initially skeptical realists

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[471] Japan's position as one of the four permanent members of the League of Nations, along with the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, was an example of Japan's commitment to the new international order.

also gradually acknowledged the ongoing normative change and a need to adjust to this new international environment. The Japanese policy shift in the postwar period began as a passive acceptance of Anglo-Saxon dominance.

Japan's policy of international cooperation became more proactive when Shidehara Kijūrō, a Wilsonian internationalist, served as Foreign Minister between 1924 and 1927. The success of *Shidehara Diplomacy* was a product of the growing embrace of liberalism in Japan, a reflection of the international normative system at that time. As Taishō democracy reached its peak, Shidehara's economic-centered policy line initially won wide domestic support from liberals and international financiers.[472]

Unfortunately for Shidehara, the favorable international condition did not last long, however. The Chinese Revolution moved into a new anti-foreign phase, and attacks on Japanese nationals and their properties in China raised criticism towards Shidehara's conciliatory China policy. In addition, quite ironically, when the Japanese government tried to realize the spirit of Wilsonian internationalism in its foreign policy, the American government moved to a new approach towards China, which created a gap among the United States, Britain, and Japan. As the United States was abolishing control-submission relations with China, the distance between the United States and Japan grew, and, as Britain followed the American lead, the Japanese position became more isolated.[473]

Increasing anti-Japanese sentiment in China intensified domestic attacks on Shidehara Diplomacy. American support for the Kuomintang government, and Kuomintang's advance into Manchuria, was recognized as a great threat to Japan's special rights in Manchuria, especially by the army. Shidehara's approach was officially rejected

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[472] The bill only allowed males more than 25 years old to vote without any tax qualification.
[473] Britain acknowledged Chinese tariff autonomy and recognized the Kuomintang government in 1928. Hosoya (1988:108-109).

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when army general Tanaka Giichi took over his office in 1927. Tanaka redirected Japan's foreign policy back to the old-style imperial diplomacy that the nation had pursued before World War I. Tanaka's attempt to implement the old tactics, though, did not resolve the problem either. Chinese nationalism continuously posed threats to Japan's interests in Manchuria, and the sense of insecurity continuously grew particularly within the army. Furthermore, increasing tension with the United States and the fear of international isolation also fueled the sense of crisis.[474] Under these domestic circumstances, where anti-government forces against the Tanaka Cabinet became powerful, the military-hardliners with strong nationalist, anti-Western ideologies gained momentum with the support of the general public.

After both Shidehara's new and Tanaka's old approach failed, domestic support was gathered around the military-nationalists' *Jishu Gaikō* (independent policy). While consolidating the domestic power base by gradually establishing an authoritarian, military regime, the military-nationalists pursued an aggressive, expansionist policy in Asia. The Huanggutun Incident (1928) and the Mukden Incident (1931), arbitrary actions by Japan's Kwantung army, were carried out with strong public backing.[475] With the subsequent events in the 1930s—the establishment of Manchuko (1932), the withdrawal from the League of Nations (1933), and the withdrawal from the Washington Treaty (1936)—Japan was moving towards a path of international isolation, which eventually led it to wage war against the United States.

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[474] For example, army leader Ugaki Kazushige wrote in his diary in 1929 about his image of Japan being encircled by the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. Hosoya (1988:103).
[475] Katō (2002:271-272); Satō (1969:141-142). The Huanggutun Incident was an assassination plot by the Kwantung army that targeted Chinese warlord Zhang Zuolin. The Mukden Incident, the Kwantung army's plot that gave Japan the impetus to set up a puppet government in Manchuria, was planned by Ishiwara Kanji, a member of the army General Staff who was heavily influenced by the idea of German geopolitics. Iriye (1966i:107-108); Banno (1993:155-156).

5.2. Uncertain Environment: Heterogeneous and Unstable Normative System during the Interwar Period

5.2.1. <u>The Emergence of the New International Order after the First World War: Wilson's "New Diplomacy"</u>

Entering the twentieth century, the relative dominance of the European imperial powers gradually waned as states such as the United States and Japan increased their influence in international affairs. The First World War accelerated the power shift away from European states.[476] The United States, with its decisive role in bringing a victory for the Allies, emerged as a new world leader, while European states, victors and losers alike, suffered tremendously from the war that had required them mobilize their gross national strength in terms of manpower and wealth. In Asia, the war shifted European states' attention away from the region, creating a temporary power vacuum. Japan grabbed this opportunity, expelling the German influence from the region and successfully expanding its influence in China. As European states were trying to recover from their war wounds, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson took the initiative in establishing a new postwar international order based on his belief in internationalism.

In January 1918, President Wilson delivered the *Fourteen Points* speech, in which he outlined a new vision of postwar international order to ensure lasting peace in Europe. The *Fourteen Points* was an innovative idea in many respects. First, Wilson made a clear departure from traditional imperial diplomacy, by which the Great Powers expanded their influence into less-advanced countries by setting up an exclusive sphere of influence.[477] Instead of strong states' creating a zone of exclusive control of trade and capital, Wilson

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[476] For example, both the United States and Japan benefited economically as a result of the war, emerging as creditor nations in the postwar period. Dingman (1974:97); Satō (1969:105).
[477] Iriye (1995:75).

suggested peaceful economic development on a global scale through expanding open markets to guarantee equal opportunity. He emphasized the role of international financial capital in order to encourage international competition in capital export. Thomas William Lamont Jr., a partner in J. P. Morgan & Co., played a major role in establishing a postwar international financial system.[478] Wilson's economic internationalism had a moralistic aspect as well, respecting the right of self-determination of all nations.[479]

Second, Wilson proposed a multilateral organization as a new postwar security framework, to replace traditional tactics, such as military alliance, balance of power, and secret diplomacy. He also called for states to make efforts to disarm in order to ease military competition among them.[480] In addition to the establishment of the League of Nations, Wilson's initiative resulted in several international treaties, including the Four-Power Treaty (1921), the Washington Naval Treaty (1922), and the Nine-Power Treaty (1922).

In the context of Asia, Wilson's new scheme contributed to changing Great Power politics in China. The preexisting loose imperial bloc through bilateral treaties among Britain, France, Russia, and Japan was rejected. While the bilateral treaties, such as the Anglo-Japanese alliance and Russo-Japanese treaty, were abolished, participants in the Washington Conference installed a new multilateral order led by the United States, Britain, and Japan. These three powers in Asia pledged to work together to ensure China's political stability and economic development.[481] The idea of economic

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[478] For a detailed account of the establishment of the international financial system, see Mitani (1974:134, 142-144,147).

[479] Dingman (1974:93); Hosoya (1988:76). Wilson's "New Diplomacy" was, to a great extent, a successor to former President Taft's Moral Diplomacy, which demanded equal opportunity of commercial activities within the existing sphere of influence. Tsunoda (1967:367); Iriye (1966i:70); Iriye (1995:71).

[480] Dingman (1974:93); Hosoya (1988:88).

[481] Satō (1969:105); Hosoya (1988:6).

internationalism was realized in the formation of an international loan consortium for China. The four states—the United States, Britain, Japan, and France—agreed to take part in the consortium, based on the principles of Open Door and equal opportunity.[482] As Wilson's *Fourteen Points* stressed the right of self-determination, the Washington system incorporated a prospect for China to recover its sovereignty.[483] China regained a partial right of extraterritoriality after the war. In addition, the Nine-Power Treaty established a framework where unequal treaties with China would gradually be abolished through negotiations under certain conditionality.[484]

As the Wilson administration took a strong initiative to design a new order to replace the conventional imperialist norms and practices, there were growing movements in Europe that questioned the conventional imperialist diplomacy and contributed to the spread of new internationalism. Wilson's liberal principles were gaining popularity in Europe at the end of the war, particularly among the Left. With its contribution to fighting the war, the European labor class gained increased political status in the postwar period.[485] Labor parties had very different interests and held a different understanding of the international system from their bourgeois predecessors. As a result, the rise of labor parties and transformation of domestic politics to the Left across industrialized states in Europe had a critical impact on growing internationalism in postwar Europe. It was no coincidence that the most enthusiastic supporters of Wilsonian principles were trade unions and socialist parties both in France and Britain.[486] The change in Europe was also

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[482] Mitani (1995:89).

[483] Iriye (1990). President Wilson had been sympathetic to Chinese nationalism and had an interest in protecting Chinese sovereignty. Hosoya (1988:27).

[484] The Washington System presented China with a process of regaining tariff autonomy and abolishing extraterritoriality. Katō (2002:269): Iriye (1966i:66).

[485] Usui (1970:114).

[486] Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990:297-298).

due to the fact that Europeans lost their sense of superiority after the First World War, and this led, in turn, to doubts about the validity of traditional diplomacy.[487]

The anti-colonial movement was the first phenomenon that suggested the change in Europeans' attitudes towards imperialism. In the United Kingdom, for example, there was a growing reaction within the Liberal Party against Lord Rosebery and other imperialists.[488] John Hobson's *Imperialism*, published in 1902, was critical of British imperial policy in South Africa and British involvement in the Second Boer War.[489] The movements by Western-educated colonial people and nationalist independent leaders, such as Rabindrinath Tagore and Mahatma Gandhi, also fueled anti-colonial movements across Europe. Pacifist sentiment gained a voice after World War I, and an impressive number of publications appeared criticizing the imperial idea.[490]

Second, growing pacifism and the public's interest in arms control also helped gain momentum for Wilsonian New Diplomacy. Though the pacifist movement had already existed before the First World War, the experience of the first modern war accelerated anti-war sentiment in both Europe and the United States.[491] The British peace movement was among the most influential ones during the interwar period. Memories of the First World War caused anti-war views to flourish in the late 1920s and 1930s, reinforced by a proliferation of anti-war novels, poetry, and films during the period. Postwar pacifism in Britain consisted of the alliance between the socialist anti-militarists,

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[487] Iriye (1966i:66-70).
[488] May (1968:219).
[489] May (1968:220-221).
[490] Examples are: J. A. Hobson's *Democracy After the War* (1917); E. D. Morel's *The Black Man's Burden* (1920); John Strachey's *The Coming Struggle for Power* (1932); and Leonard Barnes's *Empire or Democracy* (1939). See Stuchtey (2003:257).
[491] Some results of the pacifist movements before the war included the Hague International Peace Conference (1899, 1907), and the arbitration treaty signed between the United States and Britain in 1911. Hayes (1941:327); Iriye (1995:54).

largely drawn from the labor movement, and a pacifist group of women. Bertrand Russell's 1922 article "The Prevention of War" was representative of the British No More War Movement. Though not as active as the British anti-war movement, similar pacifist development was also witnessed in other European countries, including France and the Netherlands.[492]

A parallel development was noted in the United States. There was a growing interest in arbitration, versus war, to settle international disputes. There was also an increasing belief, as seen in the editorial pages of *Outlook*, that war was becoming obsolete among civilized nations.[493] Reflecting the rise of pacifism across the Western states, the movement found institutional expression in international organization and law. The Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), an assembly of nonviolent religious organizations, held the first International FOR conference in 1919.[494] In 1922, the Washington Naval Conference resulted in the Washington Naval Treaty, by which five signatories (the United States, Britain, Japan, France, and Italy) mutually agreed to limit the naval armaments. A more ambitious goal was set in the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), also known as the Pact of Paris, an international law attempting to eliminate war as an instrument of national policy.[495]

5.2.2. <u>Normative Uncertainty in the Interwar Period</u>

In contrast to the late nineteenth century, when imperial expansion was almost unanimously endorsed by most powerful European nations, the normative environment of

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[492] Brock and Young (1999:98,118-119); Ceadel (1999); Eglin (1999). For a detailed account of the French anti-war movement, see Farrugia (1999).
[493] *Outlook*, 98:242 (6/3/1911).
[494] Brock and Young (1999:102).
[495] For a detailed account of the pact, see Katō (2002:231).

the interwar period was filled with uncertainty. While the European Left passionately welcomed Wilson's New Diplomacy, opposition to this new emerging norm was also strong. The postwar initiative for arms control encountered strong resistance particularly within the European military.[496] Wilson's idea of liberal peace and collective security was also received hesitantly from the British and French governments, particularly with regard to the treatment of Germany after the war.[497] British Prime Minister Lloyd George (1916-1922) offered only reluctant support for Wilsonian initiatives, and his French counterpart Georges Clemenceau fiercely opposed them throughout 1918. In fact, there was a considerable gap between the public and elites in Britain in their reaction to Wilsonian principles. While the former was quite enthusiastic, the latter were far less receptive.[498] Even within the United States, President Wilson did not have unanimous support for his vision of the new world. Traditional isolationism regained domestic popularity once the war was over. The U.S. Senate not only rejected the Versailles Treaty, but also refused international commitments required by the League of Nations' covenant, for fear that the commitment to the League might cause the partial surrender of national sovereignty.[499]

Wilson's New Diplomacy also faced a strong challenge from China and the Soviet Union. Despite its principle of internationalism, the Washington system incorporated neither China nor the Soviet Union as a respected member of the new postwar international order. As a result of being excluded, both countries refused to accept the

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[496] For example, unlike naval arms control, arms control with regard to the army failed to pass at the Washington Conference due to strong objections from France. Usui (1970:119-121).
[497] Both the British and French governments were unwilling to accept a number of Wilson's requests, with regard to the amount of reparations, the occupation of Germany, the general disarmament, and the treatment of minorities within their borders. Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990:295).
[498] Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990:295,298).
[499] Di Scala (2004:202).

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Washington system and actively challenged this still-fragile international order.[500] Having succeeded in overthrowing the tsarist autocracy in 1917, the Soviet Union emerged as the first communist nation in the world. Communist leaders, such as Lenin and Stalin, embodied the image of a world polarized by socialists on the one hand and Western imperialists on the other. Introducing the Marxist world vision, the communist Soviets challenged the Anglo-Saxon domination of the postwar period.[501]

5.2.2.1. Nationalist Challenge: China

The Washington system exposed its weakness in facing the challenge of Chinese nationalism. The Great Powers involved, particularly the United States, Britain, and Japan, failed to form a united front in dealing with Chinese nationalists.[502] The lack of political will to realize the spirit of the New Diplomacy caused critical damage to the future prospects of the Washington system, especially because tangible benefits from the new order were still uncertain.[503] The Washington system presumed status quo in China, *i.e.*, China should remain semi-colonized and was not to request restoration of its rights immediately. This assumption became more and more unsustainable as Chinese anti-foreign nationalism continued to grow.[504] The May Fourth Movement in 1919, which grew out of Chinese dissatisfaction with the Treaty of Versailles settlement, as well as the

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[500] Hosoya (1988:76,108).
[501] Koebner and Dan Schmidt (1964:280-283).
[502] In describing the problem, historian Iriye Akira illustrates the problem as: the Washington powers defined their own new order, but failed to implement it. Another historian Hosoya Chihiro made a similar remark by saying that the Washington system was merely principles, but lacked both political will and the capability to realize it. Iriye (1990:55); Mitani (1995:87).
[503] One example was that introducing the Washington order in Asia did not result in a marked expansion of American and Japanese economic interests in China. Japan's share in the Chinese market decreased by 17 percent in 1924, compared to that in 1917. Iriye (1990:25-26).
[504] Satō (1969:128-130).

May 30 Movement in 1925, were among many developments through which Chinese nationalist attempted to regain rights and sovereignty from imperial powers.

There are several reasons why the Washington powers (the United States, Britain, and Japan) failed to work together effectively against Chinese nationalism. The fact that these three states pledged at the Washington Conference "not to interfere in China's internal affairs and to refrain from taking advantage of China's troubles for their own selfish ends" constrained them from openly intervening in internal Chinese matters by supporting one faction over another.[505] While the Washington powers remained neutral, Chinese factions continued their struggle for power, and the absence of peace and order in China endangered foreign lives and property. The powers increasingly came to take the view that, because of the unstable conditions—China's failure to meet its obligations by being unable to prevent lawless attacks on foreign interests—the powers could not further assist China in helping regain its "rights of sovereignty."[506]

5.2.2.2. Communist Challenge: The Soviet Union

While the Washington powers could not find an effective measure to counter nationalist movements in China, the Soviet Union took an active diplomatic initiative towards China. Comintern agents from the Soviet Union approached Chinese revolutionaries and tried to turn Chinese nationalism into an anti-imperialist movement.[507] In order to resolve differences with China, the Soviet Union declared in 1918 its willingness to renounce the "conquests of the Tsarist government in Manchuria"

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[505] Iriye (1990:27).
[506] Iriye (1990:28-29).
[507] The Soviet move originated from Lenin's assertion that the situation in Asia was an integral part of the worldwide struggle against imperialism. Iriye (1990:38) points out that, without direct Comintern assistance, Chinese revolutionaries would have been more concerned with social reform at home than with anti-imperialist campaigns. He argues that the Comintern consistently pointed to anti-imperialism as the immediate goal for the Chinese.

and restore the Chinese Eastern Railway to China. The Karakhan manifestoes of 1919 and 1920 further reaffirmed nullification of the old treaties and offered negotiation for new agreements.[508] The Soviet appeasement policy towards the Kuomintang government resulted in Sun Yat-sen's decision to collaborate with the Soviet Union rather than the Washington powers.[509] With assistance from the Soviets, the Kuomintang government was becoming increasingly anti-imperialist, taking an antagonistic stance towards the treaty powers.[510] The rapprochement between the Soviet Union and China resulted in the emergence of a "parallel system of international relations in the Far East, challenging the structure of the Washington treaties."[511]

While the Soviet Union was pursuing an active foreign policy to gain support from China, the United States, Britain, and Japan had a difficult time in coordinating their policy towards China. The three countries disagreed over how to respond to Chinese demands for extraterritoriality and tariffs, which resulted in the failure of the Beijing tariff special conference held in 1925. As Chinese nationalist movements intensified, the three states failed to act in concert. After the Nanking incident (1927), the proposal for a hard line approach by Britain and the Japanese army was opposed by a moderate American plan. When Frank Kellogg became the new secretary of state in 1925, the United States gradually abandoned multilateralism and took an independent policy towards China. Shifting from the trilateral framework, Kellogg attempted to include

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[508] Iriye (1990:12); Hosoya (1988:78-79).

[509] Sun's Kuomintang government and its Soviet counterpart issued a joint manifesto in 1923. In the following year, under a strong Soviet initiative, the first Kuomintang congress under Sun's leadership formally launched an alliance between the Kuomintang and the Chinese communists. Iriye (1990:39).

[510] The first Kuomintang congress declared that "[a]ll unequal treaties are to be abolished: foreigners' leased territories, consular jurisdiction, foreigners' management of customs duties, all political power exercised by foreigners in China at the cost of Chinese sovereignty. New treaties are to be concluded based on recognition of China as an equal and sovereign nation." See Iriye (1990:41).

[511] Iriye (1990:38,44).

China as a new partner and build a four-power collaborating system. In 1928, the United States independently signed a bilateral agreement with China and approved China's tariff autonomy, which was followed by the U.S. recognition of the Kuomintang government four months later. Britain, which had traditionally been closer to the Japanese position with regard to China policy, shifted its course and joined the American move to acknowledge the Kuomintang government as well as its tariff autonomy; this led to further isolation for Japan.[512]

5.2.2.3. Rise of Fascism and Pan Movements

In addition to the communist challenge, the liberal Washington system faced other rival ideologies—Pan movements and fascism—that gained popularity in Europe throughout the 1920s and 1930s. In Germany, resentment towards the Allies' treatment of their country in 1919 led to the rise of a school of German geopolitics in the 1920s, which provided a very different vision of Europe compared to that of Wilson. Geopolitical scholars, such as Albrecht Penck and Karl Haushofer, challenged the legitimacy of the Treaty of Versailles and stressed the need for a new geopolitical arrangement that would give Germans the "vital space" they deserved. Similar to English geographer Halford John Mackinder, Haushofer insisted on global shifts in the economic and geopolitical order and predicted the appearance of self-sufficient pan-regions. The German geopoliticians also strongly advocated German expansion to acquire necessary *"Lebensraum"* (living space), a notion that was subsequently incorporated into Nazi policy.[513]

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[512] Hosoya (1988:86-87,95-96,106,108-109); Mitani (1995:98).
[513] Heffernan (1998:131-135).

Fascism was a more radical attack on the Wilsonian liberal international order, though the various forms of fascism during the interwar period were also related to pan movements. A fascist state first emerged in Italy when Mussolini seized control of power in 1922. By the late 1930s, Italian fascism spawned a geopolitical movement that was reminiscent of Haushofer's German model.[514] Germany was also moving towards fascism, as Hitler's National Socialism gained domestic popularity in the 1930s. Strongly connected with Weimar geopolitics, Hitler aspired for a strong, racially determined German *Reich* as the core of Europe and suggested the need for German expansion into the east to create more *Lebensraum* for the *Reich*.[515] The rise of pan movements and fascism in Europe, and inability of the Washington powers to counter this challenge to the liberal order, further weakened the foundation of the New Diplomacy.

5.2.2.4. *The Great Depression and the End of Economic Internationalism*

In October 1929, the U.S. stock market collapsed, triggering the Great Depression. The most highly industrialized countries in the West were most immediately affected by the Depression. In most cases, production fell by about 37 percent and unemployment reached as high as 25 percent.[516] Government responses to the economic crisis made matters worse, and this led to the termination of economic internationalism. Facing economic difficulties resulting from the Great Depression, many industrialized states abandoned liberal economic policies and shifted towards economic protectionism. Even the United States, which had been a locomotive of the postwar liberal economic order, intervened in its economy after the depression. During the early 1930s, various

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[514] Heffernan (1998:138-141).
[515] Heffernan (1998:144-146).
[516] Di Scala (2004:232-233).

measures such as the creation of the Reconstruction Financial Corporation (RFC), the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in 1930, and the Banking Act of 1933, were taken.[517] American protectionist policies triggered a wave of tariff retaliation that spread rapidly around the globe.[518]

Britain, which had traditionally been a champion of free traders, also shifted towards protectionism. The Abnormal Importations Act gave the Board of Trade powers for six months to impose duties of up to 100 percent on a wide range of manufactured goods. The Horticultural Products Emergency Act was passed soon after to hamper the import of agricultural products.[519] In 1932, Neville Chamberlain introduced the Import Duties Bill that would reduce tariffs in order to protect the Dominions from more efficient producers. The policy of establishing economic blocs within the British Empire was formally adopted at the Ottawa Conference in 1932, which was then followed by a series of trade agreements between 1932 and 1935, creating a vast Sterling Area.[520]

Protectionism was found elsewhere in Europe. Germany sought to re-create a closed self-sufficient sphere in Southern and Eastern Europe by 1931. Chancellor Brüning proposed the customs union accord between Austria and Germany in March 1931. Hitler's National Socialist Party also advocated economic self-sufficiency and autarky, which was implemented as a policy after its election victory.[521] Italy, which had pursued a liberal commercial policy until the rise of Mussolini, shifted toward protectionism by 1930 under the dictator, who advocated a commercial policy of

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[517] The Smoot-Hawley Tariff contained the highest rate of duty in American history, though on a relatively narrow range of goods. Mitani (1974:148-149); Hosoya (1988:10)
[518] Lobell (1999:680).
[519] Lobell (1999:680).
[520] Lobell (1999:680).
[521] Lobell (1999:684).

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economic autarky.[522] The global trend toward self-sufficiency and economic autarky caused loss of access to foreign markets for export sectors in industrialized states, creating "domino effects" to spread further protectionism worldwide. The spread of protectionism and the regionalization of the international economy following the Great Depression severely discredited economic internationalism, one of the core principles and last resort of the Washington system.

5.3. Reflecting Uncertainty: Norm Selection Process in Japan during the Interwar Period

The normative uncertainty in the INS affected the Japanese worldview, and the post-World War I norm selection process was characterized by some distinctive patterns compared to previous periods. Until the outbreak of World War I, the Japanese worldview was more or less congruent with the dominant governing principle in the normative system. On one hand, there was a majority group of Westernizers that pushed for a status-quo policy. On the other hand, there was a minority group of Asian-nationalists who had the revisionist aim of challenging Western dominance in the world. In this political landscape, foreign policy decision-making had been carried out with little contention. Two factors contributed to creating the general domestic consensus in foreign policy decision-making. One was the existence of the majority view that was legitimized both by the international normative trend at that time and by Japan's foreign policy accomplishments. The other was the convergence of policy objectives between Westernizers and Asian-nationalists. The policies of modernization in the early Meiji period and the imperial expansion that ensued were also supported by the minority

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[522] Lobell (1999:685).

nationalists. They endorsed policies because they believed that these policies would help Japan increase its national strength, which they viewed as necessary to counter the Western powers in the future.

In the post-World War period, the dichotomy between Westernizers and Asian-nationalists was reconfigured into three competitive groups. The first was a new group, what I call *"Wilsonian internationalists,"* which emerged reflecting the new international normative trend of rising Wilsonianism. The second one was the *"realists."* Descending from the Westernizers' group, the realists were those who paid close attention to power politics among the states, and formulated policy prescriptions accordingly. In general, the realists valued cooperation with other Great Powers, for fear of Japan's international isolation. The third group was the *"Asian-nationalists,"* who maintained an antagonistic view towards the Western states. This faction was most interested in Japan's continuous expansion on the Asian continent, without fearing any negative consequences on Japan's relations with other Great Powers. Japanese policy debates during the interwar period centered around these three competing domestic views, which caused several critical shifts in the course of Japanese policy during the 1920s and the 1930s.

5.3.1. <u>First Worldview: *Wilsonian Internationalists*</u>

The Japanese internationalists were a product of the new international normative trend in the post-World War I period. The internationalists consisted of the liberal scholars and policy-makers who embraced the Washington system that was based on Wilson's *Fourteen Points* and argued that Japan should be an active participant in the new international order in cooperation with the United States and Great Britain. Supporters of the Washington system existed both outside and inside the government.

They included: liberal intellectuals, such as Yoshino Sakuzō and Anezaki Masaharu; people in the Foreign Ministry, such as Shidehara Kijūrō, Ishii Kikujirō, Makino Nobuaki, and Uchida Kōsai; idealist politicians, like Ozaki Yukio; and international financiers who had a liberal ideological bias. The position of the liberal internationalists became quite influential in directing Japanese foreign policy in the early 1920s following the Paris Peace Conference and the Washington Conference.

For Wilsonian internationalists, World War I had a symbolic meaning as the beginning of the new age. The Foreign Ministry's Makino Nobuaki described Wilson's *Fourteen Points* as the symbol of the New Diplomacy as opposed to the Old Diplomacy of defeated Germany. Similarly, Anezaki Masaharu, a religious scholar and a visiting professor in the United States, argued that President Wilson expressed the spirit of the new age.[523] Another characteristic of the Japanese liberals was their optimistic view that the *Fourteen Points* would become universal principles for realizing international justice. In 1918, for example, Yoshino Sakuzō, a liberal intellectual, wrote an article titled "From Secret Diplomacy to Open Diplomacy."[524] International financer Fukai Eigo also argued that Japan should promote international cooperation with the United States and Britain in order to take part in the progress of world civilization.[525]

In the context of domestic politics, the embrace of the Washington system brought about the promotion of "Taishō Democracy." The rise of party politics in Japan in the 1920s was, in a sense, an attempt to "Americanize" Japanese politics. Since the party Cabinet in the 1920s presupposed international détente, Taishō Democracy was

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[523] Usui (1970:109-112); Dingman (1974:99-100).
[524] Yoshino (1995:335-346).
[525] Mitani (1974:132).

strongly connected with the international cooperative system at that time.[526] Yoshino Sakuzō, a liberal intellectual who was a strong advocate of the Washington system, was also a founder of *"Minpon Shugi"* (politics of the people), which provided an intellectual basis for Taishō Democracy.[527]

The Wilsonian internationalists put an emphasis on the economy, rather than the military, as a way to promote national development. The military was considered subordinate to the economy, and the internationalists argued that economic strength was the source of national power and that the expansion of overseas markets was the best way to enhance national interests. This idea was aligned with Wilson's economic rationalism, which supported the redistribution of world capital through free trade.[528] Shidehara Kijūrō and Ishii Kikujirō, both of whom worked at the Foreign Ministry, were convinced that, with a massive expansion of the Japanese economy, free competition that was guaranteed by international cooperation would be the more ideal international environment for Japan's continuous growth. Shidehara and Ishii's optimism towards peaceful economic development led them to place less priority on securing Japan's sphere of influence and more on supporting Open Door and equal opportunity principles along with Wilson's *Fourteen Points*.[529]

For the internationalists, the foremost foreign policy objective for postwar Japan was to promote its economic progress by following the Wilsonian principles. The Foreign Ministry's Makino Nobuaki, who attended the Paris Peace Conference as an official envoy, was one of the first people to recognize the change in the international normative

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[526] Mitani (1995:78); Sakai (1999:4,7-8).
[527] For a detailed analysis of Yoshino's work, see Mitani (1995:78); Banno (1993:122-123); Silberman (1974:221,223); Minichiello (1984:4).
[528] Iriye (1966i:90-91,93,98-99,105); Hosoya (1988:5).
[529] Satō (1969:125-126).

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environment. After attending the peace conference, Makino was fully convinced that the international normative environment now favored a peaceful mode of expansion rather than tolerating the continuation of imperialism. Makino insisted that Japan should accept a new pattern of international behavior prescribed by the Americans.[530] In his opinion, Japan must join the League of Nations to take an active part in the new system, even if Japan had to make a compromise about its new sphere of influence in Shantung.[531]

The continental policy of the internationalists was also based on the Wilsonian principles to a large extent. First, in contrast with the period of Komura Diplomacy when heavy priority was placed on the expansion of Japan's sphere of influence in Manchuria, the internationalists were more interested in the economic potential of the Chinese market than benefits resulting from exclusive control in Manchuria. This was due to the internationalists' focus on export markets for Japan's economic progress. From the export market point of view, China was more attractive than Manchuria whose value as an export market was low. Second, with regard to policy towards China, the internationalists also supported the direction of the Washington system, which favored the Open Door and equal opportunity in conducting business in the Chinese market, as well as the policy of non-intervention in China's internal affairs that prevented one state from taking advantage by supporting one faction over another.[532]

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[530] Kobayashi (1966:334-335).

[531] For Makino, the advantage of joining the League of Nations and making Japan a full, respected member of the new international organization was far greater than persisting with exclusive control in Shantung. Dingman (1974:104-105); Iriye (1966i:84). The Foreign Ministry's Shidehara Kijūrō also argued that Japanese foreign policy should reflect the spirit of the Paris Peace Conference and the Washington system. Hosoya (1988:5); Iriye (1966i:89-90).

[532] This was the official policy of Japan when Shidehara Kijūrō served as a Foreign Minister in the 1920s. Iriye (1966i:92).

5.3.2. <u>Second Worldview: *Realists*</u>

I label the second domestic group "realists" because they accepted the Washington system not necessarily because they agreed with its principles, but because they were aware that it was the order chosen by the world's most powerful states after the war. *Genrō* (elder statesmen) Yamagata Aritomo and Saionji Kinmochi belonged to this group; party politicians, such as Takahashi Korekiyo and Hara Takashi, as well as some influential army personnel, including Tanaka Giichi and Ugaki Kazushige, were realists as well.[533]

Compared to the internationalists, it took the realist group longer until they were finally convinced that the old diplomatic principles of imperialism were out of date. Prior to the Washington Conference, the realists' majority was still occupied with the old-style imperialistic thinking. Major international events were judged from the viewpoint of how they affected Japan's further imperial expansion, particularly in Asia. For example, in contrast to the internationalists' perspective of seeing the defeat of Germany as the loss of the "Old Diplomacy," *genrō* Inoue Kaoru's view that World War I was a "great opportunity" for Japan's continental expansion and increasing Japan's influence in China was the widely shared domestic view at that time.[534] The same thing can be said about the realists' reaction to the Russian Revolution. Army leadership, including the General Staff, welcomed the revolution as an opportunity for Japan's further continental expansion,

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[533] Satō (1969:113-115).

[534] In Inoue's opinion, World War I caused the retreat of the European Great Powers from the Far East and weakened Yuan Shikai's government. These changes helped Japanese policy towards China in its attempt to increase its economic and political influence. During World War I, the Japanese export industry developed tremendously, turning Japan into a credit nation. Nish (1977:95); Katō (2002:181); Kitaoka (1978:163,235).

particularly in Northern Manchuria, the Russian Far East, and Russia's maritime provinces.[535]

The period between the end of World War I and the Washington Conference caused confusion in the realists' thinking. When Wilson's *Fourteen Points* were issued in January 1918, Japanese realists reacted with a great deal of skepticism. The political party *Seiyūkai* viewed the Wilsonian principles as an unrealistic expression of idealism as well as political rhetoric to inspire domestic audiences in the United States.[536] The realists' negative image of the New Diplomacy resulted not only from skepticism, but also from their sense of threat, *i.e.*, that it could harm Japan's continental interests.[537]

The realists' thinking gradually began changing at the end of World War I, and, while some people were still stuck with the old imperial ideology, others started taking the shift in the international normative trend seriously. On one hand, some politicians and journalists believed that the change in the international environment was temporary and that, once the war was over, imperial competition in Asia would resume and become severe.[538] On the other hand, in 1918 and 1919, army leaders Tanaka Giichi and Ugaki Kazushige, who were both initially skeptical towards Wilson's attempt, acknowledged the normative change by expressing the view that the unique opportunity for Japan to pursue imperial expansion was gone after World War I and Japan now needed to focus on

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[535] Hosoya (1988:47).

[536] Dingman (1974:99). *Genrō* Yamagata Aritomo and army leader Ugaki Kazushige were also initially skeptical about the sincerity of Wilson's action, arguing that the Wilsonian principles were made to satisfy Anglo-Saxon interests. The evidence of the old thinking was seen in politician Takahashi Kamekichi's position on the Paris Peace Conference, whereby he viewed the Versailles Treaty as a traditional balance of power, an attempt to stabilize the position of France by the impoverishment of Germany. Satō (1969:113-115). Crowley (1971:328).

[537] Army Minister Tanaka Giichi, Navy Minister Katō Tomosaburō, and the Foreign Ministry's Ishii Itatō shared this view. Dingman (1974:103); Satō (1969:109).

[538] Dingman (1974:97-98).

maintaining and stabilizing what it had.[539] Non-commitment was another type of reaction among the realists in facing the normative change. A good example was the initial reaction of the *Seiyūkai*'s Hara Cabinet (1918-1921) to Wilson's *Fourteen Points*. With a lack of a clear world vision, the Hara Cabinet took a lukewarm position towards the new ideals, passively agreeing based on principles with some conditionality. Hara's position, in order to avoid international isolation, was: if the majority states agree, then Japan would not oppose.[540]

Entering the 1920s, more and more realists, who had originally taken a skeptical attitude, began acknowledging the sustainability of the New Diplomacy in the postwar era.[541] After the Paris Peace Conference, for example, army leader Ugaki Kazushige commented that that international cooperation and interdependence were new rules and Japan should respect them.[542] The realists' acceptance of the New Diplomacy was based on their understanding that the postwar world was dominated by the Anglo-Saxon bloc, *i.e.*, the United States and Britain. As *Seiyūkai* leader Hara Takashi and the Foreign Ministry's Ishii Kikujirō argued, there was a widespread perception that the international order was dominated by the United States and Britain, and the Asian order was led by the United States, Britain, and Japan.[543]

Once the realists were convinced that Wilsonian diplomacy would be a new principle in the international order, their policy prescription naturally followed in supporting the new normative trend. Realists' support for the Washington system in

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[539] The "unique opportunity" included the loss of balance of power and tension among the Great Powers, which Japan had taken advantage of in its effort to expand its continental influence. Hosoya (1988:3,43). Satō (1969:110).
[540] Dingman (1974:102-103,112-113); Usui (1970:109-112); Hosoya (1988:2-3).
[541] Yanagisawa (1924).
[542] Dingman (1974:112).
[543] Ishii (1967:38-39); Hara (1965-69:109); Satō (1969:109-110,113); Hosoya (1988:2-3).

cooperating with the United States and Britain was not necessarily because they endorsed the principles, as did the internationalists, but was based on a realistic calculation of how Japan's national interests would be affected by following the new trend. Now that the Wilsonian principles were the new rules of international politics, Japanese realists considered that it was better to cooperate with the Anglo-Saxon bloc, since this was the only way for Japan to play an influential role and make conditions favorable for its benefit.[544] As *genrō* Saionji Kinmochi argued, most realists recognized that, in order to protect Japan's continental interests, it would be better to join the League of Nations and establish its position as one of the three powers in Asia, than to challenge the Washington system.[545]

A major policy shift among the realists occurred in the area of arms control. When the issue of arms control was first discussed at the Washington Conference, the Japanese government position was largely against this new international initiative. The Japanese army maintained that there was no room for compromise in arms reduction, which was supported by the Hara Cabinet. In 1921, the Japanese parliament rejected an arms control resolution 285-38.[546] The anti-arms control mood among the realists started waning as they observed the proceedings of the Washington Naval Conference. Moderating its original position, the army accepted some compromise after monitoring the decision for the naval reduction and other powers' support for this at the Washington Conference.[547] Japan's acceptance of naval arms control was based on realistic calculations as well. Navy Minister Katō Tomosaburō had been a hard-liner in 1917,

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[544] Satō (1969:113).
[545] Iriye (1966i:83-84).
[546] Usui (1970:117-119).
[547] Usui (1970:119-121).

advocating the war against the United States, but changed his position by 1921, and accepted the 5:5:3 (U.S.: U.K.: Japan) ratio of major battleships. His rationale was that it would be impossible to fight a war without a large amount of capital in the future, and, since the United States would be the only country to lend massive capital to Japan, it would be impossible to fight a war against it.[548] As for China, the realists' policy was subordinated to Great Power politics, particularly Japan's relations with the United States and Britain. The *Seiyūkai*'s Hara Cabinet China policy, for example, focused on avoiding conflict with other powers and passively siding with the winner of the civil strife in China.[549]

5.3.3. <u>Third Worldview:</u> *Nationalists*

The third domestic group consisted of nationalists who were characterized by their consistent antagonism towards Wilson's new international order. Traditionally, Japanese nationalists had been hostile towards the Western powers, putting an emphasis on the discriminatory way they had treated non-Western states, including Japan.[550] When President Wilson issued his new vision of the world, the Japanese nationalists reacted with great skepticism. While the internationalists praised and became sympathetic with the universalistic principles of the New Diplomacy, the nationalists viewed it as a selfish attempt by the Anglo-Saxons to satisfy their national interests. A good representative piece written by a nationalist after the war is the article by Home Minister Konoe Fumimaro who was a member of the Japanese delegation to the Paris Peace

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[548] Iriye (1966i:88). The Foreign Ministry's Hirota Kōki had a similar opinion. Hirota argued that, since Japan could not compete with the United States and Britain on an economic basis, it would be better to propose arms control and try to balance international naval power. Usui (1970:117-119).

[549] Dingman (1974:102-103).

[550] Unequal treaties between the Western and non-Western states, U.S. immigration laws against Japanese nationals, and Western racism were some examples highlighted by the Japanese nationalists.

Conference.[551] In his 1918 article, titled "Against a Pacifism Centered on England and America," Konoe criticized the New Diplomacy suggested by the United States and Britain as follows:

> What the English and Americans mean by peace, however, is a status quo that is to their advantage, which they dignify with the name of humanism…. I cannot help fearing that the League (of Nations) will tend to lead big countries to devour small countries economically and permanently relegate late-developing countries to second-class status.[552]

In highlighting the egoism hidden behind English and American talk of democracy and humanism, Konoe pointed out British self-sufficient economic policy vis-à-vis its colonies that was against the Open Door principles, as well as racial discrimination against Orientals, such as immigration restrictions.[553] Konoe's cynicism towards the New Diplomacy was echoed by other nationalists. Gotō Shinpei, an Internal Minister of the Terauchi Cabinet (1918-1920), argued that the American strategy of introducing the Washington system was moralistic expansionism, similar to Germany's military expansionism.[554] Similarly, nationalist intellectual Tokutomi Sohō insisted that the Washington system simply reflected American power.[555]

Critics of the Washington system were found in the military as well as the Foreign Ministry. In the army, Tanaka Kunishige, an army representative to the Washington Conference, viewed the new international order as a reflection of Anglo-Saxon domination and its pressure on other races. In the navy, Katō Kanji, a navy representative

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[551] In a later period, Konoe served as Prime Minister (1937-1939 and 1940-1941), playing a critical role in shifting the Japanese course towards fascism. For a detailed account of Konoe's anti-Anglo-Saxon tendencies, also see Iriye (1966i:80); Hosoya (1988:4,78).
[552] Konoe (1995:13-14).
[553] Konoe (1995:13-14).
[554] Kobayashi (1966:809).
[555] Usui (1970:109-112). Dingman (1974:112).

to the Conference, was a strong opponent of the Washington Naval Treaty. Convinced that the rate of Japanese naval disarmament was unfair relative to that of the United States and Britain, Katō commented that the war with the United States began as of today, and Japan will retaliate.[556] After the Washington Naval Treaty, the navy was split into two factions, the *Kantai-ha* (the Fleet Faction) led by Katō Kanji and the *Jyōyaku-ha* (the Treaty Faction) that supported the Washington Naval Treaty. The Treaty Faction led by Katō Tomosaburō initially dominated the navy, but the Fleet Faction gradually gained power and became the main group within the navy by the 1930s, playing a major role in Japan's withdrawal from the Washington system.[557] In the Foreign Ministry, the *Kakushin-ha* (reformists) was an anti-American group, as opposed to Shidehara and Makino's pro-Washington faction. The reformists were skeptical about America's intention to push the New Diplomacy, and some, such as Ninomiya Takeo, predicted that the United States and Japan were destined to fight a war over China. The reformist group became a locomotive within the Foreign Ministry to facilitate Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations in the 1930s.[558]

The nationalist force was quite strong in the Imperial Army. Historically speaking, the Imperial Army had contained more nationalists than other bureaucratic organizations in Japan. The organization had a strong stake in Manchuria, and many officers, especially in the Kwantung Army, which protected Japan's leasehold in the Liaotung Peninsula and the South Manchurian Railway, tended to place higher priority on securing Japan's continental interests than on maintaining friendly relations with other Great Powers. The nationalist ideology was becoming popular among junior officers in

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[556] Hata (1983:195).
[557] Hosoya (1988:4-5,77-78); Usui (1970:119-121).
[558] Shiozaki (1985:165,170).

the army in the 1920s. Several officer groups and secret societies were formed during this period. These later developed into the two major factions in the army – the *Kōdō-ha* (the Imperial Way Faction) and the *Tōsei-ha* (the Control Faction).[559]

There were a few critical incidents that fueled nationalist reactions among the public and consequently strengthened the nationalists' position in domestic politics. The first was the battle over the "Racial Equality Clause" in the League of Nations. Support for the Racial Equality Clause had wide domestic consensus in Japan: not only right-wing groups and nationalists pushed this agenda, but all major parties, including the *Seiyūkai*, *Kenseikai*, and *Kokumintō*, also supported it, viewing it as vital in order to stop discrimination against the Japanese nation.[560] During World War I, there was a growing domestic consensus that Japan should expect the other Great Powers to show goodwill regarding immigration restrictions in return for Japan's cooperation with the allied powers during the hostilities.[561] When it turned out that the Racial Equality Clause would not pass due to rejection by some states, including Britain and Australia, it caused a very strong national reaction in Japan. There was a growing antagonism towards the Anglo-Saxon bloc and increasing consciousness of the need to challenge the status quo.[562] The most extreme reaction was seen among the nationalists. One nationalist politician, Nagai Ryūtarō, criticized the hypocrisy of American policy and called the League of Nations "joint imperialism."[563] The Army's General Staff, including Ugaki Kazushige, took this

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[559] Kitaoka (1999:147-152).
[560] Usui (1970:112-114); Dingman (1974:109-110).
[561] Katō (2002:182-184).
[562] Katō (2002:187-190); Usui (1970:113-114); Minichiello (1984:2).
[563] Nagai also attacked the American Monroe Doctrine as another example of its hypocritical policy. Nagai (1919ii:94-97).

issue very seriously, citing unfairness by America and Britain. Right-wing patriot groups even demanded Japan's immediate withdrawal from the League of Nations.[564]

The U.S. Immigration Act of 1924 was another incident that strengthened the nationalist position. The anti-Japanese immigrant movement reached its peak around 1924 in the United States. A prominent American journalist claimed that Japanese immigrants would peacefully conquer California and change the American culture to an Oriental one. At a Senate hearing on immigration, one witness warned that the United States would become a Japanese province unless it stopped the immigration from Japan.[565] This kind of paranoid image of Japan and the passage of the law had a great impact on Japan.[566] Some Wilsonian internationalists believed that their trust towards American democracy was betrayed. Cosmopolitan liberal intellectuals felt that harmony between Western and the Eastern civilizations was quite an unrealistic dream. The feeling of disillusion and frustration often led to Asianism. The immigration dispute decisively weakened the domestic position of Japanese liberals who were against an invasion of the Asian continent and strengthened those who insisted on an aggressive continental policy.[567]

In terms of foreign policy, the nationalists had been most passionate about Japan's continental expansion. Although both the nationalists and realists were supportive of increasing Japan's influence in Manchuria and China, their priorities were fundamentally different. While, for the realists, continental expansion and Great Power collaboration were inseparable objectives, the nationalists paid little attention to maintaining good

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[564] Konoe was one of them. Usui (1970:112-114); Katō (2002:192-193,198-199); Dingman (1974:110).
[565] Asada (1973:167).
[566] The impact of the US immigration act lasted long. Newspaper, *Ōsaka Asahi* (7/1/1925), carried a special editorial on the first anniversary of the immigration act to criticize the act.
[567] Asada (1973:165).

relations with other powers. For some nationalists, like the army's Ishiwara Kanji, Japan's continental expansion was precisely targeted to prepare the country for the future war against the United States.

5.4. Norm Contestations and Policy Changes During the Interwar Period

This section discusses a series of norm contestations and shifts in foreign policy between the two world wars. In contrast to earlier decades when there was a high degree of domestic consensus over worldview and policy directions, domestic opinions were divided and the level of domestic contestation was high during this period, with several factors that intensified the policy debates. On the systemic side, the fluctuation in the international normative environment had a large impact on foreign policy debates and policy outcomes. On the domestic side, the disintegration of the decision-making structure, especially after the *genrō*'s influence declined, and policy failures in the 1920s hindered the policy consolidation. These international and domestic conditions made Japanese foreign policy development quite different from the previous periods. First, the policy course was far from stable, going through several critical shifts. Second, there was an increasingly widening gap between the Japanese course and that of the rest of the Great Powers. By the mid-1930s, Japan, which had been developing as a status quo power since the Meiji period, was no longer considered a respected member of the international community, but viewed instead as a challenger to the status quo.

5.4.1. *Still Living in the Old World?* Japan's Imperial Diplomacy During World War I

Japanese diplomacy during the First World War was, to a large extent, a succession of the old imperial diplomacy—seeking an expansion of its continental influence through assurance from other imperial powers. Political leaders and the army aimed at take advantage of the war in Europe for Japan's gain in Asia. Foreign Minister Katō Takaaki's decision to make war on Germany was based on a calculation that Japan would gain in its interests in the Pacific and in China, especially in Manchuria.[568] During the wartime period, two points of contestation arose regarding the question of what was the best way for Japan to secure its interests in China and Manchuria. The first debate was on the necessity of Sino-Japanese cooperation in order to consolidate Japan's continental interests, and the second was how to deal with the increasing American challenge to Japan's actions in the Asian continent.

With regard to the China question, *genrō* Yamagata Aritomo was the main supporter of improving Sino-Japanese relations by providing assistance to its government.[569] Yamagata was extremely concerned with the revival of the "yellow-peril" mentality in the United States during World War I, and felt the necessity of eliminating the possibility of a racial war between the United States and Japan. Sino-Japan rapprochement was considered to be a policy that would restrain the United States, and Yamagata suggested providing economic aid to Yuan Shikai's government, in his hope to turn it to pro-Japan, a development that would help Japan expand its national interests in

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[568] At a Cabinet meeting, the *genrō* and ministers lent support to Katō's plea that entering a European war would redound to Japan's credit internationally and improve its standing in East Asia. Nish (1977:93,95).
[569] Yamagata's position was also supported by other *genrō*, including Ōyama Iwao and Inoue Kaoru, as well as senior leaders, such as Matsukata Masayoshi and the army's Terauchi Masatake. Kitaoka (1978:170).

China.[570] Yamagata's China policy was an innovative one. Foreseeing the American-led world after the war, and concerned with the racial discourse in the United States, Yamagata shifted from his de-Asianization stance to support intimacy with China. Unlike majority foreign policy establishment figures who still adhered to the old imperial thinking, Yamagata had the foresighted view that Japan would not be able to maintain its continental interests by simply continuing its former imperial diplomacy.[571] At the same time, however, he was far from advocating challenging the American supremacy. While Yamagata emphasized the importance of Sino-Japanese intimacy, he also suggested continuous cooperation with other imperial powers, including the United States. Cooperation with the West was vital, in Yamagata's view, to avoid the Western fear that Sino-Japanese rapprochement was a racial alliance. Yamagata's China policy was defensive by nature, and he argued in 1914 that Japan's China policy needed to be subordinate to its Western policy.[572]

Yamagata's pro-China policy was a contrast to the views of the army's middle-ranking officers. The foremost interest of these officers was to expand Japan's influence in Manchuria and China, and they firmly believed that the imperial diplomacy of the past based on a collaboration with Britain and Russia was sufficient to achieve this goal. Unlike Yamagata, Akashi Genjirō felt little need to promote Sino-Japanese cooperation, or support the unification of China. On the contrary, Akashi was more interested in intervening in Chinese factional strife to produce chaos, which would in turn create an opportunity for Japan's further expansion into China. While Akashi and Tanaka Giichi valued the cooperation with Britain and Russia to contain Chinese resistance, they did not

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[570] Kitaoka (1978:166,215); Banno (1985:82).
[571] Banno (1985:82).
[572] Kitaoka (1978:215); Banno (1985:80-81).

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regard good relations with the United States as important as Yamagata did. In fact, Tanaka suggested Japan's further commitment with Britain, Russia, and France in order to prevent American intervention into Japan's China policy and its increasing influence in China.[573]

Japanese foreign policy decision-making during the First World War shifted between the two positions described above. When the war began in Europe, most policy makers regarded this as a new opportunity for Japan's continental expansion. *Genrō* Inoue Kaoru wrote: "This is the divine aid or the new Taishō era for the achievement of Japan's destiny. We must grasp this opportunity by showing solidarity with the Powers (Britain, France and Russia)…"[574] Inoue's remark represented the traditional imperial thinking. World War I increased public support for imperial diplomacy, which encouraged the army to pursue further continental expansion whenever possible.[575]

Under this domestic circumstance, Twenty-One Demands were issued in 1915 as an attempt to take advantage of Europe for Japan's continental benefits. Foreign Minister Katō Takaaki played a central role in preparing these demands. Katō went to London as minister at a low point in Anglo-Japanese relations during the 1890s and made a great contribution to cultivating favorable British opinion about Japan. He claimed to be the originator of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and, as a natural consequence, his foreign policy was based on Anglo-Japanese friendship.[576] In Katō's view, what Japan demanded from China was a reward for its Shantung campaign and was not illiberal insofar as Japan

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[573] Banno (1985:83-85).
[574] Nish (1977:95).
[575] Kitaoka (2001:248); Iriye (1966i:80-82); Hosoya (1988:20-21).
[576] Nish (1977:84).

was mainly insisting on economic privileges.[577] The leading liberal intellectual, Yoshino Sakuzō, commented that the Twenty-One Demands were minimum demands from the imperial vantage point and were presented at the right time for the Japanese empire to expand future footage in China.[578] The fact that even a liberal scholar like Yoshino supported the government's move indicates that there was a general perception in Japan that these were legitimate demands since Japanese forces gained control of German-leased territories in the Far East. The European powers, occupied with the ongoing war, refrained from mounting any protest, and the United States initially reacted weakly to the demands. In Japan, Secretary of State Bryan's Note issued in March 1915 was welcomed with surprise as a sign of positive change in American diplomacy towards the nation. In the note, the United States admitted Japan's special rights in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia for the first time. In the view of Japanese officials, Japan had finally established a firm position in Manchuria, based on the approval of other imperial powers.[579]

Katō's imperial diplomacy seemed to be going smoothly until the United States hardened its position towards Japan. The U.S. government attitude had completely shifted to a pro-China stance by the time it issued the second Note to China and Japan in May.[580] With backing from the United States, Yuan also hardened his position, and the bilateral negotiations were prolonged. All of sudden, Katō was in a difficult position, with criticism mounting both internationally and domestically. Japan eventually got its way,

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[577] Nish (1977:99).
[578] Katō (2002:179-180).
[579] Prior to the American approval, Russia, France, and Britain had already accepted Japan's special rights in Manchuria. Hosoya (1988:26).
[580] The U.S. policy change was initiated by Paul Reinsch, the United States Minister to China, and President Wilson. Kitaoka (1985).

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but its reputation suffered in China as well as the United States. *Genrō* Yamagata and Inoue criticized Katō for increasing friction with both the United States and China.[581] On the other hand, Katō's diplomacy was also attacked by the nationalists in the army. Akashi Genjirō and Uehara Yūsuke argued that the demands were not sufficiently strong and that the government position was too compromising, asking for an even harder policy line towards China.[582]

The Russian Revolution in 1917 and the Soviet's separate peace with Germany in the following year pushed Japanese policy in a pro-American direction. The rise of the Soviet Union and the German-Soviet entente meant the loss of one of the cores of Japan's imperial policy—Russo-Japanese collaboration to deter anti-Japanese sentiment on the international scene. Facing the change in the strategic environment, the realists in decision-making circles shifted to a moderate approach to their continental policy. With the support of *genrō* Yamagata and Matsukata, the realist group in the army and the Foreign Ministry led this move. Senior army leader and Prime Minister Terauchi Masatake, as well as the Foreign Minister Motono Ichirō, implemented a pro-American stance. The Terauchi Cabinet's decision was based on the view that Japan's further expansion into China would be to risk counteraction by the other Great Powers, which might cause a "scramble for China." In order to reduce suspicions by these nations towards Japan, Japan promised non-intervention in China and gave its support for the territorial integrity of China and Open Door principles.[583]

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[581] Yamagata and Inoue's criticism was echoed by senior policy makers, such as Matsukata, Gotō, and Terauchi. Katō (2002:176); Kitaoka (1978:175-176); Nish (1977:100-101).
[582] Kitaoka (1978:175-178).
[583] Satō (1969:129); Kitaoka (1978:196-197); Banno (1985:92).

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Japan's shift to a moderate policy does not mean that it gave up its continental interests. While the government tried to improve Japan's relations with the other Great Powers, especially the United States, it also made a continuous effort to secure and expand, if possible, Japan's special rights whenever possible. In 1917, Japan agreed to dispatch a destroyer to the Mediterranean Sea when requested by Britain. In return, the Japanese government asked for Britain's support when Japan requested rights in Shantung and the South Pacific in the postwar period.[584] In the same year, the Japanese government signed a diplomatic note with the United States, often known as Lansing-Ishii Agreement. In an effort to improve its increasingly hostile relations with the United States and rivalry over China, Japan gave its assurance of support to the Open Door policy and equal opportunity in China, with respect to its territorial integrity. As compensation, Japan acquired American recognition that Japan had special interests in Manchuria.[585]

The Siberian Expedition was another example in which the Japanese government showed its continental ambitions, insofar as this would not damage its relations with the United States. The Siberian case is also important as an early sign of disintegration in the decision-making structure, especially between the Tokyo government and the army. Japan's expedition to Siberia originally resulted from a U.S. initiative to suggest joint military intervention in Siberia.[586] Japanese leaders, particularly army expansionists, took the U.S. initiative as another great opportunity. Although the United States suggested a

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[584] Britain guaranteed its support for Japan's position. Japan was also able to gain backing from France, Russia, and Italy. Kitaoka (1978:201).

[585] In a secret protocol, Japan also agreed not to take advantage of the European war "to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects of other nations." LaFeber (1997:115-116). Banno (1985:95).

[586] Britain and France strongly requested the United States and Japan to dispatch troops to Siberia as well. LaFeber (1977:118-119); Hosoya (1988:49).

"limited" intervention, the expansionists in Japan interpreted Wilson's request as the green light to send troops beyond Vladivostok.[587] The Japanese army's attempt to establish an exclusive control zone in northern Manchuria and a puppet regime in the Russian Far East created a great deal of suspicion on the American side.[588] Increasingly dissatisfied with Japanese moves in Siberia, the U.S. government presented protest notes to Japan in November 1918 and September 1919. Each time, the Tokyo government reacted by making some compromises as well as solving the problem of "double diplomacy" between Tokyo and the army, moves that were welcomed by Washington.[589] The Siberian Expedition not only revealed the gap between the emerging U.S. liberal approach by Wilson and Japan's persistence in the old imperial diplomacy, but also left deep suspicion on both sides. On the American side, Japanese actions in Siberia increased misgivings in the American army as well as by President Wilson. On the Japanese side, the way Washington told Tokyo about its decision to withdraw its forces produced a huge controversy. The fact that the State Department's official notice came after Commander Graves' notice to the Japanese command office in Siberia was received as a violation of international convention. Although this was due to a communication problem involving the State Department, the General Staff, and the commander, the Japanese side's dissatisfaction with the United States was exacerbated. In his report to Washington, U.S.

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[587] This includes Prime Minister Terauchi, as well as the army's Tanaka Giichi and Ōshima Ken'ichi. Hosoya (1988:51-52).

[588] Suspicion of Japan's intentions was particularly strong among members of the American army. Chief of General Staff Payton March and William Graves, Commander of the American Expeditionary Force in Siberia, were prominent among them. Hosoya (1988:52).

[589] In 1918, the Tokyo government decided to reduce the number of troops and gave up exclusive control of the East China Railroad. In 1919, Tokyo worked on solving the problem of "double diplomacy" in Siberia between Tokyo and the army. By sending a new commander to the region, the Japanese government tried to make sure that the Japanese army there would comply with orders from Tokyo. Hosoya (1988:55,63-64).

Ambassador to Japan Roland Morris expressed his concern about the negative impact of the American action on Japanese liberals and pro-American groups.[590]

5.4.2. <u>First Transformation: Shift from Imperialism to Liberal Internationalism</u>

The Japanese domestic opinions before World War I were unified in their belief in imperialism, which led to a consensus for the pursuit of Japan's expansionist policy in Asia. This normative landscape did not change during and immediate aftermath of the war. The majority of decision-makers, including those who led the Ōkuma Cabinet (1914-16) and the Terauchi Cabinet (1916-1918), were occupied with imperialist thinking. Their main concern about the European war was what kind of opportunity it would provide for Japan's continental expansion.[591] Japan's wartime policies, such as the decision to join the war (1914), the Twenty-One Demands on China (1915), the Lansing-Ishii agreement (1917), and the Siberian Expedition (1918), were all in line with Japan's plans for imperialism in Asia in an attempt to secure and expand its sphere of influence.

At the same time, several decision-makers gradually recognized the change in the international system. When Russia turned into Communist hands and Germany was losing the war, the image of Anglo-Saxon domination in the postwar world was more widely shared among policy makers.[592] Army leader Ugaki Kazushige expressed his concern that the traditional balance of power system was gone and wondered whether Japan would be able to cope with the new system under American dominance.[593]

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[590] Hosoya (1988:66).
[591] *Genrō* Inoue Kaoru's comment that World War I was a "great opportunity from heaven" for Japan's continental expansion and increasing Japan's influence in China is one example. Katō (2002:181).
[592] Yanagisawa (1924).
[593] Asada (1974:319-320).

The INS began transforming meanwhile, with a gradual shift from imperialism to liberal internationalism. Japanese preoccupation with imperialist thinking, however, did not change even after U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's *Fourteen Points* speech in 1918. In fact, Wilson's speech was regarded with great skepticism among Japanese policy-makers. Politician Itō Miyoji, who was influential in foreign policy matters, claimed that no state would take Wilson's idealism seriously. Foreign Minister Gotō Shinpei suspected America's moralistic expansionism in Wilson's words.[594] With the exception of a few liberal intellectuals, such as Yoshino Sakuzō and Anezaki Masaharu, *genrō*, politicians, Foreign Ministry, and the military alike did not take Wilson's words seriously, considering them as merely an expression of America's moralistic expansionism, and believing that no state would take sincerely Wilson's idealism.[595] Japanese leaders' fixation with old imperial thinking and skepticism towards Wilson's idealism characterized the posture of the Japanese delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, which persistently pushed for the nation's special rights in Shantung and managed to win a secession of the old German special interests there. On other matters, such as discussion of the League of Nations, the Japanese delegation did not participate actively, but simply followed majority opinions.[596]

The experience at the Paris Peace Conference was a major turning point for the Japanese internationalist group, as it was the first multilateral conference that reified the principle of new internationalism originally articulated in Wilson's speech a year before.

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[594] Kobayashi (1966:308-310,809).
[595] These include *genrō* Yamagata Aritomo, political party *Seiyūkai* and Hara Takashi, Foreign Minister Motono Ichirō (1916-1918), army's Terauchi Masatake, Ugaki Kazushige, and Tanaka Giichi, and navy's Katō Tomosaburō. The nationalist group also reacted with skepticism, viewing Wilson's speech as a selfish attempt by the United States to satisfy its national interests. See Asada (1974:319-320); Dingman (1974:99,103); Konoe (1995).
[596] Asada (1984:25).

The Foreign Ministry's Makino Nobuaki and *genrō* Saionji Kinmochi, who attended the conference as an official envoy, witnessed the change in the INS first-hand, and came back to Japan fully convinced that the normative environment now favored a peaceful mode of expansion based on liberal principles.[597] In addition, the diplomatic failure at the Paris Peace Conference increased a sense of crisis and concern over Japan's international isolation in the new postwar world.[598]

Saionji and Makino's witnessing of the rise of new internationalism, as well as the failure of the old imperialist approach Japan employed at the conference, increased the legitimacy of the internationalist position. First, Makino's position was welcomed in his own Foreign Ministry's Western bureau. People like Shidehara Kijūrō echoed Makino's assertion that Japan should accept a new pattern of international behavior prescribed by the Americans and take an active role in supporting New Diplomacy. Second, Saionji and Makino were able to influence the Hara Cabinet's thinking, successfully turning it to take a more serious view of new internationalism.[599] By the time of the Washington Conference in 1921, with a help of the Harding administration's compromising stance towards Japan's special rights in Manchuria, the Hara Cabinet fully supported for pro-American, internationalist approach, which gave enough political leverage to the pro-American Shidehara who attended the conference as an official envoy.[600]

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[597] Iriye (1972:232).

[598] The passiveness of the Japanese representatives at the conference garnered critical reputations as "silent partners" among the other participants. Asada (1984:25). A nationalist politician, Nagai Ryūtarō, warned in his 1919 article that Japan was threatened by Anglo-Saxonism and Bolshevikism. Nagai (1919i).

[599] Asada (1984:25,31-33); Iriye (1974:241).

[600] Harding administration's Japanese policy was more pragmatic than Wilson's, and valued economic benefits resulting from good U.S.-Japan relations. People under Harding, including Secretary of State Hughes and Secretary of Commerce Warren Hoover, showed a compromising attitude on the part of the United States by admitting the status quo in Asia and Japan's "legitimate" right for special interests in Manchuria. President Harding also tried to ease the fears of army hardliners. Harding's envoy, Leonard Wood, Governor General of the Philippines, was sent to Japan and had a long discussion with army leader

The Washington Conference, and the resulting subsequent multilateral treaties, helped institutionalize the norm of liberal internationalism.[601] Prime Minister Takahashi Korekiyo, who succeeded Hara in 1921, made the following remark in his New Year's message in 1922:

> [The] World War had brought about fundamental changes in the foreign policies of the powers. They had recognized the impossibility of plotting expansion through force and the need to cooperate with one another to promote justice in international relations. However… competition among nations could not be stopped. Armed competition has become obsolete, but economic competition is growing in intensity.[602]

The ascension of the internationalist principle legitimized the Japanese internationalist position even further, which not only accelerated the conversion of non-internationalists to internationalists, but also hampered opponents from actively challenging the internationalist policy. The Navy's official delegate to the conference, Katō Tomosaburō, who had been a hard-liner in 1917, was deeply impressed with the passionate welcome of Hughes' arms control initiative by conference attendees and the American media. Katō's experience in Washington fully convinced him that it was in Japan's national interest to support the new normative development towards arms control and accepted the terms of the treaty.[603] Even the army, which was traditionally more supportive of forceful expansion, came under the influence of new internationalist ideas. General Staff member Matsui Iwane, for example, wrote that using old methods of expansion was out of

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Tanaka Giichi in order to guarantee the friendly intentions of the Republican administration. See Asada (1984:42,44-47).

[601] The abolition of the Anglo-Japanese alliance as a result of the Four-Power Treaty in 1922 was a symbolic reminder for Japanese policy-makers that the old international order was replaced by a new one.

[602] Iriye (1974:244-245).

[603] Katō was not only a major locomotive to sign the Washington Naval Treaty, but also played a major role in smoothing out strong resistance within his own Navy towards naval arms control. Asada (1984:49).

question and that Japan must substitute economic conquest for military invasion.[604] Media and public opinion also embraced the image of the new international order, subscribing to the rhetoric of internationalism.[605]

The era of liberal *Shidehara Diplomacy* in the 1920s also had to do with favorable international conditions. The development of the national economy, particularly the increase in Japan's trade and investment, under the liberal international economic order was critical for the success of Shidehara Diplomacy.[606] The status of Sino-Japanese relations was another important factor. During the 1920s, domestic opposition to the government's liberal foreign policy intensified in proportion to the rise of the anti-Japanese nationalist movement in China. The anti-Japanese movement hurt the Japanese export industry to China, which increased the demand from the export industry for a harder policy. The anti-Japanese movement also increased the sense of insecurity within the army about Japan's interests in Manchuria. On the contrary, when Foreign Minister Shidehara served his first term between 1924 and 1926, the anti-Japanese movement in China temporarily eased and shifted its focus to an anti-British movement. These relatively peaceful Sino-Japanese relations helped Shidehara to push his liberal agendas.[607] Under these international circumstances, domestic opinion embraced the image of the new international order, subscribing to the rhetoric of internationalism. Most

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[604] Army leaders, Tanaka Giichi and Ugaki Kazushige, also acknowledged that it was not in Japan's interest to fight against the United States and Britain under the current normative environment. Banno (1985:100); Hosoya (1988:3-4); Iriye (1974:245).

[605] Most journals published in the early 1920s contained articles discussing international cooperation and economic interdependence.

[606] Shidehara himself as a Foreign Minister set the expansion of Japanese exports as the basic policy objective. Trade relations with the United States were particularly important, as the United States consumed 40 percent of all Japanese exports. In fact, more than 90 percent of Japan's main export commodities, such as raw silk, went to the American market. The United States also supplied 30 percent of Japanese imports. Hosoya (1998:5); Iriye (1966i:106); Iriye (1974:246).

[607] The cooling off of anti-Japanese sentiment in China was partially due to the Great Tokyo Earthquake in 1923, which increased Chinese sympathy towards the Japanese. Banno (1985:162-164,166).

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journals published in the early 1920s contained articles talking of international

cooperation and economic interdependence.[608]

As a result, Japanese foreign policy in the first half of the 1920s strongly reflected

the norm of economism and multilateral internationalism. Japan withdrew its forces from

Shantung, north Manchuria, and Siberia in the early 1920s. The economic potential of the

Chinese market was underscored more than any possible benefits resulting from

exclusive control in Manchuria, with an emphasis on expanding Japanese business

activities in China, especially export and investment.[609] The Japanese Diet that rejected

an arms control resolution in 1921 passed an arms control law in 1922 after the

Washington Naval Conference.[610]

5.4.3. <u>Second Transformation: Shift from Internationalism to Traditional Imperialism</u>

The faith in the new world order and international cooperation began fading after

about 1925.[611] In 1927, Tokyo university economist Yanaihara Tadao labeled the current

international politics as "postwar imperialism."[612] Declining domestic support for

Shidehara Diplomacy was attributed to several factors. First, peaceful economic

expansionism failed to produce remarkable progress in the Japanese economy. The reality

of external economic relations was gloomier than what had been predicted by the idea of

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[608] Iriye (1974:259).

[609] The support for the Washington system with regard to China policy was, however, maintained under one conditionality—the guarantee of Japan's special interests in Manchuria. Hara Takashi, the first Prime Minister to come out with a clear pro-American policy after the war, wrote in his diary that the four-power loan consortium for China signed in 1920 approved Japan's special rights in Manchuria. For example, Elihu Root, a senior Republican statesman who worked as a mediator for Hughes during the negotiation with Japan at the Washington Naval Conference, guaranteed the status quo in Manchuria, which greatly helped Shidehara to make compromises on other issues. See Mitani (1974:142); Asada (1984:51-52).

[610] Usui (1970:117-119); Satō (1969:126-127).

[611] Iriye (1974:262).

[612] Yanaihara (1927).

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peaceful expansionism. Japanese business and agricultural activities in China and Manchuria did not develop under the restriction imposed by the Chinese government and the uncertainty of land tenure in Manchuria.[613] At the end of the 1920s, Japan was still suffering from the postwar recession and facing a period of acute social and economic crisis, including falling prices, curtailment of business, and growing unemployment. As the national economy stumbled, more and more voices demanded a new foreign policy.[614]

Domestic economic difficulties revived the image of Japan as a "have-not," and increased critical views towards the "have" group, *i.e.*, the more affluent Anglo-Saxon nations.[615] In criticizing the United States and Britain, the issue of racial discrimination and unequal treatment of Japan was re-highlighted. The question of racial equality with the West had often been viewed as "an index of the West's sincerity in implementing the new world order" ever since President Wilson disclosed his vision of the new postwar world.[616] When the Japanese proposal for the racial equality clause for the League of Nations covenant was rejected after meeting strong opposition from other powers, including the United States and Britain, there were massive repercussions on Japanese public opinion. The passage of the U.S. immigration law in Congress in 1924 also gave the impression that the postwar world order had failed to achieve racial equality despite its idealistic slogans. As a result of the immigration crisis, a series of public demonstrations and anti-American meetings were held. Military groups, right-wing nationalist organizations, labor unions, and left-wing factions all took part in the

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[613] Iriye (1974:264).
[614] Iriye (1974:265).
[615] In 1921, *Seiyūkai*'s Hara Takashi articulated the difference between "have-not" Japan and the "have" West. In the article, Hara argued that established powers, such as the United States and Britain, consumed a massive amount of capital and resources on earth. In contrast, Japan suffered from a large population and a shortage of goods. He stated that the Washington Conference should correct this inequality by removing artificial economic barriers and discriminatory treatments of different races. See Hara (1921:32-44).
[616] Iriye (1974:260).

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protests.[617] Overseas emigration was one of the core policies of the Japanese government in an effort to expand its economic interests through peaceful means. Despite the government's attempts, however, Japanese emigration figures remained low throughout the 1920s, partially due to the rise of restrictionist measures in many countries.[618] When the stagnation of the emigration figures was combined with the low performance of the national economy, domestic antagonism and frustration towards the discriminatory measures by the West increased. America's racism contributed to the rise of Asianist-nationalism in Japan in arguments such as liberating all non-white races from Western dominance.[619] Politician and bureaucrat Gotō Shinpei asserted that, in order to compete with the United States, Japan had no alternative but to strengthen its base on the Asian continent, advocating for more active continental expansion.[620] Many Japanese in China expected Chinese sympathy for Japan and thought that the Chinese would regard Japan's humiliation as Asia's humiliation. An editorial in the *Peking Shūhō* (Beijing Weekly) declared that Japan should not hesitate to go to war against the United States, since justice lay with the Japanese side.[621]

In Asia, particularly in terms of managing Chinese affairs, the Washington system of trilateral cooperation among the United States, Britain, and Japan was the central pillar of New Diplomacy.[622] The Washington system, however, continuously faced challenges from Chinese nationalism and Soviet communism, which made systemic norm

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[617] Takagi (1924). Iriye (1974:258-259); Usui (1970:124-126); Mitani (1995:103).

[618] South America was the only place where Japanese immigrants were automatically accepted. Iriye (1974:257,266).

[619] Usui (1970:124-126).

[620] Mitani (1995:103); Iriye (1974:259).

[621] Iriye (1974:259-260).

[622] The three powers pledged to work together to ensure China's political stability and economic development. The Washington system also incorporated a prospect for China to recover its sovereignty, presenting China with a process of regaining tariff autonomy and abolishing extraterritoriality. Satō (1969:105); Hosoya (1988:6); Katō (2002:269).

consolidation difficult.[623] By the mid-1920s, the United States, Britain, and Japan failed to maintain a unified position in dealing with Chinese nationalism, and began taking independent approaches, which weakened the normative foundation of the Washington system even further.

Signs of departure from the Washington system were seen both in American and British policies towards China. As for the United States, the new secretary of state Frank Kellogg abandoned multilateralism and started taking an independent policy towards China.[624] While the United States under the initiative of Kellogg sought a new regional order incorporating China, the British government showed interest in going back the old diplomatic approach, including the resumption of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.[625] The American and British departure from the Washington system in the mid-1920s accelerated the further erosion of multilateral internationalism in Asia.

The disintegration of the Washington system transformed the nature of the INS, which changed the relative power relationships among Japanese domestic coalitions, hence influencing norm contestation in Japan. Shidehara's non-interventionist approach faced increasing domestic criticism as the rise of Chinese nationalism and escalation of China's anti-Japanese sentiments continuously damaged Japanese property and nationals

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[623] Chinese nationalist dissatisfaction with the Treaty of Versailles settlement resulted in the May 4 Movement in 1919, as well as the May 30 Movement in 1925. The Soviet Union took an appeasement approach to the Kuomintang government, turning Chinese nationalism into an anti-Washington power movement. The rapprochement between the Soviets and China was as if a parallel system of international relations had existed in the Far East, challenging the normative principles of the Washington treaties. Iriye (1990:38,44).

[624] Shifting from the trilateral framework, Kellogg attempted to include China as a new partner and build a four-power collaboration system. Hosoya (1988:106-107).

[625] Facing strong anti-British movements in China, there was increasing opinion within the British government that Britain should go beyond the Washington system in order to protect its own interests in China. London attempted to change the nature of the Washington system to be more like an alliance. The supporters of this policy change believed that a bilateral alliance would be more effective for coping with Chinese nationalism and containing the Bolshevik threat. Hosoya (1988:89-91).

in China.[626] In addition to Shidehara's internationalist approach encountering protests from many directions, including the opposition party, the *Seiyūkai*, the military, and the right-wing nationalists, his position was further de-legitimized by the gradual erosion of the Washington system.

While the momentum for policy change increased, the domestic faction that adhered to the traditional imperialist approach turned victorious, led by former army leader Tanaka Giichi. The fall of the liberal *Shidehara Diplomacy* and its replacement with old-style *Tanaka Diplomacy* reflected the change in the INS, especially in reaction to the renewed British interest in Old Diplomacy. It was army leaders, such as Tanaka Giichi and Ugaki Kazushige, who most actively responded to the growing interest by the British government in resuming the old partnership with Japan.[627] As the gap between American and British policy towards China grew, two coalitions emerged in Japan—the moderate group of Shidehara that supported the American line, and the Japanese army's hardliners that adhered to a pro-British line.

Under Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain, British supporters of the traditional, more-forceful approach conducted a campaign by emphasizing the threat of Chinese nationalism and Soviet communism to win the sympathy of Japanese policy-makers.[628] The rapprochement from the British government was understood as a revival

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[626] The sense of crisis intensified after a series of events, such as the May 30 incident (1925), Chiang Kai-shek's northern expedition (1926), and the Nanking incident (1927).

[627] Army Minister Ugaki Kazushige wrote in his 1926 diary about British interests in reviving the old partnership and how ideal it would be to solve the Chinese problem. In January 1927, General Staff member Matsui Iwane notified the British side that the Japanese army was interested in a joint military dispatch to China. Hosoya (1988:92).

[628] Under Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain, there were people within the government who advocated the revival of the traditional, more forceful approach in order to prevent too much damage to the nation's interests in China. For those who supported this approach, Japan was regarded as an ideal partner to counter Chinese nationalism. This was particularly the case among British officials stationed in Japan and China, such as Ambassador to Tokyo Sir John Tilley. Hosoya (1988:89-90,98).

of the imperialist norm, and strengthened the position of pro-British groups in Japan. The Foreign Ministry's Yoshizawa Kenkichi and Yoshida Shigeru, the *Seiyūkai*'s Mori Tsutomu, and the Kansai business circle were among the active supporters of Anglo-Japanese collaboration. Supported by the favorable normative environment, the pro-British group successfully toppled the cabinet and placed Tanaka Giichi as the new Prime Minister in 1927.

Tanaka Diplomacy was an attempt to present an alternative to the failed Shidehara Diplomacy. Tanaka intended to accomplish this task by returning to the Old Diplomacy, which had succeeded in helping Japan expand its continental influence in the pre-war period. Like his predecessor Shidehara, Tanaka emphasized international cooperation.[629] The cooperation no longer meant the *trilateral* Washington system, however. Rather it focused on *bilateral* relations with other powers, notably Britain.[630] Tanaka believed that, through cooperation with Britain, Russia, and France, Japan should be able to prevent the United States from intervening in Japan's China policy.[631] He also resumed some of the diplomatic tactics of previous years. Tanaka's government was more willing to rely on forceful means, if necessary, in order to protect its special rights in China. In addition, Tanaka employed secret diplomacy, which was discouraged under the Wilsonian

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[629] Tanaka and Shidehara shared the view that Japan would not be able to protect its continental interests without getting an acknowledgement of its right to those interests from other Western powers. Banno (1985:87).

[630] Although the Tanaka Cabinet mostly worked on cultivating relations with Britain, it also made an effort to improve other bilateral ties. Tanaka attempted to introduce American capital to the South Manchurian Railway. By welcoming American capital in Manchuria, Tanaka showed that Japan was not making Manchuria into an exclusive profit sphere for Japan. Because of opposition from the U.S. government, however, this plan did not bear fruit. Tanaka also tried to improve Japan's relations with the Soviet Union, hoping that Soviet-Japan rapprochement would restrain Chinese nationalism. Hosoya (1988:101-103); Iriye (1966i:105).

[631] Banno (1985:85-86).

principles.[632] The Tanaka Cabinet's decision for a Shantung expedition in 1927 was within the framework of Anglo-Saxon joint military dispatch that the Japanese army had advocated. In April, the British government had requested the joint military dispatch to Washington and Tokyo. After Tokyo made a decision to send an expeditionary force, British Field Marshal Milne expressed his satisfaction with Japan's participation.[633]

5.4.4. <u>Third Transformation: Shift from Imperialism to a Policy of Militaristic Expansionism</u>

Tanaka's return to Old Diplomacy did not produce the satisfactory results that had been accomplished in the 1910s. First, Tanaka's reliance on imperial diplomacy did not improve the situation in China, and Sino-Japanese relations continuously deteriorated. Second, Tanaka's attempt to cultivate bilateral relations with other powers also failed to bear fruit. Tensions with the United States continued growing, and the army was concerned with the increasing threat of the Soviets.[634] Tanaka's failure to deliver viable policy accomplishments led to mounting domestic criticism, and made his group's power consolidation difficult.

Meanwhile, the INS continuously posed great uncertainty. While Chinese nationalism remained strong, as was shown in Chang Kai-shek's second northern expedition in 1928, both Washington and London pursued independent, pro-China approaches, outside of the Washington framework.[635] The Washington system that was the central pillar of New Diplomacy in Asia was practically dead by the end of the 1920s.

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[632] Iriye (1966i:101); Hosoya (1988:105).
[633] Hosoya (1988:99-100).
[634] Satō (1969:138-140).
[635] In 1928, the United States independently signed a bilateral agreement with China and approved China's tariff autonomy, which was followed by the U.S. recognition of the Kuomintang (KMT) government four months later. Britain, which had traditionally been closer to the Japanese position with regard to China policy, shifted its course and joined the American move to acknowledge the KMT government as well as its tariff autonomy, which led to further isolation for Japan. Hosoya (1988).

The norm of economic internationalism, another main component of New Diplomacy, collapsed, when many industrialized states abandoned liberal economic policies and shifted towards protectionism after the Great Depression. The rise of fascism in Europe challenged the liberal international order as well. Mussolini established a fascist state in Italy in 1922, and Germany was also moving towards fascism, as Hitler's National Socialism gained domestic popularity. The fascist leaders proposed a completely different world vision from that of liberal internationalism. Geopolitics and pan-movements are the chief examples of alternative visions cultivated by Hitler and Mussolini.

With the disappointment of *Tanaka Diplomacy*, norm contestation heightened in Japan. The Tanaka Cabinet's imperial policy not only failed to produce satisfactory outcomes, but also was de-legitimized when the British policy shifted from imperial tactics to a more sympathetic stance towards the Kuomintang government. Tanaka's main opposition came from two directions. The first opponent group was composed of nationalists, including army hard-liners. Frustrated with the stalemate condition in China, a group of middle-ranking officers in the General Staff and the Kwantung army suggested putting Manchuria under direct Japanese control. The growing concern within the army led it to take an independent approach without consultation with Tokyo. Kōmoto Daisaku, the General Staff of the Kwantung army, plotted for the successful assassination of Zhang Zuolin in 1928, which resulted in the resignation of the Tanaka Cabinet.

The second opposition force to the Tanaka Cabinet was Shidehara's liberal internationalist group. Members of the internationalist group, such as Yoshino Sakuzō,

blamed Tanaka's approach, claiming that his failure proved that Japan should have followed the direction of Shidehara Diplomacy.[636] Following the collapse of the Tanaka Cabinet, Liberal Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi formed a cabinet, appointing Shidehara as a Foreign Minister. The Hamaguchi Cabinet attempted to shift Japan's course back to an internationalist policy. Its decision to go back to the gold standard (1930) as well as Japan's participation and signing of the London Naval Treaty (1930) reflected Hamaguchi's strong belief in internationalism and arms control.[637]

Unlike the early 1920s, however, the INS did not provide a favorable condition for the Hamaguchi Cabinet. Re-introduction of the gold standard was implemented immediately after the Great Depression, and the Japanese economy was devastated when its exports plunged.[638] In the late 1920s, neither internationalists nor old imperialists received enough support from the INS to consolidate its position. As America and Britain took independent approaches towards China, Japan's international isolation deepened. Japan's special rights in Manchuria that used to be acknowledged among Great Powers under the old normative condition were no longer guaranteed as rights under the prevailing normative uncertainty. Meanwhile, rising tension with other Great Powers increased the importance of Manchuria as Japan's strategic base, which left little room for any decision-makers to compromise on the Manchurian issue.[639]

As both internationalist and imperialist approaches failed, the military-nationalists' more aggressive, independent line gained support from both the media and

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[636] Satō (1969:138).
[637] Sakai (1989:76).
[638] Between 1929 and 1931, prices fell by almost 30 percent, and the nominal GNP dropped by about 10 percent. The number of unemployed reached as many as one million, and social unrest increased.
[639] Domestic economic and social hardship also contributed to the significance of Manchuria as Japan's industrial base.

the public. In contrast to the critique from the liberals, the military-nationalists made a case that the failure of Tanaka Diplomacy was because it was not aggressive enough in dealing with China. Rather than relying on cooperation with other powers, the army suggested that Japan's special rights in Manchuria could be protected only by Japan taking independent military action.[640] Based on this belief, the Kwantung army in China began acting independently without consulting the Tokyo government.[641] The Kwantung army's assassination of Zhang Zuolin was carried out against Tokyo's will, but the public nonetheless strongly supported the army's move.[642] The Hamaguchi Cabinet decision to sign the London Naval Treaty came under attack from the naval officers, who, with the right-wing nationalists, launched a propaganda campaign against the Cabinet, including an assassination attempt on Hamaguchi.

The military-nationalists managed to take advantage of the uncertain normative condition to support their agenda. The army made the case that Japan's actions in Manchuria were unavoidable, since China was obstructing the special rights that Japan had justly acquired based on international law. The army's rationale was widely accepted by the media and the public. When the Lytton Report was issued after the Manchurian Incident, it portrayed Japan as being unjustly discriminated against in the international system. The national psyche and the disappointment in the international system led to a

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[640] Satō (1969:138); Iriye (1966i:103); Hosoya (1988:109).

[641] When *genrō* Yamagata Aritomo built a modern military system during the Meiji period, he implemented several measures in order to secure the independence of the military from party politics. Throughout the Meiji and Taishō periods, the military enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy, but Yamagata himself had the military under his control. After Yamagata fell ill in 1922, the army started acting more freely from Tokyo's guidance.

[642] The public also passionately supported the Manchurian Incident—another independent act by the Kwantung army.

public demand for Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations and the establishment of Manchuko.[643]

While none of the opposition groups that were against the military-nationalists was able to gain support from the uncertain normative environment, the military-nationalists highlighted a new pattern in the INS in order to rationalize Japan's path outside of the League of Nations. The rising economic bloc after the Great Depression and the logic of geopolitics under Nazi Germany both provided a normative base for the idea of a new "regionalism" developed in early Shōwa Japan. Intellectuals, such as Rōyama Masamichi and Kamikawa Hikomatsu, political scientists from the University of Tokyo, developed the idea of an East Asian new order. Rōyama and Kamikawa's idea of regionalism was strongly influenced by the German Karl Schmidt's new European order, as well as the international legal order on the American continents represented by the Monroe Doctrine.[644] Relying on the logic of geopolitics imported from Nazi Germany, Rōyama called for the establishment of a regional organization in Asia, similar to the League of Nations.[645] Rōyama later elaborated his regionalism and proposed "*Tōa shin-chitsujo* (East Asian new order)." He predicted the rise of a new European order, centered around Germany and Italy, and one in Asia, led by Japan. Japanese intellectuals in the 1930s also positively reacted to ideas about "re-partition of colonies" in the West. In 1935, U.S. diplomat and politician Edward House wrote an article titled "Necessity of International New Deal." In the article, he suggested fair distribution of world resources

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[643] Ogata (1970:46).

[644] In his article written in 1935, Rōyama (1938:318-319) stressed an importance of geopolitics. Mitani (1972:153-154,162); Sakai (1998).

[645] Rōyama (1941:32). Ex-foreign ministry official Kashima Morinosuke also advocated pan-Asianist regionalism – the establishment of a new peace organization in Asia. Kashima's logic was based on pan-Europeanism, developed by Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi. Mitani (1972:140, 142).

and colonies.[646] House's idea of redistribution of world resources was welcomed by people like Konoe Fumimaro, as a sympathetic stance towards Japan.[647]

Japanese foreign policy from the 1930s on was the product of a search for an alternative after the failure of *Shidehara's New Diplomacy* and *Tanaka's Old Diplomacy*. While the United States and Britain gradually abandoned their traditional relations with China and built new relations by accepting the nationalist government's demands, the Japanese position, which persisted in its special rights guaranteed in the old agreements, became more and more isolated. In the end, the fact that most policy makers, nationalists and liberals alike, could not come to any compromise about Japan's rights in Manchuria prevented Japan from joining the United States and Britain in accepting China as a new member of the international system. Under increasing security threats from China and the Soviet Union, economic difficulties, and international isolation due to rising tension with the United States, the nationalist military managed to sell their agenda to the public and media, identifying Japan as the victim of Western discrimination and injustice. While the army pursued a policy of aggressive expansionism in China and Manchuria, intellectuals justified the act in the context of new regionalism in Asia led by Japan. With the self-righteous regionalism that made Japan a liberator of Asian nations from Western discrimination, the public and media supported the military-nationalists' choice to leave the international community and created the East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere led by the Japanese empire.

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[646] House's idea was supported by British cabinet members, including Philip Snowden and Sir Samuel Hoare.
[647] Shōji (2004:126-128).

5.5. Conclusion

The INS underwent a major transformation after World War I. On one hand, previously dominant imperialist norms were waning as the traditional imperial powers, such as Germany and Russia, went into turmoil as a result of the war. On the other hand, the United States emerged as a new world leader, with President Woodrow Wilson taking a strong initiative to architect a new international order. Wilson's liberal internationalism gained momentum in the early 1920s, as the establishment of the League of Nations and the success of the Washington Naval Treaty show, but the INS went into flux again by the latter half of the 1920s. The new liberal international order faced a number of challenges from the Communist Soviet Union, Chinese nationalism, and fascism in Europe. Facing this challenging international environment, including the start of the Great Depression, even the founders of the new order, the United States and Britain, failed to support the still-fragile normative principles, increasing normative uncertainty in the 1930s.

Norm selection and norm contestation in interwar Japan reflected the heterogeneous and unstable normative conditions described above. Unlike the pre-World War I period when the domestic opinions had been more or less unified in support for imperialism, domestic interpretation of the postwar world was largely divided. Some clung to the old imperialist norms, and some endorsed Wilson's internationalism. The nationalists highlighted Western racism and portrayed the world as one divided into "have" and "have-nots," while a small minority group accepted the reality of Chinese nationalism sought a new regional order that would satisfy the Chinese nationalists. Each of these distinctive groups formed political coalitions and engaged in contestation over

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different policy options, resulting in a series of policy shifts in Japan during the interwar period.

Under this heterogeneous, unstable INS, domestic opinions were divided and norm contestation was intensified. Consequently, the norm instantiation process played a critical role in determining the final political outcome during the interwar period. Several dramatic transformations of Japanese foreign policy between World War I and the 1930s reflected the changes in the INS. Different domestic coalitions were empowered by ascending norms, or discredited by descending norms, which resulted in policy change.

The realization of *Shidehara Diplomacy* was a prime example of the norm instantiation process. The popularity of Wilsonian internationalist norms in the West, and the support of these norms by many European states and the Wilsonian administration, strengthened the position of Japanese internationalists. Both realist and nationalist groups acknowledged American and British dominance in the aftermath of the war, and endorsed the Wilsonian initiative in the West. Shidehara Diplomacy started facing problems as the Washington system disintegrated in the mid-1920s. Foreign Minister Shidehara's failure to cope with Chinese nationalism and the increasing gap between the United States, Britain, and Japan over the China policy weakened the political position of Shidehara's liberal group, and the Tanaka Cabinet replaced the government in the late 1920s. Tanaka shifted the foreign policy direction back to the prewar imperial diplomacy did not produce the same satisfactory results in the late 1920s. The Great Powers' treatment of Chinese nationalism began changing. The communist Soviets actively supported the nationalist movement in China, while the United States was gradually moving towards accepting the demands of the Chinese nationalist government. The British government's

decision to follow the American path critically changed the meaning of nationalism in the normative system. There was a growing perception among the Great Powers that Chinese nationalism, and its challenge to imperial powers, was no longer considered a revisionist act. *Tanaka Diplomacy*'s return to the old imperial diplomacy failed to anticipate this changing normative environment. The collapse of *Tanaka Diplomacy* was paved a way for the military-nationalists who dominated the decision-making circle and re-shifted Japanese foreign policy towards a radical, expansionist approach.

6. CONCLUSION

This dissertation set out to map the complex relationship between the international normative system and a state's security/foreign policy. The Japanese case between the 1860s and the 1930s clearly shows that international normative forces had a critical impact on domestic actors' thinking and the foreign policy decision-making process. The dominance of the imperialist norms in the beginning of the twentieth century, the rise of the Wilsonian liberal norms immediately after World War I, and the demise of it during the 1920s, all contributed to the formation of Japanese domestic ideas. These international norms not only helped construct actors' image of the world and national identity, but also empowered them in advancing their political agendas in the policy contestation process. The subsequent section summarizes new insights regarding Japanese political development gained by the norm-driven change model.

6.1. Summary of the Case Study: The Norm-Driven Change Model and Japanese Political Development

6.1.1. <u>Roles of International Norms in Japanese Foreign Policy Making</u>

First, the level of uncertainty in the international normative system strongly correlates with the degree of domestic policy contestation. The more uncertain the normative environment is, the more disagreements and heated debates emerge during the domestic decision-making process. For example, during the first two periods, the relative dominance of European imperialist norms created a more stable normative environment. Under this circumstance, foreign policy establishments in Japan were able to form a

consensus around the dominant international norms. In contrast, the interwar period witnessed a high level of normative uncertainty. Key policy-makers were divided into internationalists, traditional imperialists, and nationalists, and the policy contestation among these three groups intensified.

This leads to the second effect of normative uncertainty—it facilitates policy change at the domestic level. The case study reveals that when the normative system was relatively stable and homogeneous, this led to a consistent foreign policy in Japan. In contrast, a highly uncertain normative environment during the interwar period resulted in several major policy shifts. The uncertain normative environment created a discrepancy between Japan's policy and other states' behavior.[648] When policy makers acknowledge the gap between their policy and others', they are likely to reevaluate their worldview in order to readjust their course, potentially causing policy changes.

Third, prevailing international norms empower one domestic faction at the expense of others by providing legitimacy and political resources to the group adhering to the norm. When domestic factions cite international norms to advance their agendas, a *favorable* normative condition for a particular group greatly increases its chances of prevailing over other groups in the process of domestic political contestation.

In the case of the early Meiji period, European states dominated the international system, and as a result, European interstate practices were what the Westernizers relied on in order to win domestic support for their policies. For example, when the Meiji leaders faced a challenge from the *"son'nō, jōi"* activists who opposed westernization policies, the *genrō* emphasized European liberal thought as proof of the justice of the

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[648] The discrepancy can be recognized when policy-makers of a state meet situations where their own policy does not produce an anticipated result, or the policies of others deviate significantly from what is expected.

Western states. Although most Meiji leaders were aware of the discrimination found in Western diplomatic practices, they nonetheless stressed liberal European principles, such as freedom, democracy, international reciprocity, and equality among nations, in order to ease the domestic anti-Western sentiment.[649]

When Japan was slowly transforming into an imperial power in Asia at the end of the nineteenth century, policy makers again attempted to link Japan's overseas expansion with conventional Western thought and conduct. "[O]verseas emigration and settlement as well as colonization were the means through which the European powers were competing with each other in a struggle for power and wealth;" "imperialism and colonialism…are the great currents of the world today, and the nation must develop in accordance with the currents."[650] These are the phrases commonly used in order to make the case that Japan must follow suit. By the time World War I was over, Japan ascended to become one of the three major imperial powers in Asia, alongside the United States and Britain.

The highly uncertain normative environment intensified the Japanese norm contestation during the interwar period. Three domestic factions, Wilsonian internationalists, traditional imperialists, and nationalists, tried to increase the appeal of their respective positions by drawing on international norms. The turbulence in the international normative system strongly affected the course of norm contestation. The rise and fall of Wilsonian internationalism, in particular, had a critical impact on which faction succeeded at a given time.

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[649] Uete (1971:60-64,68); Okazaki (1994:71,75).
[650] The first quote comes from the opening remarks of the Colonization Society, a social organization established in 1893. The second one is an excerpt from Tōgō Minoru's book entitled *Nihon Shokumin ron (On Japanese Colonization)*. Iriye (1972:40-41,131-132).

Wilsonian liberal principles were first imported to Japan through an active campaign by participants of the Paris Peace Conference. Makino Nobuaki, an official envoy to the conference, argued that the world had entered a new stage, and that the international normative environment now favored a peaceful mode of expansion, instead of the continuation of imperialism.[651] The Washington Naval Conference and the abolition of the Anglo-Japanese alliance validated Makino's statement. By 1922, most policy makers acknowledged that the New Diplomacy had replaced the Old Diplomacy of imperialism as a new dominant international norm.[652]

By the late-1920s, however, the stumbling Washington system and a lack of notable accomplishment by Shidehara Diplomacy made room for opponents of the internationalists to promote their agendas. The traditional imperialists were the first to grab this opportunity. They focused on British interests in resuming the Anglo-Japanese bilateral partnership in managing the situation in China. As the trilateral cooperation among the United States, Britain, and Japan was falling apart, Britain's desire for rapprochement with Japan empowered the imperialist group in Japan.[653] Encouraged by favorable signs from Britain, the traditional imperialists sought to resume bilateral cooperation with Britain in order to protect their interests in China. This became an official policy line when Tanaka Giichi formed his Cabinet in 1927.

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[651] Iriye (1972:232).

[652] Prime Minister Takahashi Korekiyo made a remark that "the World War had brought about fundamental changes in the foreign policies of the powers. They had recognized the impossibility of plotting expansion through force and the need to cooperate with one another to promote justice in international relations." Even the army, which was traditionally an advocator of imperial expansion, admitted that international cooperation was the new rule and using old methods of expansion were out of the question. Iriye (1972:244-245); Dingman (1974:112).

[653] People belonging to this group were the army's Ugaki Kazushige; Foreign Ministry's Yoshizawa Ken'kichi, Yoshida Shigeru; and *Seiyūkai*'s Mori Tsutomu. Hosoya (1988:95-96).

The second challenge to the internationalists came from the nationalists. The nationalist group fundamentally differed from the other two groups in its stance of challenging Anglo-Saxon dominance. The nationalists did not believe that Japan's special rights in China would be secured through cooperation with the United States and Britain. Instead, their antagonism towards the Anglo-Saxon bloc led to the building of Japan's *independent* policy. In order to make their position more appealing, the nationalists focused their effort on pointing out Western injustice and emphasizing the discrimination Japan had suffered by the West. They argued that the Anglo-Saxon states attempted to establish a status quo that is to their advantage, and helped them to "devour small countries economically and permanently relegate late-developing countries to second-class status."[654] Racial discrimination, such as the rejection of the Racial Equality Clause and U.S. immigration laws, were often highlighted as proof of Western injustice. The nationalists' strategy of regarding Japan as a "have-not" and the Anglo-Saxon nations as the "have" group was quite effective at convincing the public when the Japanese economy stumbled in the late 1920s. The nationalists claim that the Anglo-Saxon bloc was to be blamed for Japan's suffering by not giving up artificial economic barriers and discriminatory treatment of different races had widespread appeal to the Japanese public.[655]

The international normative environment in the 1930s—the rise of economic protectionism and pan movements—worked to the Japanese nationalists' advantage vis-à-vis the internationalists. The importance of Manchuria was linked with the necessity for self-sufficient industrial economies for Japan's survival. Reflecting the normative system

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[654] This is an excerpt from Konoe Fumimaro's writing in 1918. See Konoe (1995:13-14).

[655] Examples include British self-sufficient economic policies vis-à-vis its colonies that were against Open Door principles, and U.S. immigration restrictions. Asada (1984:40).

in the 1930s, intellectuals closely tied with the government came up with new pan-Asianist regionalism in justifying Japan's conduct in Asia. Drawing on German geopolitics and the American Monroe Doctrine, scholars proposed *"Tōa shin-chitsujo,"* a new Asian regional order led by Japan.[656] The idea of new regionalism was welcomed by the Japanese public, serving as a foundation for the East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere arising in a later period.

6.1.2. <u>Impact of International Norms on the Rise of Japanese "Revisionism"</u>

The previous section reviewed the international normative effects on Japan's foreign policy making. In this section, I will analyze how the international normative system influenced the rise of Japanese "revisionism" in the 1930s. To make an accurate account of the timing of Japanese revisionism, a particular emphasis is placed on the transformation of the normative environment during the 1920s.

The changing normative implications of Chinese nationalism played a major role in the emergence of Japanese revisionism. Prior to World War I, Western imperial powers and Japan competed over special interests in China, and any resistance from the Chinese side was to be suppressed through joint efforts by the imperial states. These states shared the norm that the imperial powers were allowed to exploit China.

Western views and approaches towards Chinese nationalism underwent a significant transformation during the interwar period. Wilson's *Fourteen Points* acknowledged the right of self-determination, an important step for a Western state to acknowledge the right of China to recover its sovereignty. The Chinese nationalists' effort to regain Chinese sovereignty did not immediately bear fruit after the war, but gradually

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[656] The idea of *"Tōa shin-chitsujo"* was developed by Tokyo University professor Rōyama Masamichi. Mitani (1972:140,142).

some important changes took place throughout the 1920s. The communist Soviet Union made the first move in giving up its rights and sought an equal partnership with the nationalist government. By the end of the 1920s, both the United States and Britain shifted their positions in implementing a more conciliatory approach to Chinese nationalism. As the United States and Britain began accepting the demands of the Chinese nationalist government, a gap between the Anglo-Saxon states and Japan widened. The more Japan persistently refused to make a compromise about its special interests in Manchuria, the more isolated Japan became internationally. When the military-nationalists began taking a more aggressive approach to maintain Japan's control over Manchuria, Japan's conduct was increasingly seen as revisionist acts by the Anglo-Saxon states.

6.1.3. <u>Different Reactions under the same INS?—Domestic Conditionality</u>

The norm-driven change model asserts that uncertainty caused by a heterogeneous and unstable INS instigates change at the domestic level. Since not all states have the same reaction under equivalent normative uncertainty, however, it is vital to discuss conditionality (or intervening variables) that differentiates political outcomes. In order to understand a variation in state reactions, one needs to examine domestic attributes in addition to analyzing the impact of the INS. I argue that while the INS provides an initial trigger for domestic change, it is internal attributes that ultimately determine the *exact* impact of the INS in a specific domestic context.[657]

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[657] The norm-driven change model emphasizes the interaction between the systemic and domestic levels. This is based on a conviction that looking only at one of the levels is not sufficient for understanding a political outcome that is typically a product of a combination of factors. On this point, Jeffrey Legro (2005:ch1) states that "ideas intersect with other factors in specific ways to cause outcomes."

What kind of state is more prone to respond to a turbulent, uncertain, and heterogeneous normative system in such a militant and aggressive manner as imperial Japan? Which domestic conditions combine with normative uncertainty to produce such outcomes? The first domestic factor I would like to highlight is regime type, particularly the relations between non-democratic, authoritarian regimes and assertive, self-destructing policies. A number of political scientists have pointed out the relationship between domestic regime type and the likelihood of a certain kind of foreign policy. According to Democratic Peace theory, for example, non-democratic, authoritarian regimes are more likely to pursue aggressive policies that would destabilize the international system.[658] With regard to imperial Japan, several scholars emphasize the role of political institutions as the prime cause of Japan's militant, assertive, and self-destructive policy from the 1930s onward.[659]

The second internal factor that contributed to Japan's policy shift in the 1930s was the policy failure under the previous leadership. A decision-maker's motivation to change a policy often depends on the success or failure of the current foreign policy. As long as the existing policy produces socially desirable consequences, both the decision makers and the public find little reason to reassess the policy, while the opponents have few tools for convincing a majority of others to change the current course. In contrast, if the existing policy fails to produce a desirable outcome or to meet societal expectations, it opens room for critique and reflection and provides political opponents with a window of

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[658] For a detailed account of Democratic Peace theory, see Doyle (1997:chapter 7, 8).
[659] Examples of such works are: Snyder's (1991) study of "cartelized systems" and the impact of the late industrialization on Japan's strong state, Mansfield and Snyder's (2005) analysis on the danger of the transitional democracy, and Hosoya's (1971) examination of the fragmented, decentralized decision-making system in imperial Japan.

opportunity to push for an alternative approach.[660] The failure of the existing policy does not necessarily lead to an aggressive policy, but it increases the *possibility of policy change* to a new direction. In the case of Japan, a series of policy failures—first by the liberal Shidehara administration, and then by the traditional-imperialist Tanaka administration—resulted in a third alternative policy run by the military-nationalists.

The third internal factor that differentiates states' reactions under the normative uncertainty is contextual. Whether policy-makers of a state decide to challenge the international system depends on the level of contentment with the existing normative system. In other words, states unsatisfied with the present system are more likely to challenge the status quo, even by forceful means, than satisfied states. A state's resentment towards the international system can emerge when norms within the INS put the state in an unfavorable position. With regard to imperial Japan, for example, the norm of Western racism was recognized in Japan as evidence of the social division between the West and the East, where Japan was excluded from the superior Western club. As such, Western racism contributed to the rise of Japanese nationalism and helped the military-nationalists to advance their agenda. One can evaluate the degree of a state's contentment with the system by carefully tracing domestic opinions by elites and the public.

To summarize this section, I have offered the role of the authoritarian regime, policy failures, and a negative normative environment as three domestic factors that contributed to pushing Japan's policy towards a militant one under normative uncertainty. None of these attributes would have necessitated Japan's over-expansionist policy by itself. When they were combined, however, the turbulent INS provided a fertile

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[660] For a detailed account of the relations between the success/failure of the existing orthodoxy and the potentiality of change, see Legro (2005:29-35).

environment for the military-nationalists to advance their policy agenda.[661] These international and domestic conditions together made the resulting assertive Japanese policy possible.

6.2. Theoretical Advantages of the Norm-Driven Change Model

The norm-driven change model sheds new light on Japanese political development by emphasizing the role of *systemic ideas* in foreign policy decision-making. Most conventional studies have focused on either material elements of the international system or purely domestic factors. First, by investigating the effect of international culture and norms, the norm-driven change model allows us to discover new aspects of Japanese imperialism. The model argues that Japan's initial expansion into Asia in the late nineteenth century was a product of *learning* from its Western counterparts. This is completely different from the realist account that posits that states are doomed to unending competition in an anarchic international system, which naturally encourages statesmen to engage in expansionist security strategy.[662] Emphasis on states learning from the international normative environment equips us with a more flexible toolkit for explaining state behavior.

Second, the norm-driven change model allows us to examine the interaction between international and domestic norm formation. One of the analytical advantages of the model is its ability to uncover how the international norms help construct domestic

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[661] The military-nationalist faction was able to take advantage of Western racism in order to claim Western injustice to Japan; Japan's fragile democracy and the institutionalized military independence enabled the military to "highjack" the decision-making system; and Japanese internationalists' and traditional imperialists' attempts to solve the Manchurian problem failed due to normative uncertainty—and all contributed to the development of Japan's aggressive, militant policy in the 1930s.
[662] Snyder (1991:21-22).

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ideas. This enables us to determine the source of domestic norms and culture, which is often unclear in purely domestic cultural explanations. Knowing the source of policy content compensates for weaknesses in the realist approach as well. Realist theories, neorealism in particular, are frequently criticized for their inability to predict foreign policies.[663]

The norm-selection process intends to overcome these limitations in the conventional analyses by revealing the process by which domestic ideas are constructed. The case study discusses how Japan's initial encounter with the West left a strong impression of power politics on Meiji *genrō*. The *genrō*'s early experience made them interpret and act in the world in a realist manner, always fearful of the Western powers. In the case of the liberal internationalists, their exposure to an Anglo-Saxon type of diplomacy in their youth had a long-lasting impact on their careers in the later period.[664] In contrast, expansionists in the army and navy, who took charge of the radical aggressive policy of the 1930s, began their military careers around the time of the Russo-Japanese war. Their youth corresponded with the period of Japan's continental expansion and economic progress. Consequently, these officers were convinced that imperial expansion and modernization go hand in hand, and that once a state stops expanding, it experiences a downturn.[665] These examples highlight how an actor's early experience critically influences their worldview, which strongly affects their policy prescriptions.

Third, the model pays attention to the timing of Japanese "revisionism" in the 1930s, by comparing the Japanese political development in the previous period. By

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[663] Elman (1996).

[664] People, such as Shidehara Kijūrō, Katō Takaaki, Makino Nobuaki, Chinda Sutemi, and Ishii Kikujirō, had the experience of learning from American legal advisor Henry William Denison when they were young, career diplomats. Asada (1974:310).

[665] Perutsu (1974:161,165).

focusing on the timing, the model opens the door to investigating important questions, such as why the military-nationalists were able to gain control in the 1930s, but not in the 1920s, and what enabled the Japanese internationalists to dominate decision-making in the 1920s. An inquiry into the exact timing of revisionism intends to overcome the determinism often found in past conventional analyses. Scholars who emphasize the fragmented decision-making structure, or the timing of Japan's industrialization, as a cause of Japan's aggressive over-expansionist policy fail to address the issue of why the shift to radical policy did not happen until the 1930s.[666] Those who highlight the nationalistic political culture or the revisionist state preference of Japan also face the same problem.[667] The norm-driven change model studies a relatively long time-span, rather than focusing on a single point in time. Its process-oriented approach enables us to analyze the very dynamic political development of modern Japan. By examining and comparing several critical policy changes that happened throughout the period, the model provides a more-comprehensive account of why Japan abandoned its status quo tradition and shifted towards a revisionist path.

6.3. Further Applications

This dissertation presents a novel approach for accounting for both systemic and domestic factors in determining political outcomes, and uses the historical case of imperial Japan in order to evaluate the analytical validity of the norm-driven change model. In this section, I will analyze two other empirical cases—one historical and one contemporary—in the context of the norm-driven change model. The first case is

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[666] Hosoya (1971); Scalapino (1953); Snyder (1991).
[667] Schweller (1998); Smethurst (1974).

Germany during the interwar period. The rise of fascism and its over-expansionist policy will be examined from an international normative perspective, which will reveal how the prevailing normative uncertainty under the same period affected two different states, but brought about a similar political outcome. The second case is contemporary Iran, a state that is often regarded as revisionist in the contemporary world. Applying the norm-driven change model, I will analyze the impact of the contemporary INS on Iranian domestic politics and how its current anti-West posture has developed as a result.

6.3.1. <u>Germany during the Interwar Period</u>

Before discussing Weimar Germany and how the INS affected its establishment and eventual demise, one should look into the normative foundations of Germany since the nineteenth century in order to establish a better understanding of the subsequent period. Under the homogeneous INS of the late 19th century, when imperialism was at its peek, two lines of imperialist ideology emerged in Germany. One was the concept of *Weltpolitik*, an extension of economic imperialism that called for formal and informal imperial expansion in support of the industrial sector. The other was the notion of *Lebensraum*, a more aggressive version of imperialism and an outgrowth of migrationist colonialism that emphasized Germany's need for overseas settlements.[668] These two ideologies served as the normative base of German imperialist policies from the Wilhelmian era. German foreign policy during World War I was strongly characterized by *Lebensraum*-oriented war objectives of territorial annexation, pushed by conservative groups, such as the Pan-German League.[669]

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[668] Smith (1986:18-19).
[669] Smith (1986:19).

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When Germany lost the war, the defeated state was forced into the postwar normative system architected by the victorious Allies dominated by the Untied States. The conditions for the armistice U.S. President Woodrow Wilson imposed were that he would not engage in a settlement negotiation with the autocratic German empire. In order to end the war, Germany had no choice but to accept the terms laid out by Wilson, which empowered the SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany) that supported the establishment of German Republic and a policy of international cooperation along with Wilsonian norms.[670]

Although the Wilsonian norms managed to influence the formation of the Weimar Republic, the INS in Europe was highly uncertain in the early 1920s, which contributed to domestic divisions in Germany. Despite Wilson's attempts to ensure his *Fourteen Points* at the Paris Peace Conference, France and Britain's refusal to adopt its core principles ultimately killed Wilson's initiative, and harsh terms of indemnity were imposed upon Germany. The Treaty of Versailles, as well as the French and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, reminded many Germans of the harsh reality of power politics and increased disappointment in Wilsonian idealism.[671] Skepticism of Wilsonian norms resulted in the continued domination by German conservative groups, which intensified norm contestation between the conservatives and moderate groups supporting arms reduction and international cooperation.[672] Under the uncertain normative

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[670] Wilsonian influence resulted in the initial strength of the SPD that ensured major constitutional changes in October 1918. The Russian revolution in 1917 also had a significant influence on German workers and soldiers, who demanded the abdication of Wilhelm II and the proclamation of a republic. Mochida and Miyake (1982:109,161); Berghahn (2006:52-53).

[671] Mochida and Miyake (1982:162).

[672] The conservative groups, that were also supporters of *Lebensraum* ideology, viewed the 1918 revolution as "unnatural" and the Versailles treaty as "unjust." For them, once the current temporary unnatural situation ended, Germany's colonies ought to be returned and the direction suggested by the *Lebensraum*

environment, the conservative, right-wing groups continuously challenged the Weimar Republic, including the Beer Hall Putsch in 1923, a failed *coup d'état* organized by Adolf Hitler.

The Dawes Plan of 1924 and the following period of European détente in the mid-1920s provided a positive normative environment for a moderate domestic group, led by Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann, to build.[673] An American initiative to help German war reparations by injecting American capital resulted in a relative weakening of the hard-liners' position and strengthening of Stresemann's soft line approach based on co-operation with the Western capitalist countries. Stresemann's cooperative approach brought about a series of foreign policy accomplishments, including the Locarno Treaty (1925), the withdrawal of the French and Belgian occupation troops from the Ruhr (1925), and German membership in the League of Nations (1926).[674]

Stresemann's moderate *Weltpolitik* approach collapsed with the normative transformation caused by the Great Depression. The rise of protectionist sentiment across the industrial world, and the idea of direct government intervention to secure markets completely free of competition, helped renew the appeal of the concept of economic autarky in connection with *Lebensraum* in Germany. Facing social and economic chaos accompanying mass unemployment, those who supported and succeeded in Stresemann's policy aims had difficulty in eliciting consensus within the business community, while

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ideology was re-justified. The German conservatives maintained their support for the *Lebensraum* argument, which was reinforced by the geopoliticians of the 1920s. Smith (1986:204, 209).

[673] Stresemann's outlook was essentially that of a *Weltpolitiker*. Stresemann did not deny the reversion of the old German colonies and an expansion of German economic influence overseas. Stresemann and most of the senior Foreign Ministry personnel, however, agreed that the foremost priority for current Germany was to obtain the cooperation of the other Western European powers in diplomatic matters and to build a system of European economic relations dominated by German industry. Once these primary objectives had been met, then the reversion of the colonial empire would be obtained without difficulty. Smith (1986:199, 215).

[674] Berghahn (1982:99-100).

Hitler successfully made his mass appeal by relying on the *Lebensraum*-oriented ideologies, such as economic autarky and Karl Haushofer's geopolitics.[675] The conservative, right-wing groups that had opposed postwar international treaties were rejuvenated by Hitler's imperialist thrust, an aggressive version of the *Lebensraum* ideology, which resulted in the downfall of the fragile Weimar Republic.

6.3.2. Contemporary Iran

The norm-driven change model serves as a useful analytical tool for examining the contemporary cases of revisionist states, such as Iran. The rise of an anti-Western regime in Iran, led by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his revisionist policies such as Iran's persistence in developing nuclear capabilities, can be attributed to changes in the INS under the current Bush administration. Generally speaking, the post Cold War normative system has not seen an ideological cleavage on as wide a scale as the (Communist) East and the (Capitalist) West division seen during the Cold War period. Since the events of September 11, 2001, however, a series of speeches and policies conducted by Western states, especially those by the Bush administration, contributed to a growing ideological dichotomy between the West and the Islamic world.

Responsibility for generating this new phenomenon in the INS lies with both the Western and the Muslim sides. On one hand, the Bush administration's attack on "Islamic fundamentalism" and "militant Islam" created an easily recognizable "evil other" versus "us" mentality.[676] On the other hand, Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda group repeatedly

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[675] Smith (1986:211-212,218-219,243).

[676] With rhetoric such as the "war on terror," the Middle East, the Arabs, and Islam have been thrust into popular consciousness of Western people. Hunt (2002:418-419).

emphasize the cleavage in an attempt to unify the Muslim world against the West. The result has been the growth of an anti-American, Islamic identity in the Middle East.[677]

In the case of Iran, normative divisions between the Islamic and Western worlds had more immediate meaning, since Iran was singled out as a "terrorist state" along with only a few others by the Bush administration.[678] The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 increased the antagonism towards the West even further. As the position of pro-American, moderate domestic groups weakened with the rise of this anti-Western sentiment, a hard-liner and populist leader, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, emerged victorious in the 2005 Presidential election.[679]

Ahmadinejad's success is largely attributed to his articulation of a new Iranian identity under the current normative environment. Portraying Iran as "a big cultural, economic, and military player in the region," or a leader of "a Muslim bloc that could rival the United States, Europe, and China for global influence" had great popular appeal when people of the Islamic nations increasingly see a conflict looming between the West and Islam.[680] The current Iranian regime is a prime example where the growing Muslim identity encouraged political leaders to take anti-Western postures to distract the public from growing domestic economic and social problems, and to crush reformers by taking

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[677] Compared with the period under the Bush (senior) and Clinton administrations, the current Bush administration has become steadily more unpopular in the Middle East. "(T)he Arab world perceives Bush junior as racist, anti-Islamic and biased in favor of Israel, both politically and religiously." See Al-Jassem (2003:35).

[678] Bush administration's attacking of a particular group of states as "terrorist states" in linking them with the 9/11 attacks caused strong repercussions by these targeted states. For example, in his state of the union address in January 2002, Bush attacked Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as an "Axis of Evil." The urgency to fight against these "terrorist states" was also articulated in the National Security Strategy of the United States published in September 2002.

[679] On this point, Peter Canellos claims that Bush's declaration that Iran formed an "Axis of Evil" invited a self-defensive reaction by Tehran and played right into the hands of Iran's anti-American hard-liners." *Boston Globe* (4/25/2006) A3.

[680] Hunt (2002:423). "Iranians debate parameters for a global role," *Boston Globe* (9/5/2006) A1, 9.

advantage of the increasing skepticism among the public about a harmonious co-existence with the West.

6.3.3. <u>Comparative Analysis across Three Empirical Cases</u>

Applying the norm-driven change model, the preceding brief examinations of interwar Germany and contemporary Iran reveal the critical impact the INS had on the domestic politics and foreign policy decisions of these countries. The empirical case of interwar Germany presents interesting similarities and differences compared with the Japanese case. The major differences occurred during the norm selection process. Despite being exposed to the same INS, differences in the domestic context led to vary different interpretations of the INS by domestic actors across states. As for interwar Japan, the main focuses included the fate of the Washington system and issues of racial equality between Japan and the West. In contrast, German domestic politics was most affected the kinds of norms that dictated European interstate politics. Unique domestic situations resulted in the emergence of different political coalitions in each country. In Japan, the normative uncertainty led to the rise of three factions, internationalists, imperialists, and nationalists. In Germany, the normative uncertain created a rivalry between a moderate *Weltpolitik* faction and a right-wing conservative *Lebensraum* faction. Despite these differences, normative uncertainty played a similar role in intensifying norm contestation, and ascending and descending norms influenced the course of domestic contestation in similar manners.

The Iranian case highlights the critical impact of ideological divisions in the INS on creating a revisionist state. In the case of Japan, the *perceived* cleavage between the West and the East (Orient) had always been a sensitive issue for the Japanese, and was

repeatedly highlighted by the nationalist group in their attempt to increase their public appeal. When the military-nationalists finally took power in the 1930s, the East-West division combined with a strong distrust of the Western world served as a normative foundation for their aggressive, independent policies. The Iranian case follows a similar pattern in which a growing perception of the normative cleavage between the West and the Muslim world contributed to the rise of anti-Western nationalists and empowerment of hard-line domestic groups.

These examples show how the INS at any given time is interpreted by states using a domestic lens that is unique to each state's history. In this context, the norm-driven change model can be used in many cases as a way of explaining and possibly predicting the influence that changes in the INS might have on potentially revisionist states. Taken together, the model effectively accounts for both systemic and domestic factors in determining political outcomes.

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